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Within the present context of globalization, implementations of Western originated and 
designed information systems (IS) in non-Western contexts are commonplace. This can 
create a cross-cultural context, given the IS are embedded with the culture of the social 
context in which they originate and are designed. An exemplar of such cross-cultural 
implementation is the global implementation of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
software, a packaged business information system. I investigate an under-researched 
topic in organizational studies: In a cross-cultural context, how do organizations create a 
working ERP system through the exercise of power? I use grounded theory to analyze 
eight month-long qualitative case studies of two contrasting manufacturing 
organizations in South India—a local public organization and a Western private 
multinational organization. I identify two cyclical processes that actors employ to create 
a working ERP system: negotiating technology frames and enacting technology frames.  
A technology frame, a widely used notion in the IS literature and the Social 
Construction Of Technology (SCOT) literature, is a cognitive structure that actors use to 
make sense of technology. I focus on the process of negotiating technology frames to 
show that cross-cultural ERP software—an embodiment of contrasting norms—is a 
result of multiple actors shifting technology frames over time in their attempts to impose 
the frames that embody their interests over others. Thus, in use, a technology frame 
becomes a sensegiving discursive resource to mobilize and consolidate actors’ interests. 
 Actors combine the exercise of discursive power with the use of coercive means to 
manufacture a seemingly shared consensus on the sensemaking of ERP software and its 
modifications. I call this “consensus” institutional closure. The “consensual” technology 
frames are translated into software codes and enacted resulting in organizational changes 
that lead to the next cycle. In this process, the decisions on ERP modifications are more 
significantly explainable by negotiators’ political interests than by other factors. 
Highlighting institutional closures, I question the breadth of sharedness of sensemaking, 
an assumption in organizational sensemaking literature, and contribute to both the 
SCOT literature and the IS studies. I also develop another novel concept, technology 
non-affordance.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
NEGOTIATING FOR A CROSS-CULTURAL  
WORKING INFORMATION SYSTEM 
Contemporary organizations are increasingly choosing to purchase modifiable 
standard software products rather than build customized systems within their local 
Information Technology (IT) departments. As Sawyer (2001) notes, the 
implementation of standard software is different from traditional software or 
Information System (IS) implementation both because of the nature of the IS 
development activities and the partnership with the vendors and the implementation 
consultants. Organizations purchase standard software systems from vendors and ask 
them or their representatives, namely implementation consultants, to tailor the systems 
to fit organizations’ needs. This fitting results often in customization or modification 
of the software (Brehm, Heinzl, & Markus, 2001; Glass, 1998).  
 
Conversely, organizations also fit their local needs to the standard software, resulting 
in adoption of the software without significant modification (Davenport, 1998; 2000; 
Glass, 1998).  Usually, because of the modular nature of many standard software 
products both adoption and modification occur in a single implementation—some 
modules or sub-modules of the software are modified while some others are retained 
(e.g. Wagner, Scott, & Galliers, 2006). Modification results in extra efforts, cost, and 
time, may times leading to project overruns (Bingi, Sharma & Godla, 2001; Hong & 
Kim, 2002; Kremers & Dissel, 2000; Markus, Petrtie, & Axlin, 2000; Soh, Kein, & 
Tay-Yap, 2000). Since the objective of organizations has to be to get a working 
information system within reasonable time and cost, the choice between modification 
and adoption may create tensions and negotiations. In this context, my study raises an 
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empirical question: How do organizations construct a working information system?  
 
The context of my study is the implementation of a modifiable modular standard 
software, namely Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) technology. The off-the-shelf 
ERP software, which I call “standard ERP1”, contains standard business practices 
(Davenport, 2000) as they are practiced and taken for granted in Western business 
contexts. ERP has been labeled as the ‘technology of the firm’ by popular media 
(Davenport, 2000). The last half of the 21st centaury has been heralded ‘The Enterprise 
Resource Planning Revolution’ (Ross & Vitale, 2000) with enterprise system having 
been implemented by most Fortune 500 companies (Kumar & van Hillegersberg, 
2000). Business leaders, persuaded by the concept of an emerging ‘global market 
place’ (see Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999; Castells, 2009), were 
enamored with the technology’s promise to streamline organizational activities, 
eliminate duplication of efforts and data, and co-ordinate business operations 
successfully across geographically dispersed locations, even globally (Davenport, 
2000; Markus & Tanis, 2000). By 2008, ERP had been implemented in all six 
continents (Nah, Faja, & Cata, 2001). The spread of ERP is not only across the globe 
but also includes different types and scales of industry. Although the current 
generation of ERP systems evolved from technology designed for manufacturing 
industry (Klaus, Rosemann, & Gable, 2000), it has been implemented in many other 
types of industries, such as service industries (Botta-Genoulaz & Millet, 2006), 
government and non-profit organizations (Kumar, Maheshwari, & Kumar, 2002), and 
even higher education (Allen & Kern, 2001; Mahrer, 1999; Volkoff, 1999, Wagner & 
Newell, 2003). Similarly, although initially the intended market for ERP was large-
                                                 
1
 The use of quotation in this study: Double quotation signifies either the open ended contested nature 
of the term within the quotes or that the source of the text within quotes is oral communication. Single 
quotation indicates that the source of the text within quotes is archival materials such as articles, 
documents, and emails.  
 3 
scale industries, later it moved to the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) sectors 
(Everdingen, Hillegersberg, & Waarts, 2000; Knol & Stroeken, 2001).  
 
ERP implementation is an important topic of investigation on other grounds as well: 
the investment of money, effort, time, and its impact on organizations. In 2007, the 
investment in ERP implementation was about 700 billion USD in the U.S. alone and 
about 2000 billion USD in the other parts of the world (IBM research report, 2007). If 
we examine the annual revenue of the top five players in this market, it is 
approximately a 30 billion USD market (Datamation, November, 2005; see figure 1.1 
below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organizations have invested in ERP implementation not only in terms of money but 
also time and effort. From initiation (defined by vendor selection) to completion 
(marked by extensive use of the system), ERP projects duration ranges from one year 
to five years (Bingi, Sharma & Godla, 2001) in a single firm, demanding efforts from 
various organizational members. Once implemented, it can directly affect a range of 
FIGURE 1.1 ANNUAL REVENUE OF FIVE TOP ERP MARKET LEADERS 
(source: Datamation, November 2005) 
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stakeholders varying from a group of employees in an organization to customers, 
suppliers, and regulatory agencies (Chang, 2004; Davenport, 2000). Practitioners 
claim that ERP has had huge impacts on organizations worldwide, and in turn, on our 
society (Davenport, 2000; Gunasekaran, 2008). ERP has also been projected as an 
unavoidable necessity for modern organizations (Wagner, 2004; e.g. Davenport, 2000; 
Rutner, Gibson, & Williams, 2003). In sum, it is empirically important to understand 
how organizations create a working ERP system. 
 
Within the present context of globalization, technology implementation occurs trans-
nationally and cross-culturally. For example, in the last few years ERP 
implementations have mostly been occurring in non-Western countries such as India, 
especially in subsidiaries of Western multinational corporations (Gunasekaran, 2008; 
Huang & Palvia, 2001). With its Western origin, design, and content of Western 
business practices (called “best” standard business practices), getting ERP to work in 
non-Western contexts has different and unique challenges (Davison, 2002; 
Martinsons, 2004; Soh et al., 2000) than what has been the case with other Western 
originated and designed technologies (Walsham, 2002, Walsham & Sahay, 2006). An 
example is the less-understood influence of local organizational and societal culture on 
technology implementation (Agourram, 2009; Borchers, 2003; Sahay, 1998), 
specifically ERP implementation (Soh et al., 2002). Cross-cultural and trans-national 
factors, such as differences in tax systems across countries, is particularly important in 
the case of ERP (Sheu, Chae, Yange, 2004; Sheu, Yen, Krumwiede, 2003; Soh et al., 
2002) since, as I mentioned above, ERP contains Western business practices that are 
claimed to be standardized globally valid best practices (Grant, Hall, Wailes, & 
Wright, 2006; Wagner et al., 2006).  
 
 5 
The context of this dissertation is a trans-national cross-cultural implementation: ERP 
implementations in two organizations in India--an increasingly attractive business 
location for Western multinationals. One organization is a manufacturing subsidiary of 
a reputed Western multinational organization, which I call WestIndia in this 
dissertation for the sake of anonymity, and the other is a local government owned 
public manufacturing firm, which I call GovIndia (pseudonym) in this dissertation. 
While WestIndia is a part of a large business corporation, GovIndia falls in SME 
sector. 
 
While earlier ERP adoption was confined to large corporations, recently it is 
burgeoning in the SME sector (Chen, Sun, Helms, & Jih, 2008), especially in 
developing countries such as India (Singla, 2005).  Many of such implementations 
occur in public firms (Singla, 2005). Perhaps due to its recent origin, ERP 
implementation in the SME sector is relatively less understood (Chen et al., 2008). 
Given a) the contemporary trend in ERP implementation (implementation in 
developing countries and the SME sector), b) that this trend occurs in other technology 
implementations, and c) ERP offers unique challenges, such as cross-cultural 
difficulties in managing the implementation, it is important to understand how 
organizations construct a working information system in such cross-cultural context.  
 
Within the issue of constructing a working IS, my dissertation focuses on the cross-
cultural negotiations about the changes--both technological (e.g. modification of the 
software code) and organizational (e.g. changes in the organization’s existing business 
practices) that occur concurrently. Here, cross-cultural negotiations mean the 
negotiations between the cultural aspects embedded in the ERP practices and the 
cultural aspects that underlie the adopting organization’s local business practices. Such 
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negotiations precede and follow a collective sensemaking (Weick, 1995). Therefore, to 
understand the change process holistically and contextually, we need to examine the 
sensemaking about technology and its implementation.  Also, implicit in the question 
of how organizations construct a working IS is the assumption that the consensus on 
the operations and operability of an IS is socially constructed2. To understand this 
social construction, scholars have suggested focusing on the sensemaking of the actors 
involved (Weick, 1995).  Within negotiations and sensemaking, this study focuses on 
the process of how the political strategies (with the underlying exercise of power) that 
actors adopt influence ERP implementation, in particular, the modifications of ERP 
software, through the actors’ sensemaking about ERP technology and implementation. 
More specifically, the central question of this dissertation is: 3In a cross-cultural 
context, how do organizations construct a working ERP software through the exercise 
of power during ERP implementation in organizations? The particular focus on the 
role of exercise of power or political strategies is partly due to a) my personal interest 
in power and politics within organizations, b) my understanding from experience with 
IT implementation that political processes have a complex, significant, but less 
attended role in technology implementation, c) the preliminary analysis of my field 
data which showed that majority of change issues in the two organizations clustered 
around important political processes occurring in the organization and the wider 
environment, and d) lack of studies that focus on role that the exercise of power and 
political strategies play in constructing a working technology in organizations.  
 
As I mentioned above, one of the expected contributions of this study is an in-depth 
understanding about the role of politics that is exercise of power and its effect in 
                                                 
2
 Social construction means the interrelated web of the social process through which orderly, 
predictable relations are produced and reproduced (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). 
3 Unless otherwise specified, all italics are mine. The intention is to highlight the point. 
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sensemaking and negotiating simultaneous changes in technology and organization in 
a cross-cultural context. As my literature review in the next chapter shows, this is a 
relatively less researched topic in the organizational and technology change literature. 
There is an emerging interest in organization studies and management studies in 
understanding the link between sensemaking, politics, and negotiations in the context 
of technology-organizational change (Badham, 2005; Grifith, 1999; Weick et al., 
2005).  Yet, in the case of implementation of new ITs such as ERP, organizational 
studies are scarce while the practitioner literature is abundant (Volkoff, Elm, & 
Strong, 2007; Wagner, 2004).  
 
To investigate the politics of change negotiations, my study takes a critical theory 
perspective (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000). I question the taken-for-granted assumption 
that the standard practices built into the off-the-shelf ERP software are “best” and 
globally “valid”. Further, I unmask the instrumental nature of the off-the-shelf ERP 
software and the attempts of the managerial elite to preserve and extend their power 
over labor, and the consequent resistance of the employees. I also reveal how a new 
worker identity is produced along with the ERP implementation. Thus, I argue that 
implementation of IT can involve co-production of a new worker identity contributing 
to a central topic of critical management studies, production of worker identity 
(Alvesson & Willmott, 2002). Further, I develop a process model that explains how 
actors manufacture a seemingly widely shared consensus on the meaning and use of 
technology and the to-be-done modifications of technology. The model provides a 
theoretical framework to understand the politics of sensemaking during IT 
implementation in organizations from a critical perspective. Since such a process 
model is rare in the critical literature on technology implementation, I expect that the 
model will advance the research in ‘critical management studies’ (Grey & Willmott, 
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2005). Further, the critical organizational studies on technology mediated 
organizational change have a predominant focus on the politics involved in creating a 
consensus on the should-be-use and the should-be-meaning of technology or in other 
words the ‘politics of technical inscription’ (Spicer, 2005), which is prospective in its 
nature. My study augments this stream of research by examining the influence of the 
exercise of power on the retrospective sensemaking (Weick, 1979; 1984), for example 
framing of the evolving meaning (not potential meaning) of ERP and its felt-use (not 
potential use). My study shows that it is important to understand this process of 
framing, which is under researched in organizational studies (Van de ven, 2005), 
since, as I show, it is framing that shapes the subsequent politics of technical 
inscription. Also, the above-mentioned stream of studies focuses generally on one 
modality of power that is discursive persuasion. My study highlights the role of 
coercion in manufacturing a seemingly shared sensemaking in terms of a consensus on 
frames. It develops a new notion that I call institutional closure and questions an 
assumption in the organizational sensemaking literature that there is a cognitively 
shared sensemaking across actors. 
 
Studies of Enterprise Systems, especially ERP, have been central to IS research. In the 
ERP literature, as scholars point out (see Wagner et al., 2006), there has been a 
disproportionate focus on implementation outcomes, especially factors critical to 
success and failure, compared with implementation process. Such studies imply that 
creating a working IS is a linear process and that technology often controls the success 
or failure of a project (Wagner, 2004; recent examples: Business Process Management 
Journal, 2009; Cruz-Cunha, 2009; Zhu, Li, Wang, & Chen, 2009). Recently, critical IS 
scholars started ‘fleshing out’ the negotiations instead of prescribing the critical 
factors for successful IT implementation (e.g. Wagner et al., 2006; Pollock & 
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Williams, 2009). I join these critical IS scholars. The contextual focus of these 
scholars is mostly Western large-scale corporations. Therefore, my focus on non-
Western SME (including a public organization) and cross-cultural negotiations 
complement these critical IS studies. In IS studies, recently, there is an emerging focus 
on ERP implementation in non-Western SME context (for a review, see Cruz-Cunha, 
2009). But this stream of studies does not examine the sociopolitical construction of 
ERP. Therefore, my focus on the sociopolitical construction of ERP in non-Western 
SME and cross-cultural negotiations contribute to this stream of studies. Moreover, 
my study generates different insights into the managing of ERP implementations 
showing how cross-cultural conflicts are resolved primarily through exercise of 
discursive power that results in a cross-cultural IS.    
 
This study contributes to the IS literature in one more way. To map the collective 
sensemaking of actors, I use the concept of technological frame that I borrow from IS 
studies and Social Construction Of Technology (SCOT) studies. I show how 
technological frames are changed and stabilized over time as they interact with the 
exercise of power in organizations. This linkage framing of technological frames and 
politics is an under-researched topic in IS (Davidson, 2006). Thus, while most IS 
studies tend to assume that technological frames are static (Davidson, 2002; 2006), my 
study explores its dynamic nature. Further, while IS studies define technological frame 
by its use as a cognitive device for sensemaking, my study illustrates how 
technological frame is used as political device for sensemaking, more specifically as 
an emergent discursive resource for sensegiving.  
 
The use of the dynamic notion of technological frames and the focus on socially 
constructed shared consensus on meaning of technology are central to the social 
 10 
construction of technology (SCOT) literature. The SCOT framework and its elements, 
such as technological frame, have been widely used to understand technology 
development and use at a global level (see Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2007) but not to 
understand technology implementation within an organization. The SCOT literature 
shows how technological frames are formed, stabilized, and closed (called “closure”) 
at a global level. I highlight how an element of the technological frame central to the 
SCOT studies—the meaning of technology—although treated as stabilized and closed 
in the global discourse about ERP, is again locally negotiated resulting in paradoxes. 
Also, while the SCOT literature focuses on two types of closures—rhetorical and 
redefinitional—my study shows one more type of closure—institutional.  That is, 
technological frames are stabilized and closed through institutional means, such as 
coercion (e.g. termination of the proponents of opposing technological frames).  I also 
develop another novel concept, technology non-affordance, that explains how 
perceptions of technical constraints, such as technical complexity that are usually 
taken as perceptions of objective physical (or material) properties of technology, are 
political constructions. Thus, I contribute to the recent debate on materiality (Pinch, 
forthcoming) in the sociology of technology literature.  
 
In this chapter I introduced the research context, research question, empirical and 
theoretical importance of this study, and expected contributions. The remainder of the 
dissertation is organized as follows: chapter two presents a comprehensive review of 
the technology change literature in organizational studies and information system 
studies, particularly the ERP literature as well as the relevant work within a cross-
cultural context and a public organization context. From the literature review, my 
research question emerges. Subsequently, chapter three discusses the research 
methodology and the empirical design that I chose to answer my research question. 
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This is followed in chapter four by a description of the organizations, their external 
environment and internal work environment, and the explication of the terms--cross-
cultural context and the core concept of this study, “negotiating technology frame”. 
 
The fifth chapter presents the illustrative analytical use of the core concept to analyze 
the ERP implementation in the government organization—GovIndia, and generates 
insights from the analysis. The sixth chapter repeats the illustration in a radically 
different implementation context. It also expands and reinforces the insights and 
concepts developed in the fifth chapter.   In the final chapter I build a process oriented 
theoretical model based on the analysis of implementation across organizations. The 
model helps answer my research question.  Subsequently, I conclude with the 
contributions of my study, the limitations of this study, and the suggestions for future 
research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW:  
THE EMERGING SOCIOPOLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter positions my research question in the current literature and points out the 
gaps in our knowledge base related to technology change in organizations, more 
specifically ERP implementation and the process of negotiating change over time. The 
chapter is a review of the work of leading writers whose research is helpful for 
positioning the analysis and contributions of my study. The literature review was 
compiled through a systematic review of key organizational studies journals, IS 
journals, and a few IS conferences and organizational study conferences from 1997-
2009. I also refer to the prominent works in sociology of technology that are relevant 
to my study. To this end, I situate my research alongside other qualitative studies of 
technology change in organizations, and specifically ERP implementation within 
organizational contexts, that take a process view of change over time.  
 
In the following section, I describe ERP technology. Subsequently, I present the 
literature review and the research question. Finally, I suggest an appropriate 
methodology to answer my question that will prepare the reader for the next chapter 
on methodology.  
 
2.1 Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP): An overview 
2.1.1 Definition of ERP 
ERP is a packaged software that can be bought ‘off-the-shelf’ and tailored by an 
organization to integrate and share the organization’s information and related business 
process within and across different functional areas (Davenport, 2000). Here, 
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packaged means that different modules while sometimes correspond to different 
functions in an organization, such as marketing, production, and accounting, are 
integrated and packaged together to make a single software. Modules are combined to 
create ERP suites for specific industry sectors (e.g. manufacturing, banking, retail) or 
company size (Klaus, Rosemann, & Gable, 2000). Organized in functional modules 
that draw on common databases, ERP packages establish inter-modular connections 
that recapture the cross-functional interdependencies of organizational operations. At 
the same time, the modular architecture of the package allows for functional autonomy 
and flexibility that address the specific requirements of each function (Kallinikos, 
2004).  
 
It is through the modifications of the functional modules that local solutions are 
derived. Unlike custom-built software that must be programmed in traditional ways to 
meet local needs, ERP software is generic, targeting multiple industries, and must be 
modified before it can be used, though the degree of modification can vary depending 
on many factors. Once modified and implemented, the technology often replaces 
homegrown, discrete information systems and applications with a single infrastructure. 
The precursor of ERP, Business Process Reengineering, usually is an integral part of 
most ERP implementations (Sarker & Lee, 2000). ERP software, when combined with 
efforts to re-engineer work or business practices, promises to streamline organizational 
activities by eliminating duplication of effort and data (Davenport, 1998). This is 
expected to facilitate increased confidence in organizational data and lead to timely 
and informed decision making by squashing ‘silos or stove pipes of technology’--
large, diverse, unintegrated and ageing systems (Bannister, 2001) and build an 
integrated platform upon which all business and administrative activities take place 
(Davenport, 2000; Norris, Hurley, Hartley, Dunleavy, & Balls, 2000).  
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Thus, ERP claims to seamlessly integrate into a single software based system various 
functions in a company like production planning, manufacturing, distribution, 
shipping, and finance and accounting. The off-the-shelf software contains standard 
business and work practices that are claimed to be “globally valid” and “best” 
(Wagner et al., 2006). By business and work practices I mean the processes that are 
executed repeatedly in various departments of an organization. Examples are raising a 
purchase order, scheduling production, and raising sales invoice. The software offers 
to replace an organization’s local business and work practices with this standard best 
practices. Through such replacement, ERP standardizes local work and business 
practices. For the purpose of integration and standardization, ERP technology, as 
perhaps any technology, reconstitutes organizational operations only after it has 
broken them down into the minutest detail. The meticulous definition of data items, 
the precise identification of transactional steps, and the fashioning of such steps into 
clearly described sequences that cover the operations of the entire organization are 
essential to ERP packages (Kallinikos, 2004). 
 
Regarding the coverage of ERP software, an ERP system usually spans multiple 
departments in a corporation, and in some cases, especially with the new version of 
ERP, called ERPII, it will also transcend the corporate boundary to incorporate 
systems of partners and suppliers to bring in additional functions like supply chain 
management. Figure2.1 (next page) gives a simplified overview of generic ERP 
software along with the most frequently visible social actors. Next, I present brief 
account of the historical evolution of ERP technology.  
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2.1.2 Evolution of ERP phenomenon 
ERP systems evolved from technology designed to aid operations in the 
manufacturing industry (Klaus et al., 2000). The first genre software, called Materials 
Requirement Planning (MRP), was designed to help with inventory control. The 
second genre software, called Material Resource Planning (MRPII), was designed to 
help manage materials and manufacturing processes. Later, in 1990s, software vendors 
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exploited the notion of designing standard software packages that could be sold to 
multiple markets and across organizations within particular industries thereby 
increasing their economies of scale (Kremers & Dissel, 2000; Kumar & van 
Hillegersberg, 2000). This strategic move was based on the assumption that all 
contemporary organizations have generic business needs and could benefit from 
vendor and consultant expertise by implementing a standard business solution as their 
information infrastructure. Therefore, MRPII functionality was expanded by including 
most enterprise processes such as operations and logistics, financial and managerial 
accounting, human resources, and sales and order management (Davenport, 1998; 
Kumar & van Hillegersberg, 2000). This evolutionary process took unpredictable 
directions as local vendors redesigned standard ERP packages to their own advantage 
in order to penetrate untapped markets (Bennett & Timbrell, 2000; Everdingen, 
Hillegersberg, & Waarts, 2000; Sprott, 2000).  
 
This evolution has resulted in ERP becoming ubiquitous, spreading across different 
industries (Allen & Kern, 2001; Mahrer, 1999; Pollock, 2000; Volkoff, 1999; Wagner 
et al., 2006), covering small and medium scale industries (Liang & Xiu, 2004; Huang 
& Palvia, 2001) as well as large scale industries (the early adopters of ERP), and 
across the globe (Tham, 2002). Having presented a brief account of the evolution of 
ERP, I focus next on the changes that occur in standard ERP as it is implemented in 
organizations. My objective is to make the reader familiar with the modifications of 
the software and the possibilities for negotiations about the modifications.  
 
2.1.3 Changing the standard ERP software: Configuring ERP 
Unlike many other IT products (e.g. Microsoft project, Primevera, and other decision 
support system packaged software), ERP is basically a ‘configurable technology’ 
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(Pozzebon & Pinsonneault, 2005). Configurable technology means technologies that 
are highly parameterizable and are built from a range of components to meet the 
specific requirements of a user. Thus, although ERP is sold as an off-the-shelf product 
with built-in “best” business and work practices, in practice it is tailored to the needs 
of the user organization. Some times the consultants who bring ERP into the 
organization succeed in implementing the ERP software without significant deviations 
from the standard off-the-shelf model. Still, ERP software is changed to certain extent 
during its implementation. The process of making changes in ERP software is called 
configuring. A growing body of literature documents the changes during configuration 
of ERP and the difficulties that many organizations encounter when implementing 
ERP (Davenport, 2000, 1998; Kremers & Dissel, 2000; Markus, Petrie, & Axline, 
2000; Scott & Vessey, 2000; Soh et al, 2000). In contrast to the development of in-
house IS designed specifically to fit the needs of the organization, configuring 
packaged software there is often a tension between organizational working patterns 
and the technological constraints of the system (Hanseth & Braa, 1998; Kremers & 
Dissel, 2000; Walsham, 2001). In order to resolve the gap between the existing legacy 
of work practices with which the organization is familiar and standard ERP processes, 
the implementers have to consider a spectrum of choices ranging from changing the 
work practices of the organization to suit the ERP practices to configuring ERP to the 
required extent (Markus & Tanis, 2000; Soh et al., 2000). Below, I describe the extent 
of changes that ERP software could undergo during its configuration. 
 
From practitioner journals, academic journals, and from my experience, I identify four 
different approaches to configuring ERP software: 
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2.1.3.1 Customization 
Typically ERP software contains 800-1000 business processes claimed to represent 
“best” practices, and 8000 or more configuration tables. Users tailor the system to suit 
local needs by choosing between the business processes and setting table values 
(parameterization). In ERP terminology, this is called "customization." There are two 
types of customization: customization through module selection, and parameter 
selection. In a module selection mode the user can opt for certain modules (for 
different modules, see Figure 2.1). Once module selection is finished, the user goes for 
parameter selection. For example, within an inventory management module in the 
configuration table the user can choose between different inventory policies (e.g. Last 
In First Out vs. First In First Out), or product revenue by geographical unit, or by 
product line or by distribution channel. The number of configuration tables could vary 
from 1000 to 10,000 or more depending on the type of ERP software chosen (e.g. 
Peoplesoft vs. SAP R/3). Going through all of them is time consuming; Dell took a 
year on this task (Davenport, 1998). If the options in the configuration table are not 
good enough, the organization has either to use the existing Information System (IS), 
called legacy IS, and build an interface between the legacy IS and the ERP software, 
or change the ERP software code to incorporate the legacy IS and associated business 
and work practices. Both can dilute the integration and standardization ability of ERP 
(Davenport, 1998). Significant amount of changes could gradually transform ERP into 
a simple decision support software or an information sharing system similar to the 
legacy IS. 
 
2.1.3.2. Extensions 
Users also have access to “user exits,” where local code can be provided in a 
specialized programming language (e.g. for SAP, it is called “ABAP/4”) in which 
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local solutions can be implemented. They are called add-ons. These approaches, as 
well as the use of third-party “bolt-ons” (e.g. supply chain systems, customer 
relationship management systems), which are basically add-ons bought out from 
vendors other than ERP vendors, are called “extensions”. There are also bolt-ons 
created during the implementation to meet the organization’s requirements that are not 
bought out from vendors (the third party).  
 
2.1.3.3. Modifications 
Mabert, Soni and Venkataramanan (2001) criticize the success stories of off-the-shelf 
ERP implementation (with no change in ERP) pointing out that the system either 
needs extensive modifications or the company needs to go through a major re-
engineering process (e.g. Business Process Re-engineering) to use it. Thus, either the 
organization or the technology or both are expected to undergo changes. The authors’ 
meaning of modification is not clear; in ERP parlance modification means the 
possibility of changing the ERP code in a fundamental way (called changing the 
source code) to meet user needs. Modification is strenuously opposed by almost 
everyone knowledgeable in the field (Glass, 1998), presumably because it can increase 
the work load, cost, difficulty of maintaining future upgrades and time, and can dilute 
the acclaimed capability of the ERP such as its ability to integrate the disparate 
business functions and standardize them into the “best” practices. Even when 
customizations are needed to provide critical functionality, these are done without 
changing the source code through the development of add-on modules that are 
plugged into the ERP system’s user exits (Soh et al., 2000). Still, there are reports 
about extensive modifications (Wagner, 2004; Soh et al., 2000). Extensive 
modification can even make ERP into a different technological product or artifact 
(Shanks, Seddon, & Willcocks, 2003).  
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The proponents of ERP system software who claim ERP as an embodiment of globally 
valid best practices argue that the system’s complexity makes it impracticable to carry 
out major modifications (e.g. Davenport, 2000). Therefore, they argue, if there is a 
misfit between local business logic and ERP logic, the user organization has to yield to 
ERP logic for the system to be workable (Davenport, 1998; Kelly, Holland, & Light, 
1999;  Pireira, 1999;). This rhetoric4 is accompanied by another rhetoric that claims 
ERP as a technological imperative for most organizations: “ERP is now considered to 
be the price of entry for running a business, and at least at present, for being connected 
to other enterprises in a network economy” (Kumar & Van Hillegersberg, 2000: 24; 
also see Davenport, 2000).  Although current literature is dominated by reports of 
organizations that radically adjust work practices to fit the ERP needs (Brehm, Heinzl, 
& Markus, 2001; Davenport 1998; Willcocks & Sykes, 2000), a couple of case studies 
show that such technologically deterministic rhetoric does not reflect implementation 
reality (Brehm et al. 2001; Elbanna, 2007; Grant et al, 2006; Wagner et al., 2006). For 
example, Grant and his colleagues argue that ‘technological determinism’ was ERP’s 
false promise, showing how organizations had to modify ERP after or during 
implementation as users mounted resistance based on their trial use of the system. On 
the other hand, departing from the above-mentioned social constructivist approach, 
scholars have argued that due to ‘polyvalent constraints’ (Kallinikos, 2004 a) that 
characterize the ERP and its implementation, modifying ERP significantly is 
illusionary (Kallinikos, 2004). Also, practitioners as well as academicians point out 
that regardless of how a company approaches it or modifies it, ERP is associated with 
significant changes in how a company does business. It tinkers with the workflows, 
alters long-standing work processes, can lead to downskilling or reskilling (Hall, 
                                                 
4
 Rhetoric refers to the form of discourse that primarily uses language to persuade others through 
instrumental or means-ends logic. 
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2005), and changes the work organization (Koch & Buhl, 2002) and the business 
organization (Davenport, 2000). Since ERP makes such radical changes to business 
processes, it is not unusual for job descriptions to change or be eliminated altogether. 
Companies often meet with employee resistance (Hall, 2006).  
In short, ERP implementation is complex due to cross-module integration, data 
standardization, adoption of the underlying business model, compressed 
implementation schedules, huge financial investments, and, the involvement of a large 
number of stakeholders with varying, and many times, conflicting interests. The 
technology change process in ERP implementation gets problematic because the 
organization usually has to choose among adapting to the new functionality, living 
with the shortfall, instituting workarounds, or customizing the package.  
In this section, I have described what ERP is claimed to be—its definition, its 
historical evolution, and how it evolves in organizations through qualitatively and 
quantitatively different types of changes. I also indicated the debate in the literature 
around changes of ERP software during its implementation: some scholars claim ERP 
as a deterministic transformative tool that embodies “best practice,” while others 
challenge such claims. In the next section, I present a brief review of the historical 
development in the scholarly work on technology implementation, in particular IT 
implementation, and ERP implementation in organizations. Since ERP studies are 
primarily done in the IS field while the scholarly work in the IS field closely follows 
the development in the organizational studies field (Orlikowski & Barley, 2001), I 
review present the developments in both organizational studies and IS literatures. The 
review will highlight various conceptualizations of ERP that different theoretical 
traditions hold including the deterministic approach that I mentioned above. This is 
followed by a summary of the analytical discussion of the extant literature, which will 
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highlight the inadequacy of the present treatment to capture the political dynamics 
involved in IT implementation, in particular ERP implementation, and in technology 
change and technology mediated organizational changes. This situates my research 
question. 
 
2.2 The conceptualizations of technology in general and ERP in particular 
2.2.1 ERP as a deterministic imperative tool: The predominant view in ERP studies 
The Information Systems (IS) literature on ERP technologies is saturated with studies 
from the system engineering and project management perspectives that look for some 
fixed “critical success factors” (Wagner et al., 2006; for a review, see Esteves & 
Bohórquez, 2008; Esteves & Pastor, 2001; Moon, 2007). Some of these studies try to 
predict the effect of ERP on employees, organizational factors, and firm performance 
(e.g. Sarker & Lee, 2000). Others prioritize critical success factors in order to advise 
managers about which ones are most critical for their organization (e.g. Somers, 
Nelson, & Ragowsky, 2001). This body of literature seems to suggest that developing 
and implementing an integrated technological platform like ERP is a linear process 
and that technology often controls the success or failure of the implementation 
(Bancroft, 1996; Bancroft, Seip, & Sprengel, 1998; Parr, Shanks & Darke, 1999). 
Such studies that promote a simplistic approach lack a nuanced understanding about 
the sociopolitical dynamics of the implementation that leads to success or failure. 
Some scholars have criticized these prescriptive approaches for their attempts to 
predict success (Ciborra, Braa, & Cordella, 2000; Farbey, Land, & Target, 1995) and 
their neglect of organizational contexts and processes (Bussen & Myers, 1997; 
Walsham, 1993). More importantly, the exclusive focus on the future of ERP trends 
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and the control of project outcomes has created a gap in the literature. Our 
understanding of the work involved in such projects – the socio-political negotiations 
that come to constitute the critical factors, the ways in which ERP implementations is 
constructed as a success or failure, or in other words, how organizations attempts to 
create a working ERP irrespective of the outcome of such attempt – remains limited in 
comparison.  
 
In these outcome-oriented studies, ERP systems are assumed to be inscribed with 
state-of-the-art best practices for a particular industry, saving organizations from 
reinventing the wheel and from perpetuating local business practice anomalies 
(Cortada, 1998; Davenport, 2000). Irrespective of the context in which ERP is 
implemented, it is designed to yield the “best” results. In short, ERP is described both 
as an IT solution that integrates silos of legacy IS and a business solution that provides 
globally valid best business practices (Mabert et al., 2001). As I mentioned earlier, this 
description is supplemented by rhetoric about the unchangeability and exogenous 
nature of technology wherein, organizations have to yield to the ERP logic during the 
implementation to reap its full benefits (Davenport, 1998; Pireira, 1999), and about 
ERP as a technological imperative for most organizations to run the business 
successfully (Kumar & Van Hillegersberg, 2000) without which the organizations may 
not be able to survive in the increasingly competitive environment (Pireira, 1999). The 
business success and hence the survival is achieved through the transformation of the 
organization (Davenport, 2000). Thus, ERP is positioned to make a big “impact” on 
organizations.  
 
The ERP proponents highlight the positive impact of ERP, such as employee 
empowerment through decentralization (Davenport, 2000), cross-functional 
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coordination (Taylor, 1998), and increased organizational efficiency (Davenport, 
2000). ERP optimists tend to see ERPs as leading to a demand for higher-level skills 
among workers, paralleling claims regarding the upskilling effects of IT change in 
general (Adler, 1992). On the other hand, the critiques highlight the negative impact of 
ERP on organizations, such as larger workloads, loss of jobs, and increase in work 
stress (e.g. Hall, 2006). Scholars have also criticized ERP for its limited conception of 
human agency as a procedure enactment, neglecting other possible forms of human 
agencies like improvisation, and exploration (Kallinikos, 2004). With evidence drawn 
from five Australian case studies Hall (2005) argues that ERP implementation led to 
enhancement of managerial control at the expense of some worker autonomy, skills 
and workload. Compared to the large number of the positive impact studies of ERP, 
the negative impact studies are limited in number. Interestingly, the contradictory 
results (for example, reduction in worker autonomy vs. increase in worker 
empowerment) might be a reflection of the general contradictory results in IT 
implementation studies within organizations (Robey & Boudreau, 1999)—empowered 
employees (Attewell & Rule, 1984) and oppressed employees (Nelson, 1990); 
extended hierarchy (Blau, Falbe, McKinley, & Tracy, 1976) and reduced hierarchy 
(Crowston, Malon, & Lin, 1987); organizational rigidity (Whisler, 1970) and 
organizational flexibility (Foster & Flynn, 1984); increases in staff and radical 
downsizing (Brynjolfsson,  Malone, Gurbaxani, & Kambil, 1994; Pinsonneault & 
Kraemer, 1997). Besides all these, ERP is described usually not only as an inert 
neutral product having no contextual influence but also as brought in by the “external” 
“objective” system “experts” called consultants who have both business and IT 
expertise (Howcroft & Light, 2006).  
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In these studies we can notice three levels of ‘technological determinism’ (Bimber, 
1994) in the conceptualization of ERP technology: a) independent –ERP is described 
ahistorically as an off-the shelf product with no contextual influence on its 
implementation, b) exogenous- ERP is not only an off-the-shelf inert technology 
brought in by external experts but it has its own built-in logic to which the 
organization has to yield, and c) causal- ERP transforms organizations either 
positively or negatively. Similar to the contradictory claims about the impact of ERP 
on the organization, the technologically deterministic approach to ERP is probably 
also a reflection of the technological determinism in the IS studies and in the early 
studies on the technology-organization relationship.  
 
2.2.1 Technology as a deterministic imperative tool: The predominant view in 
organizational studies and IS studies 
The three forms of determinism—technology as an independent, exogenous, or a 
causal variable (Bimber, 1994) appear in organizational studies on of technology 
implementation. For example, new technologies like IT is conceptualized to be neutral 
intervening conduits by which managerial strategies are implemented (Child, 1985). 
Further, the IT consultants are cast as “objective” “neutral” “external” (external to the 
organization) parties who help the organization with their unique combination of both 
technical and business-know how (Bloomfield & Danielle, 1995). Similarly, there is 
large literature from the systems theory perspective that focuses on the independent 
causal impact of IT on the organization (for a review, see Esteves & Bohórquez, 2008; 
Moon, 2007). At a more general level, in much of the early work technology is treated 
as an independent exogenous causal variable that determines a range of organizational 
 26 
aspects, including workflow (Woodward, 1958), size (Hickson et al., 1969), the 
variability and analyzability of tasks (Perrow, 1967) degree of task independence 
(Thompson, 1970), and more generally the structure of the organization (Pugh & 
Hickson, 1976; for a review, see, Fry, 1982; Miller, Glick, Wang, & Huber, 1991). For 
these researchers, the characteristics and uses of a technology are treated as a given 
which shapes all other aspects of organizational life.  
Some researchers, especially those who examined the politics of technology 
implementation, turned this pattern of causation around to argue that technology use is 
shaped by structural, organizational, and economic demands. Here, technology is seen 
as a tool for economic or political domination (Braverman, 1974; Cooley, 1980; 
Marcuse, 1964). For instance, radical critics claimed that the structural requirements 
of capital accumulation have led to the formation of ‘deskilling’ technologies 
(Braverman, 1974) wherein frontline workers’ local skills and practices were replaced 
with technology embodied skills and practices (see Noble, 1984: for illustration of 
Braverman’s deskilling thesis). However, such studies (as Noble’s) helped the 
students of technology change to come out of the “hard”5 technological determinism.  
 
Later organizational studies on sociopolitics of technology change (e.g. Barley, 1986; 
Cooley, 1982; Noble, 1984; Zuboff, 1988,) modified the technological determinism of 
earlier studies, especially the assumption about the origin and the choice of technology 
– its degree of externality or autonomy, highlighting that the choice of technology (but 
not its content) and its effect can be socially shaped. For example, Cooley (1986) and 
Noble (1984) attributed the changes in technological choices that led to deskilling to 
                                                 
5
 In “soft” technological determinism the choice of the technology rather than its content is socially 
shaped while in “hard” technological determinism technology determines the social (Smith & Marx, 
1994)  
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political strategies and interests of powerful institutional actors rather than the 
inevitable progress of the technology. Zuboff’s (1988) concern is the “automating” 
and “informating” potential of IT but not the political dynamics in making the content 
of IT and its social shaping.  However, she emphasized that different organizational 
contexts influence the degree to which either potential is taken up and developed. 
Complementing it, Barley (1986) shows how similar technology (CT scanning) can be 
embedded into different social systems in different ways that occasion different 
outcomes.  
 
Although these studies move away from “hard” technological determinism, there is 
still a “soft” technological determinism implicit or explicit in these studies: these 
studies consider technology as an exogenous shock to the social system at the 
workplace. Perhaps this residual determinism is due to less of a focus on the content of 
the technology than its choice and form.  In soft determinism, shaping of form and 
effect of technology are considered but not the influence on content of technology 
(Smith & Marx, 1994). For example, while addressing the contextual influence on the 
use of CT scanners, Barley does not analyze the role of social agency in either the 
design of the CT scanners or their customization and adaptation during their 
implementation. Similar soft determinism is evident in IT design studies and the 
studies on the impact of IT. These studies focus on how to design technological 
artifacts “correctly” (on time and within budget), how users can adopt and appropriate 
technology effectively, and how IS can be used to produce desired outcomes. On the 
deployment and use side, researchers pay attention to the factors affecting technology 
- influence of culture, strategy, and change management (Kling, 1991; Robey & 
Sahay, 1996; Walsham, 1993), perception of the quality of computer interfaces 
(Jarvenpaa, 1991), users’ satisfaction with the information produced (Ives, Olson, & 
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Baroudi, 1983), user willingness to accept technology (Davis, 1989), diffusion pattern 
(Cooper & Zmud, 1990), and social cognitive processes in the user community 
(Boland & Tenkasi, 1995; Orlikowski & Gash, 1994).  
 
Underlying these studies is the adaptation to the material effect of technology. 
Moreover, the IT design and use studies altogether neglect the influence of 
institutional factors like organizational politics on technology change. Some of the 
above-mentioned organizational studies (e.g. Barley, Noble, and Cooley) and some of 
the IT impact studies consider such institutional influences, but they do not address 
how institutional factors such as the exercise of power in organizations, influence 
modification of the content of technology.  
 
However, following the earlier lead in organizational studies, such as the Noble study 
on production technologies, several critical reviews questioned the deterministic logic 
underlying the analyses of the organizational impacts of information technology 
(DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Hirschheim 1985; Kling, 1980; Markus & Robey, 1988; 
Orlikowski & Robey, 1991; Walsham, 1993). Drawing from various sources, these 
authors argued for a more complex relationship between information technology and 
organizations, advancing concepts such as emergent and reciprocal causality, and 
promoting interpretive research methods. These suggestions have influenced recent 
empirical studies, and have produced more elaborate analyses of organizational 
change, especially organizational change mediated by the sociopolitical dynamics of 
IT implementation (e.g. Volkoff, Strong, & Elmes, 2007). The professional 
management literature also manifests greater sophistication of argument, rejecting the 
optimistic determinism of earlier writings on the transformational potential of 
information technology (Galliers & Baets, 1998; Glass, 1998; Markus & Benjamin, 
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1997; Sauer& Yetton, 1997). Next, I turn to this move away from hard and soft 
technological determinism that occurred first in sociological and organizational studies 
on technology implementation, especially the political dynamics of technology 
implementation. This move was followed by a similar shift in the conceptualization of 
IT in IS implementation studies in the field of IS literature.  
 
2.2.2 Technology as a sociopolitical construction: The emerging view in 
organizational studies and IS studies 
The constructionist movement of the 1980s and 1990s argued for conceptualizing 
technology as a social construction that implied the technical (e.g. ERP technology) 
and the social (e.g. users or organizations) as either tightly coupled (e.g. structuration 
approach), interactively co-evolving entities (e.g. sensemaking and co-evolution 
approach: see, Weick, 2000), a sui generic single entity called sociotechnical 
ensembles (Bijker, 1995), or a mutually inscribed network of human - non human 
actors with vested interests (Callon, 1991; Latour, 1996; 2005; Law & Hassard, 1998). 
McLoughlin and Badham (2005) briefly review the effect of this move on the political 
studies of technology implementation.  
In the editors’ introduction to the 2005 special issue of the Human Relations journal 
on political process perspectives in organization and technological change literature, 
McLoughlin and Badham identify three waves in this body of literature. The first 
wave, which is roughly from 1950s-1990s, covers the technologically deterministic 
approach, both hard and soft that I discussed earlier. In organization theory, Child’s 
‘strategic choice’ (1972) critique of the technological determinism embedded within 
the contingency studies that were dominant at the time probably marked the shift from 
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hard determinism to a soft determinism. The second wave roughly spans 1990s – 
2000. The focus was on work organization and technology connection, especially new 
technologies like IT. Generally, we can identify two streams of studies. The first 
comprised the studies that focus on the relationship between new technology and 
workplace control (e.g. Barker, 1993; Sewell, 1999; Thompson, 2003; Warhurst & 
Thompson, 2000). There were numerous studies that focused on lean production, total 
quality management, and employee empowerment, (for a recent brief review, see Batt 
& Doellgast, 2005). The second stream comprised studies from perspectives such as 
institutional, structurational, and ‘processual’ approaches (Dawson, 1994). A few of 
these studies incorporated insights from the studies in sociology of technology. Still, 
the predominant approach of technological determinism (hard or soft) remains. 
According to McLoughlin and Badham (2005) a third wave that examines the 
sociopolitical construction of technology seems to be emerging. European 
organizational scholars have done most of these studies to which I turn next. 
 
Following the lead of the social constructionist approach to technology 
implementation, these studies assume that the technical and the social not only merely 
influence each other but also get intertwined as the social (e.g. the socially constructed 
meanings of ERP) creeps into the technical. This is a vital lynchpin for these studies of 
the political process, because the ‘meaning given by relevant social groups actually 
constitute the artifact’ (Bijker, 1995: 77). This attribution of meaning to a technology 
as these studies show, involves actors mobilizing a system of sense-giving discourse 
in order to persuade other actors. This discourse shapes how the technology can be 
spoken about and understood (e.g., Grant & Hall, 2005; Spicer, 2005). This process, 
called “technical inscription” (Joerges & Czarniawska, 1998) involves creating a fixed 
meaning and a set of uses associated with the technology. Collectively these studies 
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argue that discourses inscribed into a given technology shape how potential users 
understand a technology and its possible uses (Munir & Jones, 2004). This has been 
empirically demonstrated in the studies of the use of information technology in health 
care (Bloomfield & Best, 1992; Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; Doolin, 2003), the 
introduction of the Lotus notes system (Hayes & Walsham, 2000), a computerized 
trading system on the London insurance exchange (Heracleous & Barrett, 2001), the 
pesticide DDT (Maguire, 2004), and photo-imaging technology (Munir, 2005; Munir 
& Phillips, 2005). Each of these studies that assumes a Foucauldian perspective 
demonstrates how a discourse inscribes order and relations of power into a given 
technology. Thus, the general focus is on the persuasive political dynamics of 
technical inscription. The exclusive focus on one of the processes that involves 
deciding what technology should be and what its uses should be (as opposed to what 
technology is and what its uses are: a retrospective sensemaking) and on one modality 
of exercise of power (that is persuasion) neglecting the possibility of other modalities, 
has generated a less nuanced picture of the political dynamics and a less holistic 
picture of the processes (with its inter relations) involved. Although McLoughlin and 
Badham (2005) in their recent review do not explicitly mention this point, they 
conclude by suggesting that there is a dire need for political process study that 
investigates the political dynamics that interact with technology modification and the 
naturalization of technology as a part of the organization in a holistic manner. Also, 
note that all of the organizational studies on politics of technology or information 
technology implementation that I mentioned so far were done in a Western context. 
We can see these two points—exclusive focus on persuasion and the Western context-
-repeated in the emerging IS studies on sociopolitical construction of IT, especially 
ERP technology. 
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In the IS field, the early studies from the 1990s that took a social construction 
perspective did not focus much on the political dynamics (Van de ven, 2005; see 
Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Typical examples of such early studies are the studies 
from the structurational approach such as the Orlikowski studies and the Walsham 
studies (Jones, Orlikowski, & Munir, 2004; Orlikowski, 1992; Orlikowski, 2000; 
Orlikowski & Robey; 1991; Walsham, 1993). Although very limited in numbers 
(compared to other social constructivist studies), a few of the later studies examined 
the sociopolitical construction of IS in organizations (for a review see: Jasperson, 
Butler, Carte, Croes, Saunders, & Zheng, 2002). Noting the countable number of 
studies that examine sociopolitics of IT implementation, Jasperson et al., (2002) called 
for more scholarship in this direction. Similar to the organizational studies on the 
sociopolitical construction of ITs in organizations, the countable IS studies on 
sociopolitical construction also have an exclusive analytical focus on persuasion and 
are done in Western context (see Jasperson et al., 2002). This observation is equally 
applicable to the ERP studies on sociopolitical dynamics that both organizational 
scholars and IS scholars carried out so far.  
 
2.2.4 ERP as a sociopolitical construction   
Drawing on the insights generated in social constructionist literature, institutional 
theory, and structuration approach, some scholars came to conceptualize ERP as either 
an institution or a structure in its own right. For example, Ciborra (1993) has applied 
Star’s (Star, 1999; Star & Ruhleder, 2001) notion of information infrastructure to IT in 
general, and ERP in particular, and highlighted its similarities with institutions. 
Ciborra (1993:31) and the scholars who followed his lead (e.g., Avegerou 2002; 
Ciborra & Hanseth, 1998) argue that ITs like ERP can assume the properties of an 
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institution or a formative context as it takes shape in relation to other institutions of 
modern society. Thus, ITs like ERP is considered as an institution on the basis that it 
“constitute background condition for action, enforcing constraints, giving direction 
and meaning, and setting the range of opportunities for undertaking action” (Ciborra & 
Hanseth, 1998:315). The implication is that ITs are infused with values and achieve a 
status of taken-for-grantedness. Such studies on ERP highlight the importance of myth 
making as a vehicle by which technological attributes are rendered “real” and come to 
influence ERP implementation. At the core of such processes lies the radically 
different interpretation or meaning that different social groups attribute to ERP (Klaus 
& Gable, 2000), which is basically a process of social construction (Pinch & Bijker, 
1984). Although the social constructionist approach is widely used in IS studies that 
focus on political dynamics, as we can see below, most of these studies take an Actor 
Network Theory (ANT) perspective. SCOT, the approach that I take in my study, is 
rarely used in IS studies. 
ANT is widely applied in IS studies to investigate IT implementation (Mitev, 2006; e.g. 
Monteiro & Hanseth, 1995; Monteiro, 2000; Walsham, 1997), specifically ERP 
implementation in organizations (e.g. Boland & Schultze, 1996; Dechow & 
Mouritsen, 2005; Elbanna, 2007; Hanseth & Braa, 1998; McMaster, Vidgen, & 
Wastell, 1999; Quattrone & Hopper, 2001; Wagner et al., 2006) while other social 
constructionist approaches such as SCOT are rarely used. As applied in IT studies, 
epistemologically ANT does not differentiate between the human and the non-human 
like ERP technology, a technological artifact.  Following the same line, in ERP 
literature, those who apply the ANT perspective consider ERP as an actor equivalent 
to social actors. For example, in one of the first studies of ERP implementation from 
an ANT perspective, Hanseth and Braa (1999, 1998) highlight the persuasive power of 
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software to influence human actors thereby directing the project initiative. Some 
scholars followed this lead and used ANT to investigate ERP’s as well as the social 
actors’ persuasive influence on other social actors (recent examples: Elbanna, 2007; 
Wagner et al., 2006).  
Latour, one of the main proponents of ANT, notes that “technology is society made 
durable” (1991:103) which means that in their design, practices, like the best practice 
materialized in ERP, take a more tangible form and thereby stabilize social interests. 
Hence, it is probable that the vested interests groups might attempt to silence the 
opposing voices or coerce the conflicting interest groups while developing or 
modifying the technology artifact. Still, the possibility of coercion has gained either a 
passing attention or a descriptive role in the ERP studies that take ANT perspective. 
The scholars who use the ANT perspective to understand IT implementation 
(Walsham, 1993), specifically ERP implementation (e.g. Elbanna, 2007; Scott & 
Wagner, 2003; Wagner et al., 2006), highlight the multiplicity of interests, the 
persuasive negotiations among such interest, the coalition and consensus formation, 
and the inscription of such interests into ERP technology (Pollock & Williams, 2009). 
I join this stream of research to the extent that I highlight the multiplicity of interests, 
and examine the political dynamics of the coalition and subsequent consensus 
formation, and the inscription of interests into ERP software.  
From a social construction perspective, these studies usually highlight the mutual 
influence of various socially relevant groups and the formation of social consensus 
through the compromise or accommodation of different meanings and practices. For 
example, take one of the mostly widely cited U.S. studies--the Wagner studies (Scott 
& Wagner 2003; Wagner & Newell, 2003; Wagner et al., 2006) of ERP tensions in an 
Ivy League University-- the tension or conflict between the ‘local interest’ supported 
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by faculty members and associated administrative employees and the ERP's best 
practice interest (or the ‘global interest’) promoted by some administrative employees, 
and their central leadership (represented by the Vice President of administration: VP), 
and vendor representatives. I consider this study in detail here since it is one of the 
very few studies that focus on the sociopolitics of negotiations about ERP 
modification, the central focus of my study. The main theme of these studies is the 
mutual influence of various actors like ERP, the ERP project team, the faculty 
members, and administrative users and the resultant “achievement of order” through 
the accommodating synthesis of local and global (ERP) practices.  Using an ANT 
approach, Wagner and her colleagues map the tensions involved in the evolution of 
ERP implementation of a financial accounting module. Although consultants tried to 
sell the off-the-shelf model, the faculty members and the associated administrative 
staff did not accept it; rather they compelled the consultants to accommodate the 
traditional existing practice of Commitment Accounting (CA) into the ERP system or 
to replace the ERP’s standard Time Phased Budget (TPB) with Commitment 
Accounting. Faculty members (or Principal Investigators) had vested interest in CA as 
it gave them more flexibility and faster reports (compared to TPB) with the most 
critical information they were looking for, how much money is left for them to spend.  
It was surprising for the faculty members that only a few of them were invited to 
participate in the discussion regarding this substitution.  Subsequently, Ivy’s academic 
network “enrolled” enough powerful actors to “conscript” the VP and his project team 
and created a “translation” point where administrative interests had little choice but to 
accommodate faculty interest. Finally, yielding to the mounting pressure from faculty 
members, the VP and his project team had to create a bolt-on to accommodate the 
faculty interest. Subsequently, it led to a number of modifications.  
 36 
Unlike other ERP studies that highlight the exclusion of end user influence (e.g., 
Sawyer, 2001), this case study gets into the end-users’ (faculty members and 
associated administrative staff) influence and its accommodation into ERP. But, the 
central thrust is on the resolution of the articulated conflicts between the local 
traditional work practices and the ERP’s “global” work practices through persuasive 
means and the resultant evolution of a shared social consensus through compromises. 
For example, the major part of the story is the articulation of the conflicts and its 
resolution through making a “boundary object” (Star & Griesemer, 1994) of 
accounting practice that encompassed features of both local accounting systems and 
ERP’ standard global accounting system. As the story evolves, even amid the 
multiplicity of epistemic cultures (the academic culture of the university and the 
corporate culture that ERP and its promoters embody) and of time perspectives (the 
local rhythms of work that the university follows and the global clock time that ERP 
propounds) the creation of boundary objects finally leads to the “achievement of 
order” and to the acceptance of ERP as an “organizational matter-of-fact”. With a 
greater focus on the resolution of conflicts through persuasive processes and the 
resultant achievement of order, the Wagner studies do not focus analytically on other 
modalities of power such as coercion although they indicate the role of coercion in 
constructing a social consensus (e.g., the consultants forced to change ERP against 
their will). Rather, these studies illustrate the social constructivist idea of the rhetorical 
resolution of articulated conflicts, and subsequent “achievement of order” that could 
lead to a shared social consensus that accepts ERP as a working technology in the 
organization. In turn, such critical IS studies miss the opportunity to question the 
taken-for-granted sharedness of the social consensus that could be based on a 
manufactured consent of employees (Burawoy, 1984). Nevertheless, this study is a 
pioneering contribution to the burgeoning studies in sociopolitical dynamics of IT 
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implementation in organizations, and to the ERP studies, specifically from ANT 
perspective. Like the Wagner studies, many other scholars have also focused on either 
the possibilities of tension between the local practices and ERP’s global practices or 
the negotiations about ERP technology in Western context (for a review, see Esteves 
& Bohórquez, 2008). Many of them call for further in-depth case research to better 
understand the tensions. Therefore, the studies like the Wagner studies need to be 
followed up with a sociopolitical examination of ERP implementation that considers 
various modalities of power and in different organizational contexts and cultures.  
Another stream of sociopolitical negotiation studies focuses on the process of 
negotiations and its consequence. Howcroft & Light (2006) examined how vendors 
influenced the management’s choice of CRM products in a UK organization, which 
resulted in accepting the system as successful despite user dissatisfaction.  This is the 
only critical enterprise system study I could find that used a neo-Marxian approach to 
exercise of power that highlights the structural use of managerial power (the CEO 
imposing his decision on other employees despite their disagreement). However, this 
study neither focuses on the implementation of ERP nor does it  analyze the role of 
coercion in generating a seemingly shared consensus on the choice of ERP product.  
 
As I mentioned in chapter 1, implementation of ERP technology is an empirically and 
theoretically important phenomenon for organizational scholars to understand. Yet, 
surprisingly, there are only a countable number of organizational studies on ERP 
implementation. One of them (Volkoff, Strong, & Elmes, 2007) focuses on the 
technology mediated organizational change but not on the sociopolitical construction 
of ERP implementation. A few of them have an exclusive focus on the consequences 
of negotiations. For example, Elmes, Strong & Volkoff  (2005) showed that ERP 
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negotiations in a U.S. organization resulted in enabling the users to perform more 
tasks (and thus making them more powerful) at the same time as it constrained them 
by making them more visible to their superiors and thus more monitorable. Hall’s 
work (Hall, 2002; 2005) on Australian ERP implementation highlights the negative 
impact of ERP implementation on employees’ working life. The only study I could 
find that focuses on the critical aspects of sociopolitical negotiations of ERP 
implementation is the Grant et al. (2006) study. They found that the management’s 
discourse of ERP benefits in an Australian organization failed when end users started 
advancing counter discourses based on their actual experience with the ERP system. 
Subsequently, ERP was customized to some extent and the management appropriated 
the user discourse and protected the management’s discursive legitimacy and power. 
Similar to the critical IS studies on sociopolitical negotiations of ERP implementation, 
the Grant et al. study too has exclusive focus on discursive persuasion and a Western 
context of study. 
 
2.3 The need for a holistic process oriented approach and a non-Western study 
The literature review presented above covered three streams of literature: a) the 
organizational studies on technology change in organizations including ERP 
implementation, b) the IS literature on implementation of IS, especially ERP in 
organizations, and c) the sociology of technology literature6 as a theoretical foundation 
for studies on technology change in organizations. This interdisciplinary literature 
review highlighted four points. Historically, both organizational studies on technology 
change in organizations and the IS literature on IT implementation, especially ERP 
                                                 
6
 I do not claim of an exhaustive and systematic review of the literature in these three fields. As I 
mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, I reviewed only the prominent works that are relevant to my 
study. 
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implementation, have treated technology as an independent variable that brings forth 
organizational change. Following a social constructionist approach, there is a growing 
exception that investigates negotiations about modification of technology.  Within this 
stream of research, the critical (in the sense of questioning the prevalent claims and 
taken-for-granted beliefs) investigation of the sociopolitical process involved in such 
negotiations is a nascent topic.  In this nascent topic, most of the studies confine their 
focus to one modality of exercise of power, namely, persuasion, more specifically 
rhetoric or discursive persuasion, and on one of the processes such as inscription or 
consensus formation.  Therefore instead of asking the implicit question of how do 
organizations construct (or still narrowly inscribe) a consensus on the working 
information system through a persuasive influence process, we need to ask a broader 
question of how do organizations construct a working IS through the exercise of 
power during the implementation of IS in organizations that do not assume a shared 
consensus per se. Such a question implies the need for a methodological approach that 
will not a-priori favor a particular theoretical perspective as far as the political process 
is concerned. Therefore, as I discuss in the next chapter, I chose grounded theory 
method as the methodology. 
 
In the literature I also have noted some points for methodological consideration. Most 
of the IT/IS implementation studies, especially ERP studies, are done in a Western 
context. Also, scholars have noted that most of the in-depth studies of ERP 
implementations are done taking a single organization as the case (Pollock, 2009; 
Pollock & Williams, 2009). Moreover, the critical ERP studies, and more generally 
ERP studies, have neglected an important sector of economy—small and medium 
enterprise (SME) sector—although ERP is increasingly being implemented in SME 
sector. Thus, methodologically there is a need for a sociopolitical study of ERP 
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implementation in a non-Western SME sector taking multiple case studies. In chapter 
1, I already have described and justified the need for understanding the sociopolitical 
construction of ERP in SME sector and in a cross-cultural context. Below, I further 
explicate the need for investigating the sociopolitical negotiations in ERP 
implementations in a non-Western context, which is expected to be a cross-cultural set 
up. 
 
2.4 Negotiating cross-culturally: ERP implementation in a non-Western context 
After tapping the Western market to some good extent, ERP traveled to non-Western 
countries (Huang & Palvia, 2001).  India and China have been particularly interesting 
locations (Gunasekaran, 2008; Huang & Palvia, 2001; Liang & Xiu, 2005; 
Martinsons, 2004), but contrary to the vendor expectations, the ERP market did not 
pick up as high a momentum as it did in Western countries. One of the main reasons is 
attributed to the non-Western culture of doing business such as a preference to use 
non-computer media for transactions. Such peculiar problems during ERP 
implementation has made some writers label ERP a ‘cultural misfit’ for non-Western 
countries (Soh et al., 2000). They observed that the problem of cultural misfits 
resulted in more numbers of workarounds. For example, Soh et al. (2002) show how 
employees had to initially institute a number of workarounds since ERP practices were 
at odds with the practices of the local insurance systems. In this cross-cultural context, 
scholars have even called for developing a cultural perspective on ERP 
implementation (Boersma & Kingma, 2005). Such calls and the need to examine the 
sociopolitical construction of ERP, a Western originated and designed technology, is 
based on the consistent argument and illustration that technological artifacts (such as 
ERP) come to embody the culture and social knowledge of the space (or locale) and 
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the time in which it is created (Dubinskas, 1988; Van de ven, 2005). Yet, most of the 
studies that focus on ERP implementations in non-Western context do not examine the 
sociopolitical construction of ERP (for recent example, see Cruz-Cunha, 2009). 
There are many studies that investigate the influence of local culture on IT 
implementations (for a review, see Walsham, 2003), especially ERP implementations. 
Most of them study the influence of local culture on the implementation outcomes. 
One of them (Sahay, 1998), although not on ERP implementation, is particularly 
relevant to this study since its context is India and it focuses on the difference in 
cultural assumptions that are inscribed in technology—Geographical Information 
System (GIS) technology—and the culture of the recipient Indian society (a set of 
public organizations in North India). Sahay (1998) show how the cultural difference 
led to an unexpected ‘failure’ of the project, failure defined in terms of the Western 
actors involved. At the same time the Indian actors defined it as a success since their 
definition of success was different. Although this study does not focus on the 
sociopolitical negotiations, it illuminates the complexity of negotiating through IT 
changes in non-Western organization. Since none of the non-Western studies in my 
survey of the literature focus on the sociopolitical negotiations about technology 
modification, especially ERP modifications, it is important to carry out such a study.  
Given the epistemological and methodological concerns I raised above, it is important 
to choose a methodology that will allow an exploratory interpretive theory building 
approach to answer my research question. In the next chapter, I discuss my choice of 
methodology. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In the 2007, Academy of Management Review’s special issue on interplay between 
theory and method, the editors called for researchers to make their ontological and 
epistemological stand explicit and to reflect on them. In the first section of this 
chapter, I present the epistemological position underpinning my study. I emphasize the 
interpretive epistemological approach and make explicit my ontological orientation. In 
the following two sections, I describe the research approach and tools employed in 
carrying it out, and describe the research design that uses grounded theory 
methodology.  The methods used in the field study are commensurate with the 
interpretive epistemology and are specifically informed by the study’s interpretive 
grounded theory approach (Glaser, 2004). The tools include unstructured and semi-
structured interviews, direct observation, participation in meetings, group discussions, 
examination of archives including emails, and questionnaires. The remaining sections 
(four, five, and six) explain how I employed these methods in my study and how I 
meet the evaluation criteria that the methods stipulate. I conclude with a summary and 
a remark that prepare the reader for the next chapter—case study description. 
 
3.1 The choice of research methodology: the interpretive epistemology 
While scientific tradition argues that an objective reality exists independent of the 
observer and the aim of the researcher should be to bring those truths and laws that 
constitutes that reality, the ontology of the interpretive research assumes that scientific 
reality is socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This subjective reality can 
be accessed through the articulations of participants and researchers as a result of their 
sensemaking activities (Walsham, 1993; Weick, 1978). Thus, one gains access to 
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individual interpretations of reality that evolves into a collective construction of reality 
by collecting and analyzing such participants’ articulations (Klein & Meyers, 1999). 
Therefore, the main aim of the researcher is to understand the process of sense making 
as situations emerge and are made meaningful by individuals and groups (Scott, 
2000). While there are different philosophical approaches to understand and interpret 
this individual and collective sensemaking (Lee, 1991), such as the phenomenological, 
hermeneutical, and ethnographic, this study is informed by the ethnographic process of 
interpretation (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Geertz, 1983) because it could sensitizes me 
to the context enveloped in the reality construction.   
 
The design of fieldwork should be consistent with the philosophical assumption 
underpinning the study. Epistemology becomes manifest within the chosen research 
methods and these in turn impact the status and nature of the data collected and the 
contributory claims made based on the research findings (Van de ven, 2007; Walsham, 
1993).  
 
3. 2 Research Method: Qualitative approach 
The qualitative approach is one of the predominant and legitimate methods in 
organizational and management research (Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Van de 
ven, 2007). In an attempt to provide tools for studying social, cultural, and political 
contexts through the eyes of the inhabitants, qualitative methods work to elicit 
perspectives, observe activities, and reflect on interaction during field investigations 
(Geertz 1983; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Rather than employing research tools that 
work to quantify and test variables, qualitative methods help the researcher gain a 
close relationship between context, content, and process (Pettigrew, 1990). A 
qualitative approach is especially fruitful in nascent theory research—topics for which 
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little or no previous theory exists (Edmondson & McManus, 2007: 1161) or in 
developing midrange or intermediate theories that draw upon separate bodies of 
literature in order to propose new constructs and/or provisional theoretical relationship 
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007: 1165; Eisnehardt, 1989). As I stated in the literature 
review, there is scantly any theory available that explains the exercise of power 
involved in embedding organizational elements into information technology system 
during its implementation within organizations, especially in a cross-cultural context. 
Therefore, a qualitative approach is suitable for this study. Moreover, as Denzin and 
Lincoln (2000) point out, adopting a qualitative approach is a particularly effective 
strategy for capturing individual viewpoints by examining the constraints in everyday 
life and developing a rich description of the social world in action. Capturing rich 
descriptions is essential to studies that examine sensemaking (Weick, 1984)   
 
There are various qualitative approaches that organizational scholars have been using, 
such as action research, narrative approach, and discourse analysis, with varying 
research agendas. Therefore, one needs to be careful about the choice of a particular 
qualitative approach—the research strategy.  
 
3.3 The choice of research strategy: Grounded theory approach 
The main research strategy selected for this study is grounded theory methodology 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Similar to the qualitative case study approach, grounded 
theory uses an ethnographic in-depth case study approach. Yet, unlike the qualitative 
case study approach, where researchers tend to impose their pet theories onto the data, 
grounded theory claims to facilitate a more inductive approach (Glaser, 1998). 
Therefore, if the objective of the research is to build midrange theories, especially 
where there is lack of theories, a grounded theory approach can help researchers better 
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develop the theory from the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Moreover, similar to the 
case study approach, grounded theory has gained legitimacy in organizational and 
management research (Suddaby, 2006; Van de ven, 2007) as well in IS research field 
(Orlikowiski & Baroudi, 1991).  
 
While using grounded theory to describe and analyze empirical data, I also bring in 
some features of the qualitative case study approach. I situate my empirical data in 
their historical context by giving a rich description of the context. Such an approach 
has the benefit of not losing the ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1983) of the context and 
simultaneously identifying the theory that emerges from the data through the 
systematic analysis that grounded theory provides. Moreover, I believe that such 
situating of the data will ward off the criticism against grounded theory-in-use for its 
decontextualization of empirical data (see Charmaz, 2006; Glaser, 2002, Goulding, 
2002). This criticism of decontextualization could also point to the positivist ontology 
of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser, 2002). Therefore, there might be a loose 
coupling between my ontological position (social constructivist approach) and 
epistemological position (post-positivist epistemology coming from grounded theory). 
But, since my objective is to build mid-range theory and that grounded theory has 
been used in sensemaking IS studies (e.g. Boudreau & Robey, 2005; Orlikowski, 
1993), I choose to use grounded theory methodology.  
 
3.4 The selection of the case organizations and their locations 
In a qualitative case study approach, the selection of the cases or the sampling of the 
case studies is sequential and conceptually driven (Miles & Huberman, 1994). But 
grounded theory emphasizes empirical concerns such as the probability of covering 
the empirical phenomenon under study to the maximum possible extent (Glaser & 
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Strauss, 1967). Therefore, the most important criterion for the selection of a case 
organization was that it should have an ongoing implementation of an ERP 
technology, preferably in its initial stage of implementation and likely to complete the 
implementation at least within a year—the approximate period of my fieldwork. Such 
organizations were available in different parts of the world. Since the focus of my 
study was partly on the process of embedding the contextual elements, such as the 
culture of the organization and the wider society, it was advantageous to have some 
knowledge about the social context in which the implementations would occur. 
Therefore, familiarity with the environment of the society was an important factor. 
Accordingly, I chose my home country—India--as the location to select the 
organizations. Moreover, in the age of globalization, the implementation of such 
technology projects takes place in an international cross-cultural context. Given most 
of the ERP products are designed and developed in Western countries, a non-Western 
country is particularly interesting. Coupled with this, there is a growing significance of 
Indian software industries in the international market, and India is a major destination 
for outsourcing software development and consultancy (NASSCOM data, 2004; 
Noronha & D’Cruz, 2009). On these grounds, India is a particularly interesting 
location to carry out this study. I prepared a pool of ten organizations that had ERP 
implementation at its initial stage and had plans to complete the implementation 
within the period of my observation. The pool contained seven manufacturing 
organizations and three service organizations.  
 
Next, I considered access and data availability as the main criteria for choosing the 
organizations from this pool. Scholars have noted the importance of these criteria in 
selecting cases (King & Applegate, 1997; Yin, 2003). For example, King and 
Applegate (1997:29) note that access to case sites is fraught with difficulty because of 
 47 
several “powerful barriers” to be overcome, including length of time, cost of research, 
access to managers, data availability, and the level of business sophistication. Four 
manufacturing organizations agreed to give me access in terms of sharing of company 
documents, employees’ time, other resources, and the permission to participate in 
some meetings. One was a public organization—a local government owned 
organization in my home state and the other three were private organizations: the first 
one a Western multinational organization in my home state, the second one a local 
private organization in my home state, and the third one a local private organization in 
another state in India. To enrich the theory by covering all nuances and variations of 
the empirical phenomenon the grounded theory suggests choosing contrasting cases 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Goulding, 2002). The qualitative case study approach also 
suggests such contrast to increase the generalizability of findings (Yin, 2003). 
Therefore, I considered the degree of contrast as the next criterion. Although there 
were two similarities (geographical location in the same state and type of industry--
manufacturing), the local government owned organization and the Western 
multinational private organization offered the maximum contrast along ten 
dimensions. These are described in Table 3.1 (next page). 
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Characteristics Site 1 (The public: Gov India) Site 2 (The private: WestIndia) 
Ownership State government owned, 
MD—a political appointee. 
Market leading European private 
multinational that took over 
Europeanowned private 
multinational replacing the 
owner MD with a British MD. 
ERP product 
chosen  
Local ERP later turned into a 
new ERP product development; 
operational environment: Linux 
Syteline—Infor (3rd in global 
market); operational 
environment: Microsoft 
windows 
Product and 
production 
process 
Basic chemicals; continuous 
production  
Specialty transformers; batch 
production small-medium 
industry sector 
 
Industry 
sector 
Small-medium industry sector Subsidiary unit of a large 
corporation 
Geographical 
location 
Chemical industry belt in a 
South Indian state 
The only hardware company in a 
local “Silicon Valley” in the 
same South Indian state 
Employee 
strength & 
average age of 
employees 
200 (managerial staff) +2000 
(non-managerial staff); average 
age: 45  
40 (managerial staff) +260 (non-
managerial staff); average age: 
30 
Labor 
relations  
Reported in the media as 
peaceful during past decade 
Reported in the media as 
conflictual during past decade 
Market focus Exclusively domestic market Mostly international market 
(60% approx.) 
Governance 
structure 
Labor-management partnership 
with presence of trade unions 
(TUs) from the inception 
No labor partnership; TUs not 
allowed as per Employer 
Protection Act (1995) 
Age of the 
organization 
48 years 12 years 
 
Each of these ten dimensions has bearing on either the ERP implementation or the 
exercise of power or both. For example, the difference in the production process is 
important for ERP since ERP is a software that contains standard work processes.  
Among the three private manufacturing firms, given the accessibility of data, the 
proximity between the organizations, the location of the organization in the society 
TABLE 3.1: COMPARISON BETWEEN SITE 1--GOVINDIA AND 
SITE 2--WESTINDIA 
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where I was born and brought up, and the degree of contrast, I chose the Western 
multinational organization in my home state. Moreover, my work experience in 
technology implementation with both a private multinational manufacturing firm and a 
public local manufacturing firm, and a family relationship with one of the managers in 
the public organization were added advantages.  At the same time, the fact that I knew 
the manager might have introduced some bias (for example, some people might not 
have talked to me openly). However, I was conscious about such a chance and took all 
precautions (e.g. proposing and signing non-disclosure of information with the 
interviewees) to gain credibility and confidence of the interviewees. The interview 
data showed that the chance of such bias was negligible. Moreover, I was 
conscientious about maintaining utmost integrity with issues of privacy. My status as a 
relative of the manager meant that a few community member prodded me for 
confidential information by asking questions such as ‘so what are the Materials saying 
about this?’ or ‘I heard you interviewed Mr.X in SQAD (plant 1), right? He is just an 
invertebrate-what did he say?’ Maneuvering through the political landscape was 
difficult at times but my previous experience in conducting qualitative fieldwork 
helped me, once the community realized that I would not disclose information, they 
stopped asking. Next, I discuss further implications of selecting the sties. 
 
3.5 Implications of selecting sites 
I expect this interpretive field study to enhance our understanding of the contemporary 
small and medium scale manufacturing industry context in developing countries and 
the behavior of its members during a large-scale IT project. Where the characteristics 
of this study are present within other contexts, the researcher might expect the 
negotiations surrounding the localization of the ERP system to produce the same 
consequences (Barley, 1990; Baskerville & Lee, 1999). Further, the selection of 
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contrasting research sites theorized through the lens of organizational theory and 
sociology of technology should provide a conceptual vehicle that is useful for future 
research projects and informative for professional practice.  
 
I am aware of the dominant perspective both within organizational literature and IS 
literature that intensive field study cannot be generalized to larger populations and is 
therefore of limited relevance. However, I join the scholars who have refuted this 
position and argue that such findings can be applicable to other contexts sharing the 
same empirical circumstances of this organization (see Barley, 1990; Baskerville & 
Lee, 1999; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003) 
 
An ontological belief that scientific reality is socially constructed underpins my 
interpretive epistemology. As such, the researcher is always involved in a circle of 
interpretation as he tries to make sense of the context. Inevitably the researcher will 
form prejudices, opinions and preferences based on his interactions and field site 
observations. My goal has been an awareness of, and accountability to, these biases. I 
documented my perspective in my research journal and actively sought to refine my 
perspective through interpersonal communication and the reading of official 
documents. Most importantly, I designed the study to support me in remembering my 
responsibility to be critical of initial interpretations. I explain this further in the next 
section on research methods. 
 
3.6 Research methods  
This section presents the methods I employed for conducting qualitative investigation 
of ERP implementation in two organizations. The main techniques for collecting data 
were semi-structured interviews, archival reviews, casual conversation among 
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employees, casual conversation with employees, and direct observation of various 
activities that included meetings, design and use of ERP software, and other 
organizational activities. Below, I explain the steps for collecting and analyzing data 
that I adopted. 
 
3.6.1 Preparation of case study protocol 
To conduct any kind of in-depth case study, scholars have suggested preparation of a 
case study protocol. The objective is to increase the rigor, reliability, and external 
validity of the study (Esienhardt 1989; Miles & Huberman 1994; Yin 2003). The case 
study protocol for this study included overview, field procedures, method of 
investigation and instruments of data collection, and planned interim analysis. I 
deliberately avoided preparation of outline of case study report—a usual part of case 
study protocol—since my intention was to build a grounded theory.  
 
3.6.1.1 Overview of the case study 
The overview contained primarily the objectives of the case study and the research 
question, the theoretical background on which my research question rests, and the role 
of protocol in guiding the investigator. Unlike a conventional case study approach, a 
theoretical framework or propositions were not formed at this stage since the intention 
of the study was to build theory through an exploratory study. Also, due to the 
sensitivity of the topic of this study—the influence of the exercise of power on 
technology and implementation from a critical perspective —the overview that I gave 
to the organizations I studied was very brief and couched more in general terms such 
as consensus making. For example, in both organizations, I presented the study as an 
attempt to understand how organizations manage to create a working information 
system from a standard technology package.  
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3.6.1.2 Field procedures 
The field procedures included selection of the field sites and gaining access to the 
organizations that I already described, participation requests, and collecting resources 
needed in the field. Although the participation requests were made formally later, it 
was more informal in the beginning. For example, in the beginning I requested my 
contact person in the organization to introduce me to the ERP managers. Later on, as 
both organizations gave me a free hand to interview anyone, I made appointments first 
with the individuals involved in the implementation, and subsequently, with the 
individuals not involved in the implementation (for example, supervisors and non-
managerial staff). All interviews in the field were in-person. Of the 154 interviews 
scheduled, I conducted 151 interviews.  
 
Before the interviews, and even before entering the field, I had collected as much 
information as possible about the organizations from documents and websites. I also 
had collected information about the ERP software during my initial visits to the 
organization before gaining access. I also had my laptop, digital voice recorder (no 
laptop), pocket diary and pens (all the time), and other accessories with me in the 
field. The organizations had given me special permission (which they usually do not 
give to researchers) to keep and use my laptop and digital voice recorder in the 
organization during meetings (except a few meetings) and interviews. This shows the 
unprecedented access I got in these organizations. I was given permission of the 
interviewees before taping the interviews. The use of pocket size digital voice recorder 
avoided diversion of interviewees’ attention from the discussion matter onto the 
device.  
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3.6.1.3 Method of investigation and instruments of data collection 
As I mentioned earlier, the primary methods of investigation were interviewing (in-
person) and direct observation. Additionally, I used questionnaire surveys based on the 
interim planned analysis. I collected data from multiple sources such as individuals 
(interviews), archives (company document and emails), visuals such as notice boards 
and placards, meetings, casual conversations among the employees (eavesdropping), 
and my casual conversations with the employees. I also had the opportunity to listen in 
on both formal and informal group conversations. I conducted group discussions as 
well. In Table 3.2 (next page), I provide a summary of these different methods of 
investigation, the multiple sources and the instruments that I used in both 
organizations. The use of multiple methods and sources ensured validity, reliability, 
and credibility of the data collected (Miles & Huberman 1994; Strauss & Corbin 
1998). Note that I took multiple interviews of the same individual at various stages of 
the implementation to map the evolution of individuals’ sensemaking.  
 
Next, I describe how I used these instruments in the field to collect data starting with 
the interviews.  
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Location & 
time spent # of  interviewees 
# of times interviewed (# of 
person* # of times) 
Site 1 9 managers 4*3+2*2+3*1 
Private 
multinational 3 consultants 1*1+1*5+1*3 
  14 engineers/officers 3*3+8*2+3*1 
August 07-
March 08 9 supervisors/ clerical staff 5*2+4*1 
  8 workers 2*2+6*1 
8 months (2 
weeks hiatus) Total # of interviewees: 43 Total # of interviewees: 60 
  
Interviewed 90% of the people 
directly involved 
Length of interviews: 30 min to 3.5 
hrs 
  # of meetings participated 10 
  # of surveys 2 
      
Site 2 8 Managers 1*4+1*3+6*1 
Local 
government 5 consultants 1*2+4*1 
  24 engineers/officers 3*3+16*2+5*1 
Sep 07- 
March 08 11 supervisors/clerical staff 2*2+9*1 
  5 workers 2*2+3*1 
  4 TU reps (workers) 2*1+2*2 
7 months (2 
weeks hiatus) Total # of interviews: 57 Total # of interviews: 91 
  
Interviewed 85% of the people 
directly involved 
Length of interviews: 30 min to 4 
hrs 
  # of meetings participated 3 
  
Group discussion (with non-
managerial staff) 5 
  # of surveys 2 
In both organizations:    
a) Functional areas covered: diverse b) organizational hierarchy covered: across, c) 
interview locations: inside and outside of organizations, multiple 
Other sources: Direct observations, archives, informal/casual conversations, 
employee conversations 
Note: * means a multiplication sign 
TABLE 3.2 METHODS AND SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION 
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As the qualitative case study approach suggests (Yin 2003), I prepared an interview 
probe. The interview probe consisted of an outline of some general questions.  The 
objective of the probe was to provide a framework to articulate the bare necessity 
questions to be asked. But in line with the grounded theory approach, in most of the 
time during the interviews, I did not confine myself to these questions. Moreover, 
based on the preliminary analysis, I refined the interview probe after two months of 
field investigation. The revised probe consisted of seven general themes: a) meaning 
of ERP, b) expectations of ERP, c) anticipated and actual changes in ERP software 
and organization, d) reasons for implementing ERP, e) Implication of ERP 
implementation for one’s own work and others’ work, f) images of actors (consultant 
and users), and g) understanding about the process of implementation. The interview 
probe served as a reminder regarding the bare information that needed to be collected. 
All the interviews (except four due to reluctance of interviewees and another two 
which were conducted over telephone) and meetings (except two where permission 
was denied) were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim. At the same time, I took 
detailed notes during the interviews. I transcribed all the interviews to my best ability 
with the help of my detailed notes. The verbatim transcription process was very time 
consuming with each 1-hour interview taking approximately 6-7 hours to convert into 
text. I did not use any voice recognition software; instead I listened to the audio 
records and transcribed it myself most of the time referring to the field notes in my 
research journal. The research journal, thus, helped fill-out the transcripts and 
supplemented the interviews. I added some notations to the end of transcripts from the 
research journal. These notations included pre and post interview banter, non-verbal 
cues, and my interpretation of events. An example: 
Although he had agreed for an interview at his office, now, he took me away to 
the canteen corner where there were none except two of us. He looked a bit 
timid in the beginning. Later on, he was comfortable. People consider him 
(name) to be close to the Purchase manager, who was fired three days back. 
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(Name) is known in the company for his open talk and I found this to be the 
case in the interview. He seems to pay high respect to research activities and 
considers research as an exercise of finding the truth. Also, see, he mentioned 
in the interview, “I am telling this so bluntly since you look like a true 
researcher” (ref: Kool 0.1).  
 
The research journal contained my observation, comments, informal or casual 
conversations (including eavesdropping), and practical information about office and 
plant locations and personal details that could help me develop rapport with 
interlocutors, such as hobbies, family members, or personal interests. Such rapport 
helped the interviewees to be at ease with me during the interview. 
 
All interviews except the interviews with the external ERP consultants were in their 
native language (which is my native language). I translated the transcribed interviews 
into English. To test the goodness of translation, I picked up three transcripts 
randomly from the initial set of ten transcripts and gave it for rating to two 
independent expert translators. On a five point scale (below average, average, good, 
very good, excellent) both of them rated my translation as good. I had contacted them 
later for suggestions giving them a description of the context. I accepted their 
suggestions on translation (for example, customer “push-in” for customer 
“thirukikayattal” in native language was their suggestion).  
 
In addition to the interviews, direct observations and participation in meetings served 
as primary data. I scanned various visuals such as the notice boards (for example, the 
notice on the company notice board and TU’s notice boards), placards (for example, 
five out of seven displays in the plant in the multinational organization were about 
customer focus), postings, etc. While the Western multinational organization allowed 
me to sit through all ERP meetings and record it (but no recording of employee-
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management council meeting), the local public organization did not allow me to attend 
most of their meetings. In the Western multinational organization, given my prior 
experience with ERP implementation and my engineering background, the MD told 
me that I could give suggestions in the meetings, if I wish. But I chose to be a silent 
observer. Both organizations offered me access to all ERP related documents 
including company correspondence with the consultants (such as emails and work 
contracts). In addition to these instruments of data collection, I also conducted group 
discussions with the non-managerial staff (called “workers”).  
 
Besides the methods I described above, I also conducted questionnaire surveys: two in 
each organization that I have not included in this dissertation. One survey in each 
organization was to measure the organizational members’ perceptions about time in 
their work-life since perceptions about time in work-life came up as a main theme 
during the preliminary analyses of the data. Another survey in both organizations was 
an opinion survey to collect organizational members’ opinions about certain aspects of 
ERP implementation, which emerged as central themes in the preliminary analyses of 
the data. One of these preliminary analyses was a planned interim analysis that I 
performed in November 2007, near the middle of my fieldwork period. I took a two 
weeks hiatus from the field to do this analysis.   
 
3.6.1.4 Planned interim analysis 
The final component of the case study protocol is the plan for an interim analysis 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). The interim analysis helped me to question my biases and 
initial interpretations in the field, which were highlighted in the process of analyzing 
the data. It also helped me collect new data on the themes that emerged during the 
analysis (for example perceptions of time in work-life). At this point in time, I did not 
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have access to any content analysis software such as Atlas-ti or N-vivo. Therefore, I 
used manual coding and followed the procedures of grounded theory that I describe in 
detail in the data analysis section.  
 
My research question is the following: in a cross-cultural context, how do 
organizations create a working information system through exercise of power? 
Preliminary analysis showed that one of the ways it happens is through influencing 
organizational members’ sensemaking (Weick, 1995) about technology and 
implementation. Therefore, I started focusing more on how the exercise of power 
affects organizational members’ sensemaking about ERP technology and 
implementation. For example, I started focusing more on the image about ERP 
technology, the actors (consultants and organizational members), and the 
implementation that the organizational members and the consultants held and 
projected over time.  
 
In addition to this interim planned analysis, I performed cursory preliminary analyses 
approximately every two months. The timely transcription of major interviews and the 
detailed field notes facilitated this process of preliminary analyses. It also helped me 
prepare for the next stage of empirical work. Many times, the important issues and 
actors referred to in interviews and conversations set my agenda guiding me to the 
next round of interviews. This incremental and participant-led process meant that I 
was able to take opportunities to reach interviewees and collect their narratives that 
reflected their in situ sensemaking. The incremental and participant led data collection 
strategy allowed me to gain multiple perspectives by interviewing not only 
organizational allies but also controversial actors and non-involved organizational 
members who may have otherwise remained ‘silent voices’ (Star, 1991). In order to 
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get the free flow of the narration, I also added general questions such as ‘please tell me 
what happened in the last implementation run (or meeting)’. Such general questions 
were supplemented with the ‘bare necessity’ questions that I outlined in the interview 
probe. The repetition of the ‘bare necessity’ question kept me in focus and increased 
the reliability. The results of the preliminary analyses were informally discussed with 
the ‘key informants’ (Yin, 1996) in order to refine my interpretation of events.   
 
Similar to the evaluation criteria for the qualitative case study approach (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003), Strauss and Corbin (1998: 268) stipulate four criteria for 
evaluating a qualitative grounded theory study: 1) the data, i.e., the validity, reliability, 
and credibility of the data as inputs to the research process, 2) the theory itself, i.e., the 
credibility of the output of the theory-development process, 3) the adequacy of the 
research process through which the theory is generated, focusing on analysis methods, 
and 4) the empirical grounding of the research, i.e., the grounding for the resulting 
concepts and theory in the data. The previous sections on selection of research sites 
and data collection methods cover criterion 1. For example, the selection of 
contrasting sites and collection of data using multiple methods from multiple sources 
ensures the validity, reliability, and credibility of the data (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
The following sections on data analysis and theory building methods describe how my 
study met criteria 3 and 4. The resulting process theory and coverage of criterion 2 are 
presented in later sections. 
 
3.6.1.5 Data analysis 
My research objectives were to find the processes by which exercise of power affect 
creation of a working IS. In other words, the intention is to build a longitudinal 
process theory as opposed to a variance theory (Van de ven, 2007). Unlike variance 
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models, process models do not identify causal factors and predict outcomes, but 
instead explain how the process unfolds, identifying the mechanisms that move it 
along. Explanatory process theories explain an event by neither predicting what will 
happen (e.g. variance theories) nor describing what did happen (e.g. descriptive case 
studies), but by identifying the mechanisms that generate what we observe in the 
empirical domain. Grounded theory is especially meant for building such longitudinal 
explanatory process theories that focus on social processes (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  
Therefore, I employed grounded theory to perform data analysis and build the theory.  
 
3.6.1.5. 1 Data analysis and coding 
Concurrent with grounded theory and the qualitative case study approach, the data 
collection and analysis occurred iteratively. As field notes and interviews were 
transcribed, they were coded. However, while I was in the field, I did the coding 
manually and briefly. I could not perform a detailed coding and analysis at that point 
in time. I performed the detailed coding and analysis only after I got back to Cornell 
from my field. The detailed analysis followed Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) 
recommendations for open, axial, and selective coding. I coded my field notes 
(research journal), memos I generated in the field, most of the archival data including 
emails and excluding some company documents such as manuals that were not 
significantly relevant to the research, and all interview data. Specifically, each passage 
(from one to several sentences in length) in every interview was assigned one or more 
codes reflecting what I perceived the speaker to be talking about. The code labels were 
the words used in the interviews (code in vivo) or were suggested by them. For 
example, below in Table 3.3 (next page), is an interview excerpt from my interview 
with a production supervisor along with the codes: 
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Interview excerpt  Codes 
The main point is the visibility 
to the (group’s) owners so that 
they can control things from 
there. They sit far away from 
us. As owners, they need to 
know so many things such as 
the variation in production, 
profitability, production turn 
over, etc. If they can come to 
know on real time basis, they 
can trace and control things 
better. ERP provides that 
visibility. 
 
Open codes: visibility to the owner, visibility to the 
management, owner’s control 
Family: visibility to the owners 
Super family (subcategory): visibility to the 
management 
 
Axial codes: “real time visibility through 
traceaility”, “visibility to owners for controlling 
purpose”, “owner’s virtual control through increased 
visibility” 
Category: visibility increaser; increaser of discipline 
 
Selective code:  
Category: disciplining tool 
Core category: technology frame  
 
During open coding, I coded this passage in many ways such as “visibility to the 
management”, “visibility to the owners”, “owner’s control”. These are called 
concepts. I grouped all similar concepts (e.g. “owners’ expressed desire to gain more 
visibility”) under a family “visibility to the owners”. Similarly, I had another family 
named “visibility to the top management”. Clubbing these two families together I 
formed a super family, named “visibility to the management” (see figure 3.1, next 
page). 
 
TABLE 3.3: AN ILLUSTRATION OF CODES  
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I used Atlas-ti 5.0 software package to track the coded interviews and field data. These 
super families formed subcategories. Theory development occurred iteratively with 
coding. Thus, as coding progressed, I organized codes into families and trees (for 
examples, see figure 3.1), compared similarly coded passages to generate more 
abstract theoretical concepts, and wrote memos to propose abstract concepts and 
Disciplining Agent Disciplining tool
Forced through visibility 
Visibility to peer Visibility to the management 
Time breakdown 
Work breakdown 
Traceability 
Real time Archive 
Category 
generated 
during 
selective 
coding 
abstracting 
from the two 
dotted boxes 
Additional 
code  
generated 
during 
axial 
coding 
Additional 
Concept 
generated during 
axial coding 
Technology frame 
Core 
Category 
Visibility increaser Increaser of 
discipline 
Sub 
category 
FIGURE 3.1: AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE CODING PROCESS 
 63 
potential relationships. Field memos formed the part of these memos. Next, I describe 
these steps.  
 
During the open coding stage the codes were primarily substantive, mostly using the 
vocabulary of the interviewees, e.g.,  “visibility to the owners”, “expected change”. As 
concepts emerged from the open coding, I started categorizing them and grouping 
them into families (e.g. “visibility to the owners”) and super families (e.g. “visibility 
to the management”). The super or super-super families (depending on the levels of 
break down) are called categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1998:114). In my case super-
super families were categories. For example, I had “visibility increaser” as the 
category at this point in time. At this point in time, I grouped the super families of 
“visibility to the management” and “visibility to peers” (subcategories) under two 
super-super families, named “visibility increaser” (category) and “disciplining tool”. 
This is the inductive part or forward moving. The open coding stopped here. Then I 
proceeded to axial coding, which is more deductive and backward moving. Strauss 
and Corbin (1998) recommend axial coding once a phenomenon (category) is 
identified and further explanation is desired. Similar to Glaser’s (1978) 
recommendation of coding around a core category (or subcategory), I started axial 
coding once open coding had uncovered phenomena of interest (category or 
subcategory), in my case, for example, visibility to the management (subcategory) and 
visibility increaser and increaser of discipline (category). 
 
I followed Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) axial coding recommendations, but treated this 
technique as a method through which to discover the relationships in the data, rather 
than as a set of restrictive rules. This was to avoid Glaser’s concern that axial coding 
could be overly restrictive, with questions emanating from the researcher rather than 
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the data (Locke, 2001). Suddaby (2006) expressed similar concerns, noting that 
grounded theory techniques require active interpretation by the researcher, not 
mechanical application of techniques. I used Glaser’s (1978) dimension family, i.e., 
coding for different types within a category or subcategory, for example different 
types of anticipated changes (by implementing ERP). As an example of my axial 
coding, consider the same excerpt I reproduced in table 3.2. Now I coded the passage 
around the subcategory, “visibility to the management”. I generated additional codes 
such as  “real time visibility through traceaility”, “visibility to owners for controlling 
purpose”, “owner’s virtual control through increased visibility”. Similarly, during 
axial coding, I coded a passage as “discipline forced through visibility” (which formed 
a subcategory) during open coding (see figure 3.1). In relation to this new code, now I 
had additional codes (that formed subcategories) such as “visibility to peer”, 
“visibility to managers”, “visibility to the top management”, and more specifically 
visibility to peer that occurred by increased breaking down of work (“work break 
down”) or increased breaking down of time of execution (“time break down”), which 
were concepts.  In this manner, I went through each super family and family of codes, 
re-checked whether the codes within the family (and super family) belonged to that 
particular family, and coded further (axial codes) to show its relationship within the 
family (or categories) with the subcategories.  To avoid the risk of fitting data into a 
pet theory (Glaser, 1998), I deliberately sustained a willingness to reassign the codes 
to a different family (or super family or super-super family) or even to change its 
label. I did make such changes. 
 
After axial coding of the interview and field data, the code list had expanded to 895 
codes. This large number of codes reflects two characteristics of my coding process. 
First, because I did not know what theory might emerge from the data, I coded broadly 
 65 
to cover several possible theoretical approaches to understanding role of exercise of 
power to create social consensus about technology and implementation. Second, 
perhaps, I coded for more depth than needed for the resulting theory, e.g., 68 codes 
were labeled consequences with some qualifier such as time, workload, visibility, and 
master scheduling. Although such detailed coding was useful in the constant 
comparison process, not all of it contributed to the resulting theory. 
 
3.6.1.6 Theory Building 
Theory building starts with selective coding. Selective coding is a process of 
integrating and refining categories with the goal of building and refining theory 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998: 143-147). Selective coding moves the analysis from a 
potentially large number of codes produced from axial coding to a few theoretical 
categories, called central categories or core categories that form the foundation of a 
new or revised theory. Theory emerges basically through finding the relationship 
between core categories. Selective coding involves integration and abstraction through 
comparison of coded passages, as well as comparison to the literature. To facilitate 
this process, I used Atlas-ti to produce various reports of all the text coded with 
particular subsets of the axial codes. I then read and reread these reports, comparing 
coded passages to each other both within and across categories for similarities and 
differences in order to re-group them and identify the core category that they 
represent. Going through the memos (in which I had written the possible relationship 
between categories or concepts) and comparing the coded passages, I built relationship 
between core categories. For example, I abstracted the  “visibility increaser” and 
“increaser of discipline” to “disciplining tool” after I went through more codes 
generated during axial coding that expressed the effect of visibility increase as a 
disciplining by the management via ERP software. Thus, at this point in time, I had 
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only one category, disciplining tool (in place of the earlier two categories). Further, I 
labeled “discipline” as a core category (see figure 3.1) around which two types of ERP 
images were projected during period 2 in the multinational organization. This core 
category was related to other categories through the notion of “technological frame” 
that I came across during my comparison of the categories with concepts in literature. 
Thus, the theoretical framework was about the change in technological frame that 
occurred across different periods interactively with the exercise of power. The theory 
that I describe later explains how the change in technological frame interacted with the 
exercise of power by relating the core categories under the notion of technological 
frame with the core categories under the notion of exercise of power.  
 
I moved back and forth from selective coding to axial coding. This generated more 
relationship between codes. For example, take the category “visibility to the top 
management” (see figure 3.2 on the next page). “Visibility to the top management” 
has 12 sub categories.  For the sake of explanation, I have exploded the relationship 
between codes in the sub category of “work break-down” under the category of 
“visibility to the top management”. Work breakdown has three members, which are 
interrelated. For example, management’s intention to gain more visibility into 
subordinates’ work (coded as “management’s intention for visibility”) led to 
management’s interest in embedding a more work break-down view in the software 
(coded as “management’s interest in work break-down”). 
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When a task was broken down into minute details and coded into the software, it 
resulted in an increase in the visibility of the subordinates’ task-related action to the 
superiors (coded as “detailed break-down—visibility”). In figure 3.2, I have not shown 
all the relationship and connections since my intention is just to make explicit how I 
used grounded theory method in my study. The abstraction to higher levels and the 
relationships forms the body of the theory.  Further, since my intention was to 
understand how the exercise of power leads to the evolution of social consensus about 
technology and implementation over time, I separated the codes with respect to the 
FIGURE 3.2: SAMPLE RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN CATEGORIES OR  
SUB CATEGORIES 
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time period in which the described phenomena occurred. For example, in figure 3.1, 
the category “disciplining tool” is an image of ERP that emerged during a particular 
time period of ERP implementation in WestIndia. Similarly, during different periods 
different images of ERP were projected and in turn translated into the software. I 
assigned the codes into different time periods based on two criteria: a) the time at 
which the interview was conducted (for example, I had asked most of my interviewees 
about their image of ERP during each time I interviewed them: I had multiple 
interviews of a single individual that spanned nearly the complete span of my 
fieldwork: see table 3.2), and b) I also separated them based on the time that the 
speaker (or the author of the text in case of archival data) attached to the image of ERP 
that they were explaining or the time a particular email or memo was circulated that 
projected the image of ERP under consideration. This helped me to map the change in 
the sensemaking of various actors and the processes involved in the evolution of 
consensus making over time.   
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Table 3.4 (on next page) gives the summary of what I have described so far including 
the theoretical background that I used for formulating my research question.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69 
 
 
Given the explanations of how I conducted my field study, in the next chapter, I define 
and explain the key terms I use in this study—technology frame and cross-cultural 
context. Further, I illustrate how I used grounded theory to evolve technology frame.  
Research perspective Choice 
Topic IT-enabled modernization efforts 
Overall premise How does the exercise of power affect creation of a 
working information system from a standard 
technology package 
Ontology Social construction of reality 
Epistemology Interpretive 
Methodological approach Understand the context and process of technology and 
organizational change through an interpretive field 
study 
Research strategy Qualitative case study overlaid with grounded theory 
Research methods Interviews, observations, review of archival 
Research site -- focal 
level 
Western private multinational manufacturing 
organization & local public manufacturing organization 
in South India – organizational level 
Detailed unit of analysis Negotiations around work practices 
Theoretical grounding Organizational theories of power; Sociology of 
technology 
Topic IT-enabled modernization efforts 
Overall premise How does the exercise of power affect creation of a 
working information system from a standard 
technology package 
Ontology Social construction of reality 
Epistemology Interpretive 
Methodological approach Understand the context and process of technology and 
organizational change through an interpretive field 
study 
Research strategy Qualitative case study overlaid with grounded theory 
Research methods Interviews, observations, review of archival 
Research site -- focal 
level 
Western private multinational manufacturing 
organization & local public manufacturing organization 
in South India – organizational level 
Detailed unit of analysis Negotiations around work practices 
Theoretical grounding Organizational theories of power; Sociology of 
technology 
TABLE 3.4: RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE AND CHOICES (adapted from 
Walsham 1993) 
 70 
CHAPTER 4 
 
TECHNOLOGY FRAME IN A CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT 
The objectives of this chapter are to define and explicate the two key terms I use in my 
study. The key terms, as the title of this chapter indicate are technology frame and 
cross-cultural context. I explicate the terms by showing how I abstracted these 
theoretical concepts from my empirical data. This will reveal how the key terms are 
grounded (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) in empirical data. In turn, it will also illustrate my 
use of grounded theory method. In addition to presenting the link between the abstract 
concepts and the empirical data, I also briefly describe the industrial and institutional 
environment of the State (especially during 2000-2008) in which the ERP 
implementations took place. The expected result is a smooth transition from the 
abstract world of literature review, research question, and methodology that we dealt 
with in the previous chapters to the empirical world of implementation case studies 
that the following two chapters address.  
 
4.1 Technology frame: Developing a central category 
In this section I explain and illustrate the development of the ‘central category’ 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998), the key concept that I use as the building block to build my 
theory that will answer my research question (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  
 
In figure 4.1, I illustrate the development of the central category. As I mentioned in 
the previous chapter, to develop the central category I followed Strauss and Corbin 
(1998).  Initially, I generated concepts through open coding (step 1 in figure 4.1). 
Subsequently, through axial coding, I abstracted from these concepts that resulted in 
categories and their relations with sub-categories (step 2 in the figure). During axial 
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coding I also generated more concepts, subcategories, and categories. I abstracted 
further, through selective coding to generate the central category that relates the 
categories (step 3 in the figure).  My central category is technology frame (step 4 in 
the figure).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.1: BUILDING THE CENTRAL CATEGORY: 
TECHNOLOGY FRAME 
 
Concepts 
increased cost 
consciousness, control 
over expenses, 
detailed cost analysis 
(Step 1: open codes) 
 
Subcategory 
Cost related 
behavioral changes 
(Step 2: axial code) 
Concepts 
timely data entry, 
punctuality, sequential 
execution of task 
(Step 1: open codes) 
 
Subcategory 
Time related 
behavioral changes 
(Step 2: axial code) 
Category  
ERP as a 
disciplining agent
 
Category 
Disciplinary changes by 
ERP 
(Step 3: selective coding) 
Concepts 
error-free data entry, 
no information 
hiding, work in team 
(Step 1: open codes) 
 
Subcategory 
Task related 
behavioral changes 
(Step 2: axial code) 
Concepts 
System forced time 
boundedness, 
reduction of users’ 
data control, through 
increased visibility to 
the management, 
increased accuracy in 
estimates 
(Step 1: open codes) 
 
Subcategory 
Means to achieve 
(Step 2: axial code) 
Concepts 
Increase in individual 
level task efficiency, 
time saving, cost 
saving, teamwork, 
increased 
professionalism 
(Step 1: open codes 
 
Subcategory 
Cost-benefit 
results 
(Step 2: axial code) 
Central category 
Technology frame  
 
Box 1 
Box 2 Box 3 Box 4 
Box 5 
Box 6 
Box 7 
Box 8 
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Now, let us consider the details of the steps. In figure 4.1, consider box 1. The 
concepts such as error free data entry, no information hiding, and teamwork across the 
departments were all task related behavioral changes that the employees expected 
would happen (or felt as happened) by implementing the ERP. Therefore, I grouped 
them together as task related behavioral change, which formed one sub category. To 
make clear how I generated the concepts such as error free data entry, in table 4.1 
(next page), I have given representative quote for each concept in box 1, frequency of 
such quotes, and the sources of such quotes.  I also have given the frequency of quote 
considering each open code separately. The table shows the density of grounding that 
the open codes have. As we move up in abstraction from open codes to axial code and 
further to selective code, the density of grounding also increases since the total 
number of quotes grouped under the code increases.  
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Open code Sample quote Frequency 
of quote 
Sources of 
quote 
Error free 
data entry 
In the old system (TIS) if we forgot to 
enter a requisition, I could easily trace it 
and edit it. This ERP does not give me 
anything like that...no error allowed in 
the data entry…. to deal with ERP we 
need to be perfect without any mistake  
30 Employee 
conversation, 
Interview, 
meetings 
No info. 
hiding 
We not only did not share the 
information but hid it from others..for 
example,..now, it’s no more 
possible..system makes it visible..no 
hiding of the information 
25 Employee 
conversation, 
Interview 
Teamwork 
across the 
depts. 
There was no teamwork. All works are 
in individual depts. When will the 
teamwork come? When we share the 
data. This is what ERP does. If I don’t 
share my design data, the other person 
also will do the same….Now, there will 
be and are more discussion and a team 
work. 
32 Interview, 
meetings 
Frequency of quote for open code: minimum-3, average-10, maximum-30 
 
TABLE 4.1: SAMPLE QUOTES FOR THE OPEN CODES 
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Now, I turn back to figure 4.1. Similar to task related behavioral change, there were 
time related behavioral changes (box 3), and cost related behavioral changes (box 4). 
Since the employees interpreted these changes as a part of a new discipline that the 
ERP was bringing, I grouped these changes under disciplinary changes (box 6), which 
is called an axial code. Then, other comments of the employees that resulted in the 
concepts presented in box 1 and box 5 made sense. These concepts were means the 
ERP used or the management used via ERP (box 1) to achieve the disciplinary 
changes and the resulting costs and benefits (anticipated and felt) (box 5) of such 
changes. Therefore, I confirmed the label “disciplinary changes” as the axis (result of 
axial coding). Underlying the disciplinary changes was an image of ERP: ERP as a 
disciplining agent. In sum, now we have a) an attributed meaning (or image: ERP a 
disciplining agent, see box 7) of ERP that implied an objective of ERP 
implementation—disciplining user behavior, b) means to achieve this objective 
through ERP implementation (example of one such means is system forced time 
boundedness, see box 1), c) expected or felt behavioral changes by application of these 
means (example of one such changes, specifically temporal changes is timely data 
entry, see box 3), and d) expected or actual results in terms of cost-benefits of such 
changes (example of one such results is increase in individual’s task efficiency, see 
box 5). In the next step (selective coding), I compared and contrasted these four 
aspects with other families of codes. I found similar relationship repeatedly emerging 
in other families too. As Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggested, I compared this 
repetitive phenomena with the theoretical concepts available in technology 
implementation literature and organizational cognition literature in order to check 
whether any concept could represent this repetition effectively. I considered “frames 
of meanings” (Collins & Pinch, 1982), “cognitive maps” (Bougon, Weick & 
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Binkhorst, 1977; Eden, 1992), “frames” (Goffman, 1974), “interpretive frames” 
(Bartunek & Moch, 1987), “interpretative schemes” (Giddens, 1984), “mental models” 
(Argyris & Schon, 1978; Shutz, 1970), “paradigms” (Kuhn, 1970; Sheldon, 1980), 
“scripts” (Abelson, 1981; Gioia, 1986), “thought worlds” (Dougherty, 1992), and 
“technological frames” (Bijker, 1995; Orlikowski & Gash, 1994).   I found 
technological frame, which I shortened as technology frame, as the most suitable 
concept that would tie the four different aspects together (i.e. category-subcategory 
relationship) as well as the different meanings or images of ERP (categories) that 
emerged over time. The different images of technology emerged over time, in other 
words the categories, were manifestation of shift in technological frame. Therefore, 
technological frame could connect the categories (see box 8, step 4). In the following 
paragraph, I explain why I found technological frame as the most suitable concept.  
 
The literature on Social Construction Of Technology (SCOT) discusses technological 
frame in the context of technology development (e.g., Bijker, 1995) in a community. 
The Information Systems (IS) literature discusses the same concept in the context of 
IT implementation in organization (e.g., Orlikowski & Gash, 1994). In both literatures 
technological frame is defined as a socio-cognitive device used for collective (as well 
as individual) sensemaking. Common to the definition of technological frame in both 
literatures are the assumptions (for example, the image or meaning attributed to 
technology), the knowledge (for example, working of the technology), and the 
expectations (for example, anticipated changes) that those who are involved in the 
technology development or implementation use to understand technology. In my 
representative sample, we can find these three dimensions. For example, the data 
suggests an image of ERP, anticipate or felt behavioral changes, and how ERP would 
function (for example through increasing accuracy in estimate) in order to facilitate or 
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bring about such changes. While SCOT defines technological frame broadly (which 
includes the technology itself, tests, procedures, etc. see Bijker, 1995), in IS literature 
the dimensions of technological frame are narrowly specified as a) an image of 
technology that reveals the actors sensemaking about the nature of technology and its 
capability, b) the reasons for implementation of technology, and c) the conditions in 
which technology will be used and the consequences of such use. Both the literatures 
mention that one may not find all dimensions of technological frame in the empirical 
study except the essential element of technological frame, the meanings or the images 
that actors attribute to technology. Given that technological frame is defined as a 
collective (as well as individual) sensemaking device, the essential dimension—
meaning attributed to technology-- and the elements of technological frame such as 
assumptions, knowledge, and expectations are consistently observed in my data, and 
that categories can be connected to each other as shift in technological frame, 
technological frame is apt to abstract from the categories that I interpretively identified 
in my data. Therefore, I chose technology frame (a shortened version of technological 
frame) as the central category.  In the following paragraph, I explain the central 
category, technology frame, starting with a more general concept frames of reference.  
 
The frames of reference held by organizational members are implicit guidelines that 
serve to organize and shape their interpretations of events and organizational 
phenomena and give these meaning (Moth & Bartunek, 1990; Weick, 1979). 
Borrowing the concept of “schema” from cognitive psychology (Bartlett, 1932; 
Neisser, 1976), an individual’s frame of reference has been described as “a built-up 
repertoire of tacit knowledge that is used to impose structure upon, and impart 
meaning to, otherwise ambiguous social and situational information to facilitate 
understanding” (Gioia, 1986:56). Literature in organizational cognition has extended 
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the idea of individual cognitive structures to groups and organizations (Calder & 
Schurr, 1981; Gray, Bougon, & Donnellon, 1985). A variety of terms has been used to 
convey the idea of shared cognitive structures, including “cognitive maps” (Bougon, 
Weick & Binkhorst, 1977; Eden, 1992), “frames” (Goffman, 1974), “interpretive 
frames” (Bartunek & Moch, 1987), “interpretative schemes” (Giddens, 1984), “mental 
models” (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Shutz, 1970), “paradigms” (Kuhn, 1970; Sheldon, 
1980), “scripts” (Abelson, 1981; Gioia, 1986), and “thought worlds” (Dougherty, 
1992).  In the context of the organization, frames refer to “definitions of organizational 
reality that serve as vehicles for understanding and action” (Gioia, 1986: 50). They 
include assumptions, knowledge, and expectations, expressed symbolically through 
language, visual images, metaphors, and stories. Frames are flexible in structure and 
content, having variable dimensions that shift in salience and content by context and 
over time. They are structured more as webs of meanings than as linear, ordered 
graphs (Gioia, 1986). The essential element of a frame is its interpretive meaning.  
 
Based upon the above-discussed literature and following IS scholars, I define 
technology frame as a subset of actors’ frames of reference (cognitive structure) that 
concerns the assumptions, expectations, and knowledge that actors use to understand 
technology in organizations (Orlikowski & Gash, 1994:178-179). As a subset of 
frames of reference, technology frames share the properties, dimensions, and uses of 
other frames. While, the IS literature specifies use of technology frame as cognitive (a 
cognitive device for sensemaking) (Davidosn, 2002; Orliowski & Gash, 1994), SCOT 
literature suggests one more use, political: a political device to create a shared 
consensus through persuasion. But, SCOT literature does not define technology frame 
as a political device per se. However, in the following chapters, I show that technology 
frame is used as an emergent discursive resource for sensegiving. Therefore, I will 
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argue that technology frame has a political use. In the following chapter, I use 
technology frame—the central category—as an interpretive frame (Bartunek & Moth, 
1987) to describe and analyze the two ERP implementations that occurred in a cross-
cultural context.  
 
4.2 Meaning of cross-cultural context  
In the literature review, I have mentioned a consistent argument that the sociologists 
of technology have made so far. That is technological artifacts (such as ERP) come to 
embody the culture and social knowledge of the space (or locale) and the time in 
which it is created (Dubinskas, 1988, 1988a; Latour, 1988; 2005; Walsham, 2003; Van 
de ven, 2005). I also mentioned that scholars have either implied or argued that since 
ITs such as ERP (Soh et al., 2000) and GIS (Sahay, 1998) have originated and 
designed in the West, they have embedded Western culture. When such technologies 
with embedded Western culture are implemented in non-Western social context, they 
may encounter a different culture (Sahay, 1998). This is called a cross-cultural 
encounter. Instead of following the general argument that ERP may have embedded 
Western culture and that the local organizations may have a different culture, I analyze 
the cultural notions underlying the standard practices preprogrammed into ERP 
software (i.e. ERP’s global practices) and the cultural notions underlying the 
organization’s local practices. Since ERP is basically a software that has 
preprogrammed standard work practices, I focus only on the work practices. Within 
this boundary of work practices, I focus on the temporal norms that are manifest in the 
enactment of the organization’s work practices (“local practices”). I focus exclusively 
on the temporal norms since they came up as the most interesting and crucial aspects 
of organizational change (i.e. the change in organization’s local practices vis-à-vis 
ERP’s global practices) during ERP implementation in WestIndia. These temporal 
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norms were in contrast with the temporal norms that underlie the ERP’s global 
practices. Therefore, the explication of the temporal norms embedded in local 
practices will lead us to the cross-temporal context, a dimension of cross-cultural 
context (Sahay, 1998; Trice, 1993), in which the ERP implementations occurred.  
 
4.2.1 Analysis of local work practices in WestIndia: The enactment of local 
temporal norms 
As part of the production planning, in WestIndia, the Production department had 
weekly targets in terms of number of pieces, due dates, and start dates. But, start dates 
were flexible, however, and each production supervisor had the discretion to decide 
start date. Many times supervisors would depart from the planned start date with the 
informal approval of the production manager. According to the production documents, 
there was recurrent slippage in hitting due dates. It was taken as “normal” to slip due 
dates by 5-8 days. In an interview one manager commented: “When the job order goes 
to production area it is very flexible there. Assume five orders go to production (as per 
the weekly schedule]. They (supervisors] may take up one while the other may be 
taken two days later, estimating that we can complete it even if we start it two days 
later. If we slip by a week, nobody cares.”  
 
Some times the slippage went even up to 2 weeks without much questioning from the 
top management. Thus, both the start time and the finish time were taken to be flexible 
and evolving through negotiations among the production staff and between the 
production department and other departments, such as Sales and Purchase. The 
historical context might reveal the reasons for these slighted and unquestioned delays. 
Also, the historical context described in the next few paragraphs depicts the evolution 
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of two existing practices7 (different from the ERP practices) that seem to embody local 
temporal norms, which are different from the temporal norms that underlie ERP’s 
global practices.  
 
4.2.1.1 Customer push-in 
Consider figure 4.2 (next page). During the inception periods, without checking8 the 
availability of material and machines, WestIndia used to accept all the orders it could 
get. Many times when a customer promised date approached, WestIndia would 
negotiate with the customers--mostly Indian--to get extension on delivery dates. Here, 
note that time is taken to be flexible, negotiable, and constructed between two parties 
(Adam, 1990; 1995). This ‘successful’ negotiation strategy was continued for ten 
years, which resulted in a practice of taking up the most “pressing” customer’s orders 
first for manufacturing, stopping ongoing manufacturing. Employees referred to this 
practice as “customer push in”, which disrupted the planned temporal order in which 
customer orders should have been taken up. The resultant delay in hitting the targeted 
completion date of production of the ongoing orders got carried over to the following 
periods. Over time, this “customer push in” with its associated disturbances in the 
temporal order became a normal practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Existing practices means the practices in WestIndia that existed before the implementation 
of the ERP technology 
8 There was an intuitive cursory check that the Production manager performed. But, there was 
no detailed checking. Later, I explain why there was no detailed checking. 
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4.2.1.2 Material diversion 
As figure 4.2 shows, the customer push in led to another practice—material diversion. 
The raw materials for manufacturing were issued from the Store after being recorded 
in the existing information system, called EIS against product ID (transformer 
number). Whenever the pushed-in orders were taken up for manufacturing, since there 
were no planned raw materials in the inventory stock against these orders9, the 
materials issued against the planned orders were diverted on the shopfloor towards the 
manufacturing of the pushed-in orders. Material diversion was also normalized. 
Surprisingly, the reallocation of materials that occurred in diverting materials was 
                                                 
9
 WestIndia had an inventory policy of keeping low volume of stock partly due to physical 
space constraint. 
Time 
negotiation 
with 
customers: 
Time 
negotiable,  
and flexible 
(Flexible 
schedules) 
Material 
diversion +  
No timely 
recording of 
material 
reallocation: 
Time less 
bound 
(No time 
bound 
action) 
Emergency 
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Time order 
disruption 
Incorrect 
material 
consumption 
pattern + 
experience 
based Ld:  
Time less 
bound 
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delayed 
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normalized: 
Time less 
bound 
(Normalized 
schedule 
slippage) 
Reinforcing & 
reproducing 
FIGURE 4. 2: TEMPORAL NORMS EMBEDDED IN  
WESTINDIAN LOCAL PRACTICES AND THEIR ENACTMENT 
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usually recorded in the EIS many days after starting the production. Sometimes, it was 
not recorded, apparently showing ‘indifference towards time’ (Sahay, 1998). Partly, 
this led to the generation of incorrect material consumption patterns resulting in wrong 
estimation of the quantity of the material required, and consequently ended up in raw 
material shortage. The lack of accuracy in the material lead-time (Ld)10 estimation 
worsened the situation. The Ld estimation rested on the experience of the purchase 
manager, implying that time is not some thing to be externally (to human beings) 
recorded and analyzed (Sahay, 1998).  However, this resulted in raw materials not 
being available in time to start production, which in turn, led to production delays. The 
production delays pushed WestIndia to again negotiate with the customers, reinforcing 
the temporal norms that take time as negotiable and flexible.  
 
Next, I analyze the third practice that employees called as “sequence jumping”, which 
is skipping some steps in sequence or not adhering to the linear sequence against the 
expected adherence to sequence while enacting a practice.  
 
4.2.1.3 Sequence jumping 
“Sequence jumping” pervaded many enacted procedures in WestIndia. Here, for the 
sake of convenience, I describe a simplified procedure. Consider the enactment of the 
steps from customer order arrival to starting of production (see Table 4.2, next page).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Material lead-time: It is the period between the time the purchase order for a material is 
placed and the time it is received at the Store.  
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Figure 4.3 (read with table 4.2) shows the expected enactment as per the ISO 
document11. Employees were expected to strictly adhere to this sequence, which has a 
linear flow. Compare this with the actual enactment in figure 4.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 There are a few more simultaneous steps, which are avoided for the sake of simplicity.  
Connection Activities 
a Order arrival 
a-b Order firming up (Sale manager) 
b-c Posting firm order to Production (Sale Manager) 
c-d BOM preparation & Control plan preparation (Sales Engineer) 
d-e Transfer of BOM and control plan to Production (Sales Engineer) 
e-f Preparation of Material list and transfer to Stores (Production 
Engineer) 
f-g Issue of material to shopfloor (Store staff) 
f-f’ Re-check for man-machine availability (Production staff) 
g Start production 
a 
b d c 
f1 
e 
g 
f 
FIGURE 4.3: EXPECTED ENACTMENT: LINEAR SEQUENTIAL FLOW 
AND EXPECTATION OF SEQUENCE ADHERENCE 
TABLE 4. 2: LIST OF WESTINDIAN ACTIVITIES 
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Browsing figure 4.4 (read with table 4.2), in actual enactment we can see two (or 
more) tasks done simultaneously along with skipping of some steps. This results in a 
network flow of tasks (as opposed to a linear flow).  I describe how it usually occurs 
in WestIndia. The manager1 who sat next to the production manager would tell him 
that a customer order arrived and the changes the manager1 would make in the control 
plans (no posting of firm orders and no control plan prepared).  From this conversation 
the production manager would guess the change in the materials to be issued (no BOM 
prepared). Immediately, the production manager would dictate the material 
requirements to the engineer sitting next to him. The engineer would prepare the 
material list and would post it to EIS at his convenience but usually within a day. 
Simultaneous with the posting, the engineer sends an operator to pick up the materials. 
Usually, the engineer did not expect the operator to return with the material within a 
strict time period such as an estimated standard time for such movements. Instead if 
the operator returned within a “reasonable time period” that varied from twenty 
minutes to an hour, it was considered normal. Interestingly, there were no standard 
time estimates available for such transportation movements. The operator who goes to 
FIGURE 4.4: ACTUAL ENACTMENT: NETWORK FLOW & 
 SKIPPING OF STEPS  (LACK OF SEQUENCE ADHERENCE) 
c e d 
b 
a 
f1 
g 
f 
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the store chats with the employees at the store and returns with no signal of haste. 
Once the materials are on the shopfloor, without any recheck of man/machine 
availability, the production would start. Meanwhile the Sales manager confirms the 
order and posts it to production. Sometimes, the BOM and new control plans would 
not be prepared at all. Thus, activities c-d and f-f1 are skipped. We can see the 
sequence jumping, which was a normal practice, evident in other examples that I 
describe later 
 
One may think that sequence skipping is merely an issue of change of (or deviation 
from) the order in which tasks are to be done (or spaced). But, adherence to sequence 
or sequence fixing, when it is ordering the activities carried out has temporal orders 
(Schriber & Gutek, 1987; Zerubavel, 1981) since activities encapsulate time. By fixing 
the sequence, the activity gets fixed both in space (i.e. its position in the sequence), 
and in turn, in time (i.e. the following activity can occur only after the previous 
activity is finished12) (Giddens, 1984; Sahay, 1997). While the sequence skipping 
avoids a linear imposition of temporal order, the adherence to sequential pattern of 
procedural action imposes a linear temporal order (Kallinikos, 2004). By fixing the 
position, the possible pattern of activity occurrence in time (for example, at any time 
A will always follow B) is also fixed and made easily predictable and controllable. Put 
differently, time is bound (time boundedness) and made controllable through binding 
space.  
 
In sum, in the enactment of WestIndia’s local practices, time was perceived flexible, 
negotiable, non-linear or networked, and less bound (e.g. lack of timely recording). 
                                                 
12
 This is particularly applicable in this case since there are no portions of activities done in 
parallel.  
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The enactments of these temporal norms were schedule slippages, simultaneous 
execution of two or more tasks, lack of adherence to sequential pattern of action, and 
lack of time bound action. These temporal norms, to a significant extent, reflect the 
historically salient temporal norms in Indian society as they have been depicted in the 
literature.  
 
4.2.2 Historically salient temporal norms in India 
In this section, I go through the historically claimed13 so-called “traditional” Indian 
temporal norms (as opposed to the so-called Western temporal norms). Agreeing with 
the critique of the cognitive-cultural dichotomization of time as Indian vs. Western 
(see Munn, 1992), I do not claim the traditional temporal norms or assumptions as the 
only way Indians perceived and correspondingly enacted time.  Instead, based on the 
literature available, I assume that the traditional temporal norms were made more 
salient (from a possible set of all temporal norms that Indians had been practicing). 
Perhaps such traditional temporal norms were more predominant among the powerful 
(e.g. Brahmins) of the Indian society at that point in time.  
 
Here I give only a brief description of the traditional assumptions based on Sahay’s 
(1998) detailed account. In religious Hindu14 literature, time is symbolized as an 
unending stream of life and death. Paniker (1976) describes the vision of time in India 
to vary according to whether it is treated as power, the self, or a divinity. In Vedic 
literature, time is discussed as the fruit of ritual action. The unfolding of time was 
something which man created (as opposed to an objective view) in close collaboration 
                                                 
13
 I put it as a claim since what is projected as Indian tradition is a Brahministic tradition, 
which was traditionally the most influential cast in Hindu religion. 
14
 Hindu (including its variants) is the major religion in India (80.5 %). Other major religions 
are Muslim (13.4.%), and Christian (2.3%) (see: http://www.india-travel-agents.com/india-
guide/religion.html) 
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with the Gods. Another view of time is one based on the absolute principle of fate. 
Quoting from the Vedas, Paniker (1976) describes this view of time as eternal and 
non-controllable. In this view all reality depends on time, one that cannot be 
controlled--an uncontrollable fate.  In a similar vein, while discussing fatalism in 
India, De Reincourt (1960) argues that the key to an understanding of Indian culture 
lies in realizing its indifference towards history and the very process of time. This 
indifference, De Reincourt (1960) suggests, eliminates the concern for immediate 
time, and thus the study of eternity takes precedence over the present. In addition, 
Indians often deal with cosmic, astronomical time that takes time as transcendental 
and goes to abolish the present, empirical time. Transcendental time tends to dominate 
immediate or empirical time where it is often the deed, the human or divine action, 
which determines the structure of time. In short, historically in the Indian Hindu 
tradition -- the predominantly practiced tradition in India-- time is assumed to be 
eternal, uncontrollable, and transcendental. This is in contrast with the so-called 
Western assumptions about time that conceptualizes time more as transient, 
controllable, non-negotiable, rigid, and immediate or empirical (Sahay, 1998). In the 
following section, analyzing the fundamental processes embedded in ERP software, I 
argue that ERP embodies the so-called Western temporal norms that normally an ERP 
user has to enact when the user uses the software. Acknowledging the contested nature 
of the term “Western”, I use the label global instead (which means globalized through 
ERP or claimed to be global by ERP promoters). 
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4.2.3 ERP’s global temporal norms 
First I describe how temporal norms are reflected in the mainstream ERP discourses15. 
ERP is generally described as both a business solution that provides globally valid 
“best business practices” and an IT solution that integrates various functional systems 
in an organization (Mabert et al., 2000). As an integrated Information System (IS), 
ERP replaces disparate silos of existing traditional ISs in an organization, and 
simultaneously standardizes existing organizational practices replacing most of them 
with the ERP’s in-built globally valid “best” practices (Wagner et al., 2006). The 
objective of the integration and the standardization is to increase data processing 
efficiency through increasing the speed of data processing, and in turn to reduce cost 
(Davenport 2000). ERP fits squarely with Pickles’ (1995: 85) description about new 
electronic technologies: “(N]ew electronic technologies permit the extensive 
surveying of new and more complete sets of data at great speed, decreasing cost and 
greater efficiency…also permit the standardization and manipulation of a variety of 
discrete data sets ..that can be codified and even commodified. This control 
technology and knowledge engineering require special skills, knowledge and training. 
The output is in great demand, students can find good jobs, and government, military, 
and business applications provides challenge for the university researcher”. The above 
example on the use of language to describe ITs like ERP reflects instrumental 
rationalistic assumptions of efficiency, standardization, and market-driven skills. It is 
also implied that time can be controlled by task wherein specific discrete data sets are 
standardized, codified and commodified at ‘great speed’ and ‘decreasing cost.’ Most 
of the academic studies (recent reviews: Moon, 2007; Esteves & Bohoquez, 2008) as 
                                                 
15
 Following Foucauldian literature, I consider a discourse as an institutionalized way of 
thinking, a social boundary defining what can be said about a specific topic, or, as Butler 
(1999) puts it, "the limits of acceptable speech". I locate it by checking for the patterns of 
communication (textual and non-textual) 
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well as practitioner literature (see the websites of ERP vendors, e.g. 
http://www8.sap.com; Davenport, 2000) on ERP implementation from a system 
engineering perspective have emphasized the reduction in time and the resultant 
increase in efficiency (Wagner, 2004).   In short, the discourses claim one of ERP’s 
main benefits to be an increase in process efficiency through control of time and cost, 
two important resources. This control is achieved through three basic processes built 
into ERP software: standardization, optimization, and integration. In the next two 
paragraphs, I explain the temporal norms that underlie these processes inscribed in 
ERP. I start with standardization.  
 
The objective of standardization is to reduce variability, and thus, make the entity 
(data) controllable and easily predictable. For example, as in Scientific Management, 
time for executing a task (broken down to minute levels) is standardized (called 
standard time) resulting in more controllability and predictability. Scholars have 
written elaborately on standardization process and the implicit assumptions of 
controllability and predictability (see Bowker & Star, 1999; Hatling, 1996; Hanseth, 
Monteiro, &). The same concerns underlie optimization. Here, the overall objective is 
to complete a transaction within optimal time and optimal cost. Thus, time and cost 
are taken as two key variables16 in the models of mathematical optimization that reside 
inside ERP. The very idea that time is a resource to be optimized is based on the 
assumption that time is controllable, finitely measurable or empirical, and expendable. 
This view of time is further reinforced in the next two steps: the planning of targets to 
realize the optimal values and the scheduling of the activities or tasks to hit the 
planned targets—the targets that can be broken down into minute levels (e.g. hourly 
                                                 
16
 There are many other variables like space, for example, that is expressed and optimized in 
terms of the distance that a material is moved on the shop floor.  
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targets). Next, I turn to integration. 
 
Integration is realized by linking each function and with its sub functions. These links 
are translated as relations between the function/sub functions (which are basically 
data), and constructed into a relational database. The relational integration of functions 
also implies a view of efficient coordination of action over space and time, an 
instrumental rational assumption, especially since these discrete data sets will be the 
responsibility of different groups of people (like the Purchasing department, and the 
Sales department). More importantly, through relational linking, the data and the 
operations on the data can become dependent on other data and the operations on 
them. For example, since the Sales functional module (set of data) is linked with the 
Production functional module (set of data)) through product ID—one linking key17--it 
may happen sales invoices cannot be generated unless the Production department 
enters or record the status of completion of the product. In practice, the implication is 
that the time at which production completion data should be recorded is dependent on, 
and bound by the starting time of the sales invoice generation. Actions (e.g. data 
recording) get time-bound which, in turn, makes time a bound entity. Thus, it is 
assumed that time is finite and measurable.  
 
The standardization, optimization, and integration are made possible through breaking 
down the tasks. That is ERP technology, as perhaps any technology, reconstitutes 
organizational operations only after it has broken them down into the minutest detail. 
The meticulous definition of data items, the precise identification of transactional 
steps, and the fashioning of such steps into clearly described sequences that cover the 
                                                 
17
 For example, the product ID will be present in the master tables of both Sales module and 
Production module 
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operations of the entire organization are essential to ERP packages. The unspoken or 
hidden premise onto which ERP systems are predicated assumes that organizational 
operations can ultimately be reduced to a large series of procedural steps. On this 
account, organizing is no more than the mechanics by which these steps are brought 
together and coordinated. The syntax of ERP systems just entails carefully defined 
data items, transactional steps and rules for bringing them into various combinations. 
Placed in such a context, the meaning of process tends, in fact, to dissolve into that of 
procedure, i.e. a linear sequence of discrete transactional steps necessary to 
accomplish a certain task (Sawyer & Southwick, 2002). The mandatory adherence to 
procedures that is to be enacted by the ERP user imposes a linear temporal order on 
the task execution (as opposed to the lack of this linear temporal order in the sequence 
skipping of WestIndia).  
 
In sum, in the enactment of ERP’s global practices, time is expected to be objective, 
rigid, linear, bound, measurable and controllable. The expected enactments of these 
temporal norms are schedule adherence and procedural adherence, and time bound 
action. If we compare these temporal norms and enactments, they are in conflict with 
that of the temporal norms and enactment in WestIndia. ERP’s temporal norms reflect, 
to a significant extent, the set of temporal norms that has been labeled “Western” in 
the literature.  Following the literature on temporal norms, if we assume that these are 
the temporal norms more frequently enacted or made salient in Western, or perhaps 
more industrialized part of the world, it is not surprising that ERP’s temporal norms is 
the reflection of those so-called Western norms. This is because ERP has been 
designed and developed originally in the Western countries. As I mentioned earlier, 
the literature on technology development has suggested that developer’s norms or 
broadly culture gets inscribed into technology (Dubinskas, 1988). In short, there is a 
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conflict between the temporal norms and enactments of WestIndia’s local practices 
and the temporal norms and expected enactment of ERP’s global practices. Also, 
while WestIndia’s temporal norms reflect the so-called traditional norms, ERP’s 
temporal norms reflect the so-called Western norms. Thus, we have a cross-temporal 
cross-cultural context in which ERP was implemented. Since the same arguments go 
with GovIndia too, I do not discuss the GovIndia case in detail.  
 
Having defined and explicated the key terms in my study and their empirical 
significance, in the following paragraph I give more empirical context, a brief sketch 
of the industrial and institutional environment of the State where the two 
implementations took place.  
 
4.3 The industrial and the institutional environments of the State 
Among all Indian states,18 the State had the highest rate of literacy, 90% (National 
Survey India, 2006), is one of the smallest states in terms of geographical area, 
covering only 1.10% of India’s total land area, and ranked third highest in terms of 
population density, 819 persons per sq. km. (The State census report, 2001), nearly 
three times as densely populated as the rest of India, with a per-capita GSDP of 
USD 237.09 (Raman, 2005), above the Indian average and far below the world 
average (Mohindra, 2003:8). The State's Human Development Index (HDI) rating was 
the highest in India (Varma, 2005) and is comparable with the HDI of the advanced 
nations in Asia (Heller, 1999; Varma, 2005). The high population density, high 
number of educated youth (service sector is the main economy and education is the 
prominent one in service sector), and low number of industries in secondary sector 
have resulted in large pool of unemployed or under-employed manpower (Heller, 
                                                 
18
 India has fifty two states that have semi-federal nature in its functioning 
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1999; Varma, 2005), the unemployment rate being 15.1%, the highest in India 
(Zachariah & Rajan, 2006). Many of the unemployed youth are active in trade 
unionism and state politics wherein the State had the highest number of public 
protestations (The Hindu, July 5, 2005; Heller, 1999).  
 
Some scholars have drawn a direct link between labor militancy that has been 
attributed to have caused low private investment and poor economic performance 
(Heller, 1999, e.g., Alexander, 1972; Herring, 1989;1991; Sankaranarayanan & Bhai, 
1994; Thampy, 1990). With regard to the private investment, the state had only 3.5 % 
(below national average of 5%) growth during 1980-2000, and thus the major 
enterprises were still public organizations. But, during the period of 2000-2007, there 
was a significant change. The State showed 8.93% growth in number of industrial 
enterprises that is higher than the 4.8% of national growth rate (Economic census 
India, 2005). This growth has been claimed to be an effect of change in the attitude of 
the political parties. That is, following the earlier lead of right wing parties, in year 
2000, the left wing parties changed their stand towards both private investments and 
the implementation of modern technologies in the workplace. The media as well as the 
left-wing scholarship discussed this change widely (The Hindu on modernization in 
the State, 2003). During the current decade, these changes manifested in ‘corporate 
friendly’ labor market policies that ‘would loosen the labor market rigidity’, consistent 
efforts by the alternate right wing and left wing governments to attract and sustain 
private investments especially by multinational corporations, and modernization of 
Public Sector Organizations (PSOs) (Bhattacharjea, 2006). This changed environment 
is the context in which the ERP implementations take place in the two organizations 
under study. 
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In the next two chapters, I describe and analyze the two ERP implementations that I 
studied. I use technology frame—the central category that I developed in this chapter 
as the interpretive frame (Bartunek & Moth, 1987) of my analysis. Through the two 
analyses, I connect the central category, the technology frame with other categories 
that I develop during my analysis. The relationship between the categories will lead us 
to a theoretical model that answers my research question.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RESISTANCE BY OTHER MEANS: ERP IMPLEMENTATION IN GOVINDIA  
This chapter presents the analysis of the implementation of ERP in GovIndia using 
technology frame as the interpretive framework (Bartunek & Moth, 1987). I present 
the episodes of implementation as changes in technology frames that occur through 
negotiation over the changes. I present the episodes in an approximate chronological 
order. I used the changes in two or more aspects of the technology frame as the 
criterion to slice the whole spectrum of events into different stages. Thus, the label 
stage does not necessarily indicate a temporal aspect. Instead, it signifies a change in 
technological frame. Still, the stages as it evolved in the two organizations mostly 
follow a chronological sequential order with some overlaps between consecutive 
stages. Wherever there was a significant overlap between consecutive stages, I 
mention it at that point of discussion. To understand the second ERP implementation 
that I examine in the following chapter I employ the same interpretive lens and style. 
To put the ERP implementation in context, below, I describe the historical context in 
which GovIndian ERP implementation occurred. 
 
5.1 The historical context of the implementation 
GovIndia is a State owned public sector premier manufacturer of basic chemicals such 
as chlorine, caustic soda, and lime. Before the year 2000, 80% of the production was 
sold out through annual contracts with other PSOs (Company document, 2000). 
During the current decade (2000-2010), GovIndia lost 10% of its annual contracts with 
a few PSOs because these organizations switched to other private companies 
(Company document, 2008). Therefore, there is a change in the market competition, 
which the management assessed as moderate (Company document, 2008).  
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During the past decades (1980-1990 & 1990-2000) many PSOs had faced frequent 
employee strikes, many times over technological change (The Hindu, July5, 2005). As 
mentioned earlier, the TUs affiliated with left wing parties called “left wing TUs” 
strongly opposed the introduction of information technology, arguing that it would 
result in the replacement of labor skill by technology. This reflects the Bravermanian 
deskilling thesis in the technology implementation literature (Lewis, 1997; Panteli & 
Corbett, 1996). For example, in GovIndia when the ruling government (right-wing 
government at that time) initiated automation of chemical plants, there were series of 
employee strikes staged by the left-wing TUs. The main attributed cause (by media 
and scholarship) for the slow-growth or death of many was the frequent strikes. 
During 1985-1995 many PSOs were declared “sick”19 (BIFR annual report, 2000) and 
some were either closed or privatized. Policy makers suggested “modernization” as 
the medicine to revamp the PSOs that would soon become sick and categorized them 
as “stagnant PSOs”. For example, in the year 1992, GovIndia was categorized as a 
“stagnant PSO” (but not “sick”) in need of modernization (BIFR Annual report, 1993). 
Modernization meant not only automation but also application of “modern 
management techniques” (Company document, 1999) such as Total Quality 
Management (TQM). This was the situation from 1990 to 1995. 
 
In 1996, when the left-wing coalition came to rule the state (following the 1991-1995 
ruling of the right wing coalition), the party declared that it would reexamine its stand 
toward technology change in PSOs (Malayala Manorama daily, July 31, 1996). 
                                                 
19The Board for Industrial and Financial Restructuring (BIFR)—a central or federal 
government agency--under the Sick Industrial (Special Provision) Act 1985, has the 
authority to declare an industrial organization as “sick”.  
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Gradually, by year 2000, the party pointed out the need for modern technologies to 
revitalize PSOs. The party also asked all TUs to support such initiatives since they 
were seen as the only means to increase the job opportunities in the State. As the 
media reports indicate and my interview data show, the change in the stand towards 
technology implementation trickled down to the TUs in the workplace. For example, 
in GovIndia, the TUs supported the TQM implementation that spanned 2000-2002, 
and the “computerization” initiatives that started in the year 2004  (I describe it later). 
ERP implementation is a part of this computerization initiative.  
 
Suggesting that the power relations can be embedded in technology, some scholars of 
sociology of technology have noted that technology is politics by other means (Latour, 
1981:229; Woolgar, 1996:92). At the heart of such politics lies resistance (Jermier, 
Kinghts, & Nord, 1994). In the case of GovIndia, the ERP implementation was 
unfolded through managerial employees’ (except the top management’s) resistance to 
GovIndian top management’s action. Thus, as the title of this chapter indicates, the 
ERP technology became a means for expressing employee resistance against the top 
management. In other words, the ERP technology and the implementation came to be 
employee resistance by other means. To understand the employee resistance at 
GovIndian, and in turn, the ERP implementation more contextually, we need to look at 
the ‘organizational climate’ (James & Jones, 1974)—a climate of managerial 
employees’ resistance.  
 
5.2 A climate of resistance 
During an interview, one administrative manager put the change in the current 
GovIndian climate succinctly:  
 
“Our earlier culture was that if boss commands something, it will be done irrespective 
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of whether it is positive or negative. Present culture is nearly the opposite…We used 
to respect the management [earlier]. They used to reciprocate. That is gone now...We 
used to obey even the managers in other departments.. Today, even if my boss says to 
make a payment today, I would say okay; but will do it only after, say, two or three 
days. [The employees considered this response as an ongoing informal go-slow strike]. 
The general tendency now is to defy..if possible..mostly due to lack of motivation..that 
has surely affected the implementation badly.” 
 
The managerial employees including the top management attributed the reason for 
such resistance to unresolved grievances about low salary (roughly two times less 
compared to the salary that the multinationals offer, 1.2 times less compared to the 
salary that the Central Government (equivalent to Federal government in the U.S.) of 
India provides, keeping grade of employee constant), low career growth due to 
stagnant promotions20, increase in workload due to freeze on recruitment21 while 
retirement is frequent,22 and consequent lack of motivation. A recent study on 
employee motivation in GovIndia found the level of employee motivation among 
managerial employees (except the top management) as worse (on a seven point 
Lickert scale) (Nair, 2006). The significant reasons for lack of motivation, according 
to that report, are the same as those mentioned above. To these reasons, during my 
interviews, many employees added two more reasons, lack of appreciation from 
superiors and unhealthy political intervention that resulted in current unfair 
promotions. Some managers attributed the reasons such as ‘increase in workload’ to 
the change in the GovIndian culture from a “command (by the superiors) and obey (by 
subordinates)” culture to a “request (by superiors) and resist (by subordinates)” 
culture. For example, see a senior manager’s (a member of the top management) 
comment during an interview: 
 
                                                 
20
 One average a managerial employee had been in the same hierarchical status for past 12 years.  
21
 In PSOs, the State government had imposed a freeze on new recruitment. 
22
 The average age of GovIndian employees is 45 (HRD document, 2006). As per the State rule, an 
employee retires at the age of 55.  
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“I should also explain the situation to you. Many times in the plant, mangers are at the 
mercy of engineers. For example, it is compulsory that in a shift there should be two 
engineers. [Currently] These two engineers are handling four engineers' work. Now, 
when the next shift comes, the second engineer may be on leave on genuine ground. 
The manager then has to request, rather than command the engineer, to stay back for 
another shift. This has been a regular feature (once in a week). That resulted in 
managers loosing grip over their subordinates. The effect has gone up to the top 
management except the MD and perhaps the DGM, the only people who can force the 
subordinators or can take strict action against them at present.” 
 
The ERP implementation unfolds the recursive relationship between employee 
resistance and management’s action in the changing or changed climate. In the 
following sections, using technology frame as the analytic lens, I present how this 
action-resistance (response) couple unfolded through various stages of the ERP 
implementation. But, before that, below, I describe briefly the evolution of the idea of 
ERP implementation since this evolution set up the backdrop for the technology 
frames that emerged later.. 
 
5.3 Evolution of the idea of integrated exhaustively automating software solution 
Earlier, I mentioned that in GovIndia ERP implementation was a part of the 
“computerization” program that the State Government asked Public Sector 
Organizations to implement (State Government Order, January 10, 2005). 
Accordingly, many PSOs in this State had ongoing “ERP implementation” programs 
(Malayala Manorama daily, March 13, 2006). GovIndia was no exception. The 
government order did not mention or suggest “ERP implementation” per se. Instead, 
the order asked the PSOs to ‘modernize’ the organization by ‘implementing modern 
Information Technology tools’ that would help ‘faster effective decision-making and 
management’ (State Government Order, 2004). As the top management reported, 
GovIndia (like other PSOs) had a free hand to choose what to implement and how to 
implement it. The top management held a series of discussions in which the TU’s were 
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not involved. It also discussed this point in the regular monthly meetings with the head 
of each department. Through such discussions the idea of implementing an “integrated 
software solution” (Company document, 2006) came up. In the spirit of 
“computerization” that was synonymously used for automation of work practices, 
GovIndian managers expected such an integrated software solution to be capable of 
exhaustively automating the work processes (Minutes of HOD meeting, January 6, 
2006). For example, below is a representative excerpt from interviews with the 
employees: 
 
Head of department 1: In the beginning our expectation was to get a very high level of 
automation of manual work.  I don’t mean exactly a paperless office but pretty much 
close to that, and then a good information flow across all departments to get all 
relevant information online..the idea was to achieve exhaustive automation that would 
lead to reduction of our work. Therefore, everyone was interested in this project. 
 
Senior Accounts Officer: In the beginning, when we went for the first meeting with 
Itech (the ERP consultant who implemented the ERP) our idea about ERP was that 
everything we will get at our fingertips..our goal was to have a paperless office. This 
is what we heard.. this is what we expected. We had a nice picture of our work getting 
reduced. 
 
Fifteen interviews reflected ‘paperless office’ (in vivo) or exhaustive automation as an 
expectation of ERP implementation referring to this period of time. Related 
expressions (e.g., complete automation) came up in twenty other interviews. As 
indicated in the above two excerpts, the expectation of the staff was that such 
automation would lead to reduction of their work content. This seems to be the 
primary reason for employees’ initial interests. Next, I describe how this image of 
exhaustive automation was subsumed into another image, an integrated software.  
 
GovIndia is divided broadly into two domains: a) office side, and b) plant side. The 
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office buildings are geographically located near the main entrance of the company (1/4 
mile from the entrance and within one-mile radius), while the plant buildings are 
located farther from the main entrance (1.5 mile from the entrance and within six-mile 
radius). The plant side has its own separate entrance. The main functions of the office 
side are those that support the production such as general management, finance and 
accounting, sales, HR, administration, materials management, project management, 
and purchase. The main functions of the plant side are direct production such as 
manufacturing of the basic chemicals and maintenance of the plants and the office 
including the buildings and equipment. The office side had an existing independent 
Information Systems (IS) while the plant side had no IS. The initial idea was to 
integrate the existing independent MIS of the office side into a large integrated 
software. But since these MISs had been developed with old genre software languages 
for which expertise was not available in the market, the management dropped the idea 
of integrating existing IS. The next idea was to purchase an off-the-shelf software that 
could integrate and automate all office functions. Later, the functions of the plant side 
also were added into the project. Thus, the final idea was to go for an “integrated 
software solution” that could integrate all functions of GovIndia (Minutes of Board 
room meeting, 12, February, 2006).  The minutes of the meeting did not mention the 
idea of automation. However, during the interviews most of the interviewees recalled 
that they had interpreted integrated software as a part of computerization (that is 
automation), and therefore expected it to result in automation of employees’ manual 
tasks.   
 
After the idea of an integrated software solution was finalized in the HODs meetings, 
the Managing Director (MD) constituted a “cell” (task force) to prepare with the 
details of tender advertisement and a draft of the work contract. The cell had eleven 
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members at the middle manager/officer level, each one representing different 
department. The cell members had expected that they would be given the overall 
responsibility to implement the software. By the time the final drafts of the tender 
advertisement and the work contract were ready, the chairman of the cell passed away. 
Subsequently, the MD dissolved the cell. The MD transferred the responsibilities of 
the software implementation to the Head of the Project division (HPD). HPD 
requested the MD to transfer the then-materials manager to assist HPD in the 
implementation. The MD created a new post, Manager Information System (MIS) and 
transferred the materials manager to Projects Division appointing him as M. Here 
onwards HPD and MIS had been the coordinators for the software implementation. I 
use the term ‘ERP coordinators’ to denote MIS and HPD, as GovIndian employees 
used it. Before MIS’s post was created, GovIndia had invited competitive bids for the 
software implementation. 
 
5.4 Stage 1: From integrated software to customizable integrated software-ERP an 
exhaustively automating completely customizable integrated software  
Many companies responded to GovIndia’s tender advertisement. As per the state 
government rule, the lowest bidder would win the contract unless the management 
decided to choose another bidder with sufficient justification for such decision. An 
external auditor would scrutinize these justifications during annual external auditing of 
the company. Therefore, to avoid problems during auditing, GovIndia used to choose 
the lowest bidder. GovIndia asked for sales presentation from the five lowest bidders. 
Three of them had reputed ERP software (such as SAP and Oracle) to offer, while the 
remaining two proposed to develop customized integrated software for GovIndia. One 
of these two bidders, Itech Inc. projected their software as ERP application.  Itech inc. 
also mentioned the aspect of task automation. These two parties, in their sales 
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presentation, pointed to the failures of reputed ERP software due to their lack of 
customizability and flexibility.  GovIndia feared that choosing less customizable or 
inflexible software such as SAP and Oracle would result in a difficult situation of 
either being forced to adopt the standard ERP practices built into these software 
products changing GovIndia’s local practices, or having the implementation result in a 
failure (Minutes of HOD meeting, June 6, 2006). Therefore, ‘in order to retain our 
(organization’s local) procedures’ and the underlying ‘rigid government rules’, 
GovIndia wanted to have a ‘completely customizable integrated software’ (Minutes of 
the HOD meeting, June 6, 2006). GovIndia held negotiations with Itech inc. and the 
other bidder. Itech inc. reduced its price quote below that of the other bidder and thus 
became the lowest bidder. Citing this reason, GovIndia chose Itech inc. for 
‘developing a significantly customizable integrated software solution for GovIndia’ 
(Company document, 2006). Thus, there was an expansion of the image of the 
software, or the expectation about the software, from “integrated software” to 
“completely customizable integrated software”. This sensemaking (Weick et al., 2005) 
about ERP before its implementation was prevalent among the employees. See some 
excerpts from interviews: 
 
Quality Engineer: That time our expectation was like this: a customized integrated 
software solution exclusively for GovIndia. The software engineers would develop an 
integrated software from scratch that would automate our transactions. Actually, 
Ramesh (a cell member) told me that this was their [cell members’] idea when they 
drafted the contract…  
 
Manager 2: We expected them to develop a fully customized integrated software for 
us..That was the major benefit we anticipated, of course, apart from the low cost…at 
the same time, as I mentioned earlier, we expected a complete automation that covers 
all GovIndia.  
 
Safety engineer: Although we started with just an integrated software, I think the idea 
was not to go for an off-the-shelf software..in the beginning this was not very 
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clear..we knew that we needed an integrated software, one that completely automates 
GovIndia ..then we understood what we need is a maximally customizable 
software..this is what the management told them (the consultants).   
 
As we can see from the excerpts of interviews, the GovIndian employees in general 
retained the expectation of exhaustive automation that underlay the image of 
customizable integrated software. During this period, 90% of the written 
communication between GovIndian management, represented by HPD and MIS (the 
ERP coordinators), and Itech’s management carried subject line as “development of 
integrated software solution”. In all these communications, Itech employees who 
would work on this project were labeled as “software engineers” (as opposed to 
software consultants or ERP consultants), which signaled that the software is not an 
off-the-shelf product but that some software engineers would develop it for GovIndia. 
The written communication within GovIndia such as internal memos regarding the 
software implementation, carried subject lines as either “development of integrated 
software solution” or “development of customizable integrated system” or 
“development of integrated computerization”. There was no word “ERP” in these 
written communications. Interestingly, another written communication, the draft of the 
work contract, was modified (from what the cell had drafted). “Integrated software 
solution” and “Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) solution” were used 
synonymously in the modified work contract. For example, see four representative 
sentences from the work contract: 1) ‘The integrated ERP software will be 
substantiated after 3 months of successful trial run’, 2)  ‘supply and substantiation of 
an integrated software solution spanning different departments’, 3) ‘source code of the 
ERP software is to be provided..’, 4) ‘the infrastructure requirements for implementing 
the integrated software solution’ 
 
 105 
The work contract shows that Itech had agreed to develop a ‘fully customizable 
Enterprise Resource Planning solution’ (or “integrated software solution”) for 
GovIndia. Some of the interviewees recalled that at this point in time, the employees 
as well as the consultants started using the word ERP and integrated software 
interchangeably in their daily talk. From this interchangeable use, some employees 
expected that the ‘new software would have significantly customizable (although not 
completely customizable) best business practices or in-built industry standards’. This 
was based on these employees’ understanding about ERP as a customizable standard 
software with best business practices or industry standards. 
 
At this point in time, Itech suggested GovIndia to start preparing the system 
requirement and to send it to Itech in the format that Itech supplied (Itech’s technical 
manager’s letter to HPD dated June 24, 2006). The format had an Inputs-Process-
Output format. To fill out this format, each department of GovIndia held a group 
discussion among managers, engineers (in the case of plants) and officers (in the case 
of office) within each department. Meanwhile, a team of four Itech software engineers 
came to GovIndia and spent three days collecting the input and asking for 
clarifications. Itech as well as GovIndia called this three-day effort, the system 
requirement study (SRS), and the resultant draft document, the SRS document. The 
average (as well as modal) time that Itech spent in each department for SRS was about 
2 hours (maximum 5 hours, minimum 1 hour). This was against the expectation of 
many employees, especially the office staff who had more experience with IS 
implementation. GovIndia asked Itech to meet all the requirements as it was drafted in 
the SRS. Itech agreed that they would meet all SRS requirements. Itech also assured 
that they would develop a prototype software at their site (Bangalore, a city in another 
State) based on their previous experience and the ERP software that they implemented 
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in another public sector organization, SQC. Subsequently, they would straight away 
implement the new ERP application software in GovIndia for trial use (Itech business 
manager’s letter dated June 30,2006).  
 
From such written communications as well as oral discussions during SRS, the 
employees expected the resulting software to be significantly customized ERP 
software tailored to GovIndia’s requirements. Quite contrary to their expectation, 
when Itech came with their ERP software after two months (in August 2006), the 
employees noticed that the built-in work practices were different from GovIndia’s 
work practices. The employees suspected that the so-called standard practices were the 
practices of the previous company, SQC, where Itech had an “ERP” project running. 
Moreover, many of the modules that GovIndia had mentioned in the work contract 
were not included in the software. Instead, Itech identified these modules as 
‘additional modules..that can be provided under additional scope of supply at a later 
date’ (Itech’s letter dated August 25, 2006). The ERP coordinators (from GovIndia) 
wrote back: ‘In the work order it is clearly mentioned under scope of work that you 
have to cover all the departments (italics in original) identified by GovIndia after 
completion of your system requirement study. You have accepted the work order and 
work was started. Hence, the above modules cannot be considered as additional scope 
of work..Moreover, as you have mentioned that your ERP is an exhaustive (my 
emphasis) system, it is expected that you would cover various [GovIndian] 
departments..Your consultants had promised us to show a prototype of the system that 
is fully customized (my emphasis). But, in the prototype SQC’s [the public sector 
organization where Itech had an ongoing ERP project] forms and entries are seen that 
is to be corrected’. (HPD’s letter to Itech dated August 26, 2006).  
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 As the italicized terms indicate, these communications also reinforced the image of a 
completely customizable exhaustive ERP software. Itech mentioned that although they 
used SQC (the previous company where Itech claimed to have implemented an ERP) 
procedures that were customized standard procedures, Itech had customized these 
procedures further to suit GovIndia’s needs. The Itech consultants went ahead with 
customizing the SQC practices to tailor to GovIndia’s need. But, the GovIndian 
employees opposed such moves openly during the interaction with Itech employees. 
Meanwhile, the management asked GovIndian employees to cooperate with Itech so 
that Itech would customize their software to suit GovIndia’s needs (HPD’s note dated 
October 5, 2006 to all HODs endorsed by DGM). The employees seemed to be 
increasing their cooperation by regularly turning up to give inputs to the software 
engineers who were customizing the software. 
 
Subsequently, the GovIndian staff in their staff meeting suggested that in accordance 
with the work contract Itech should develop an integrated software from scratch 
exclusively for GovIndia (Minutes of staff meeting, November 5, 2006). Finally, the 
GovIndian management asked Itech to develop a software from scratch (HPD’s note, 
November 11, 2006). But Itech initially opposed this suggestion, mentioning that a) 
ERP meant that there had to be built-in practices and then they were customized, and 
b) it would delay the project and would in turn cause huge financial loss to Itech inc. 
as well as to GovIndia. Subsequently, as MIS explained in an interview, in a 
discussion with Itech’s business manager, the HPD and MIS indicated the likelihood 
of terminating the contract if Itech failed to develop a fully customized ERP for 
GovIndia. Below is the relevant part from MIS’s interview: 
 
“When they [Itech] became too adamant [against significant customization], we had to 
change our voice a bit. We highlighted the contract clause for terminating their work 
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and the chance for such action. Then we could see a change in their stand. You know, 
sometimes these things only work”.  
 
Neither Itech nor GovIndia documented this conversation or any indication of the 
threat. None of the employees except the top management knew about threatening 
Itech. Itech fell in line and claimed to start a complete customization.  
 
Note that for Itech, ERP meant the presence of built-in standard practices to which the 
organization should yield at least to some extent, while for GovIndia (except for some 
employees) ERP meant just integrated software irrespective of whether it had built-in 
standard practices. The GovIndian employees’ synonymous use of integrated software 
and ERP in their daily conversation as well as in formal documents, such as work 
contract, is a manifestation of this view of ERP. In line with this meaning attributed to 
ERP, Itech was forced to develop a fully customized ERP. Itech felt that it had no 
choice but to accept this meaning of ERP (against their will), and in turn, change their 
technology frame of ERP as a customizable standard off-the-shelf product to a fully 
custom built integrated software. For example, see an excerpt from Itech’s business 
manager’s interview: 
 
“Instead of us if they (GovIndia) had SAP [System Application Products], they (SAP) 
would have bade bye-bye (when GovIndia asked for total customization).  They (SAP) 
should have escaped by this time.  But in our case, we are a small company, if we do 
like this, nobody will give us a project…Whereas in SAP’s case they can demand, in 
our case we have to budge even though we are forced to start from scratch…now, we 
are developing a new fully customized ERP for GovIndia.” 
 
But a little later in the interview, we can see the same manager interpreting and 
projecting this total customization as Itech’s flexibility (that implies a volitional 
choice) and sensitivity towards GovIndia’s needs.  
“Initially we tried to reuse. We struggled to bring in everything (referring to the 
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standard practices). Now, we are trying to give as much as they want.  This is just to 
keep our promise. Even the configuration we are changing.  Our approach is: tell me 
whatever you want I’ll give you the solution. This is a complete customized approach, 
a total flexibility from our side, as we promised them.”  
 
Intentionally or unintentionally, the fact of a coerced consent was turned into a story 
of understanding customer needs and solving their problems—Itech’s attempt to 
satisfy the customer. Itech employees as well as GovIndia employees reproduced this 
story.  For example, see a representative talk from GovIndian employee’s interview: 
 
“We told them straight that they have to customize completely to meet our procedures. 
We cannot change the government procedures. Now, they realized this fact. So they 
are trying to understand our procedures and solve our problems technically”.  
 
See a similar point in a conversation between a GovIndian employee and an Itech 
employee: 
 
“See, he (Itech’s business manager) asked us to keep it as flexible and open as 
possible because that is what he had promised. So we are trying to understand your 
procedures sir, and develop the software accordingly. That is why it is taking us more 
time.” 
 
The conversion of the coerced consent into a repeated story of Itech’s customer 
responsiveness, if removed from its historical context, would suggest that the 
similarities in GovIndia’s and Itech’s technological frame (meaning of ERP as an 
integrated software) was a result of consensus and the shared sensemaking. The 
information systems literature (e.g. Orlikowski & Gash, 1994; Davidson, 2002) as 
well as the organizational studies literature (e.g., Edmonson, Bohmer, & Pisano, 
2001) that use technology frame suggests that the similarities of the cognitive content 
between actors’ technology frame is a result of shared sensemaking. But the above-
described part of my study suggests that such a conclusion may be questionable unless 
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the possibility of coerced consent is addressed explicitly. The cognitive similarities 
may occur also as a result of coercion. This insight suggests that to generate a 
consensus on technology frame, and in turn, the meaning of technology, in addition to 
rhetoric and redefinition of problems (Pinch & Bijker, 1987), actors may also use 
coercive techniques. We will see these two points emerging again.  
 
We have seen that ERP technology has acquired a new meaning in this process, that is, 
ERP as merely an integrated software with no mandatory built-in standard practices. 
Following this new meaning, at this point in time many interviewed GovIndian 
employees who had understood ERP as a standard software with built-in best business 
practices, interpreted integrated software with standard practices as “branded ERPs” 
and integrated software without standard practices as “non-branded ERP”.  Thus, 
GovIndian employees’ common understanding was that Itech had been developing a 
non-branded customizable ERP for GovIndia. For example see an excerpt from an 
HOD’s (H) interview: 
 
Interviewer: Is there any difference between integrated software solution and ERP? 
H: Now, people are talking about integrated software systems as ERP.  Even they call 
it mini ERP in some companies. That is a kind of non-branded ERP. That is what we 
call it here.  
 
See an often-repeated dialogue between the interviewer and the interviewee during 
this time: 
 
Interviewer: What do you call this new technology? 
Interviewee: Integrated software, in other words ERP..It’s not a branded ERP such as 
SAP. But, it’s a non-branded ERP.  
 
An analysis of the written communication between Itech and GovIndia, and within 
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GovIndia showed that now the software was commonly referred to as customized ERP 
or a customized integrated software solution, the two terms being used 
interchangeably. Further, the synonymous use of the terms ‘integrated software’ and 
‘ERP’ in the daily conversations between Itech employees and GovIndian employees, 
and among GovIndian employees, reproduced and reinforced the ‘matter of fact’23 
(Latour, 1999:307) that ERP is just an integrated software. Moreover, whenever 
GovIndian employees tested the software, they had to pass through a first computer 
screen entitled ‘ERP Application for GovIndia’ (in a very visible and striking manner 
with illumination, bold font with size 150 point) which stayed in sight for about 30 
seconds. Many users had noticed this title and were irritated by the length of the time 
this screen stayed in sight. Moreover, in all other screens that the user would see this 
title appeared in conspicuous but small size (22 point). These incidents reinforced the 
“fact” the new meaning of ERP. Thus, so far, it is a mix of coercion (of Itech) and 
rhetoric (among GovIndian employees), that ‘stabilized’ (Pinch & Bijker, 1987) the 
meaning of ERP as an integrated software. 
 
By this time Itech had developed a few fully customized sub modules and given them 
for testing to the users, which took significantly more time than Itech had expected. 
Meanwhile, four of the Itech employees who were deployed in GovIndian ERP project 
resigned. Consequently, Itech deployed newly recruited employees in the GovIndian 
project. These employees, who were fresh graduates with Information 
Technology/Computer Engineering academic training, were left with the SQC model 
with which Itech started GovIndian project. Itech management had asked the new 
employees to a) retain the server design and the business logic they had in SQC ERP 
                                                 
23
 Matter of fact: something so ingratiated within a community as a result of extended negotiations that 
its presence is indisputable and obvious (Latour, 1999:307) 
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to the possible extent, b) change the database design to minimum extent, and c) 
change the only front end views (such as forms and the screens that the user see) to 
satisfy GovIndian needs . In other ways also, as the Itech engineers expressed in an 
interview, without practical experience they felt it enormously challenging to change 
the technology significantly (for example by changing the configuration or 
architecture or server designs including the business logics). Itech’s MD had emailed 
the Itech engineers asking them to finish the project as quickly as possible since the 
estimated project time was one year while the project had already crossed 22 months 
by now. Hence, the new Itech employees found themselves in a tight situation since 
they simultaneously had to satisfy the GovIndian employees who pressured to 
automate their individual work to the possible extent and to encode the GovIndian 
procedures intact changing the technology significantly. 
 
5.5 Stage 2: From complete customization to partial customization-ERP a partially 
customizable integrated software 
Itech software engineers as well as their technical manager dealt with this tight 
situation by projecting the translation of GovIndian work practices into software codes 
as impossible due to “system limitation”. At this point in time, the Itech engineers as 
well as the GovIndian user employees interpreted system limitation as the technical 
constraints that made it impossible to either automate or translate organizations 
existing work practices into software codes. For example, see an excerpt from the 
conversation between Itech’s technical manager (TM) and a set of GovIndian 
employees: 
 
TM: In your Flicker (the existing IS), you can straight away code into the database 
according to your needs. But this technology is Linux based web system (as opposed 
to Window based), more complex, and entirely different. In our technology, the code 
has to go from the screen to the EJB, from EJB to hypernet, and then to strut.  I have 
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to automate all these links and then only I can connect to the application server.  
Through application server, I have to send it to the database server.  That is what I 
need.  This is neither client server nor window-based with which you guys are 
familiar. In client server, you can do any program, you can bring in any procedure, any 
flexibility you can make, and you can automate anything.  In our system, nothing is 
possible that way.  To do that, we have to completely change the technology.   
 
 The same point came up in my interview with Itech’s business manager: 
 
“You go select table, everything comes here, this is their (GovIndian employees) 
understanding.  They think that this system is like their existing systems.  This system 
is totally different. It has its own limitation that we can do nothing. That is what we 
have been educating them. They are getting it bit by bit.” 
 
This ‘education of the users’ continued during the interaction between Itech engineers 
and GovIndian employees. During this stage I observed fifteen such instances of 
‘educating’. Below is a representative example.  
 
This is from the discussion regarding modifying the ERP in order to meet GovIndia’s 
existing purchase procedure. According to the existing procedure, the indenter would 
take the purchase folder that contained indent for the item to be purchased, the detailed 
description of the items, and the approval note of each superior in the chain (it can go 
up to the MD) through 22 steps of approval, to hand it over to the purchase manager. 
Once the suppliers quote their price, for the technical comparison of the products and 
the clarifications about technical specifications, the file will go from the purchase 
manager back to the indenter. Thus, there is a reverse flow. The Itech engineers were 
not ready to code this reverse flow. Instead, they suggested that the Purchase 
department print out the hard copy of all documents (since there is no internet or 
intranet available in GovIndia) and send it manually to the indenter.  It was not 
possible for the indenter to take print out at his or her end since the software engineers 
 114 
did not want to give access rights to the indenter. Giving access rights to indenter 
would have complicated the access right structure of the software. Now, see a part of 
the discussion between MIS, Assistant Managers (AM), and Itech Engineers (AE): 
 
AM1: But, why is the reverse flow not possible? 
AE1:Sir, the software will not allow us to do that. 
MIS: Can you please explain? 
AE2: Sir, you know, this is a java based multi tier program.  Once you commit the 
event of ordering (Purchase Order) into the database, you cannot change it. If you 
really want to change, you will have to change the database design and then you will 
have to change the connection to EJB and the logic in the EJB. It amounts to almost 
adopting a new technology. We can do these things easily in Windows but not in this 
software.  
AM2: But, then why can’t you at least give the access right to indenters? Isn’t it 
possible sir (to MIS)? 
MIS: Rani, that will lead to so many other problems. These boys are right. In web 
based program we have a lot of limitations. So we have to understand such technical 
limitations and accept them as such, I think.  
 
Finally, the technology was kept intact, not coding in the reverse flow. The 
implication was that the manual content of the work--an office assistant carrying 
purchase folder to the indenter and taking a print out that was not necessary--remained 
unchanged. This was against the expectation of employees that ERP would lead to 
significant automation, and in turn, reduction of their manual work content. See 
another example from a discussion between a senior engineer (SE) and Itech engineer 
(IE1) during testing of mechanical utility. The user asked for a search utility for 
finding cylinder number.  
 
SE: “It should be a simple program. Even in excel we can do it” 
IE1: ‘Sir, this is a database based program. You can’t change so easily as you do with 
excel. It has its own limitations. Also, you have to decide beforehand. There is a 
procedure that you made. If you want, you can modify. But you have to finalize and 
give us the final one. Then we can try, but I cannot assure you that it is possible. 
System may not allow it”.  
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The discourse around the system limitation and technical constraints embodies a clear 
message that the technology has its own objective existence independent of the 
developers and users of the technology, and such complex existence limits the extent of 
customization and automation. In other words, Itech employees had been trying to 
give a new sense of technology to GovIndian employees using a technology frame that 
depicted the ERP as a complex software independently (of its developers and users) 
existing that limits the extent of customization. Thus, the Itech engineers employed 
this technology frame to ‘mobilize sensegiving discourses’ (Spicer, 2005) that would 
influence other actors’ interpretation of technology and associated change.  
 
Since such discourses had an intentional purposive goal (influence others’ 
interpretation), it is strategic in nature (Child, 1972). Such sensegiving discourses are 
not simply a reproduction of the actors’ sensemaking. For example, as Itech’s software 
engineers expressed in an interview, they knew that if they had put more efforts into 
modifying the technology, it would have been possible to avoid the manual content of 
the purchase order processing job and encode the reverse flow. But perhaps for the 
sake of convenience, the software engineers chose to attribute the cause of difficulty to 
the nature of the software as opposed to so many other plausible reasons, such as lack 
of the engineers’ knowledge and skill, and time pressure from the MD. At least with 
some engineers it was not a convenient expression of their sensemaking, but an 
intentional political choice. For example, see an excerpt from my interview (I) with an 
Itech Engineer (AE) regarding the reverse flow issue. 
 
I: Yes, I see your point of the issue of difficulty in reversing the DB commitment. I 
also understand your difficulty to deal with the event triggers in this case. But, as per 
your tier structure, the data have to flow from EJB through the strut interface to the 
DB server, right? 
AE: Yes 
I: Then, why can’t you stop the commitment to DB at the strut validation? It may be 
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possible if you create an interface logic in the strut layer that would sit between the 
EJB server and the strut layer, I guess. Also, writing exceptions to event handler might 
help. 
AE: (a long pause) Sir, I don’t really mean that it is impossible. What you suggest 
seems possible. But, unless I try it out, am not sure. The issue is actually none of 
these. Promise not to tell anyone, sir. See there are many things. We are fresh and our 
experience is limited. The seniors (the experienced Itech engineers who resigned) have 
not left any documentation and so we don’t know much about how they built the 
architecture or they designed the database. Those guys do not respond to our queries 
now. Also, we are not given enough time to explore creative solutions, rather are time 
pressured. Then what can you do? You have to present it such that it hurts no 
one….Then, we sometimes highlight the technical constraints and system limitations 
to the users. This is what KK (Itech’s technical manager) also did, you see.  
 
Therefore, the use of technology frame as a discursive device for mobilizing 
sensegiving discourses could be both strategic and political. If it is strategic (or 
purposive), what is the purpose such sensegiving discourses serve? It is obvious from 
the data I presented that the logic such discourses embodied was ‘system limitation’ or 
‘technical constraints’. Therefore, such discourse was an attempt to create a perception 
among the users about what technology cannot do.  
 
The human-computer interaction literature discusses the notion of “perceived 
affordance” (Norman, 1988; 1999) as a user perception of the capability and usability 
of material objects. “Perceived affordance” is built upon the concept of “affordance” 
(Gibson, 1979) that originated in social psychology. Norman (1988:9) defines 
perceived affordance as perceived properties and capabilities of the material object. 
Recently, Hutchby (2001) extended the notion of affordance to technology 
development and coined the term “technology affordance”. Some scholars have used 
the term “perceived technology affordance” to denote how users perceive the usability 
or capabilities of technology (e.g., Gaver, 1991) including ERP software (e.g., 
Nandhakumar, Rossi, & Talvinen, 2005).  Since perceived technology affordance is 
users’ perception of what technology affords (or capable of) (Gaver, 1991), it is 
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possible to define “perceived technology non-affordance” as users’ perception of what 
technology cannot afford or what technology is not capable of. Therefore, we can 
translate the purpose of the sensegiving discourses of Itech employees as trying to 
influence the perceived technology non-affordance of the users, GovIndian employees. 
That means the system professionals’ (e.g., Itech’s software engineers and technical 
manager) expert power operates through mobilizing sensegiving discourses that 
attempts to create certain perceptions of technology non-affordance in users. We will 
see this mode of exercise of system professionals’ power again during another stage 
well as in the following case study of WestIndia’s ERP implementation. I discuss the 
significance and implications of this new concept “perceived technology non-
affordance” later in the discussion part.  
 
5.6 Stage 3: From exhaustive automation to partial automation -ERP a partially 
automating integrated software  
Meanwhile, through the interaction with the Itech software engineers (that involved 
creation of perceived technology non-affordance), and through testing and trial using 
the modules that Itech engineers had developed by this time, the employees realized 
that exhaustive automation, as claimed (by Itech) and agreed (between Itech and 
GovIndia) in the beginning was not coming through. Instead, GovIndian employees 
interpreted (a sensemaking process) ERP as a partially automating tool. In this new 
technology frame, there is a change in two aspects of the technology frame that we 
saw in stage 2: a) the degree of automation—from complete automation to partial 
automation, b) the customary presence of standard practices: this was not there in the 
technology frame of stage 2 but later added during stage 3 and then subsequently 
dropped.  Note that the negotiations between the employees, the management, and the 
consultants occurred around these two changes. Corresponding to these changes, there 
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were changes in the other aspects of the technological frame such as anticipated or felt 
organizational changes (due to ERP implementation), and the expectations of ERP 
implementation.  
 
By this time, Itech resumed the development of modules, such as the billing module, 
accounts module, and finance module, for the office side. Through the grapevine the 
image of partial automation had reached the office side. Many officers (office staff in 
supervisory capacity) informally discussed their concern about the reduction in the 
degree of automation with the MIS. For example, below is a part of the discussion 
between the Tax officer (TO), Accounts officer (AO) and MIS. 
 
TO: Don (nick name for MIS), finally you are putting us in trouble. The boys (Itech 
engineers) are okay but not their software. I don’t mean they don’t have the capability. 
But, what you told us in the beginning that kind of automation is not coming through. 
AO: Don, you know what happened in the plant. They are also not very satisfied. We 
expected a system better than our Flicker [existing IS] at least, leave Tally [another 
existing IS] alone.” 
MIS: I know that QC, UDAI, ME, and SE (different departments in the plant side) are 
fine with their ERP modules. Some of them started trial use. But, yah, we cannot get a 
paperless office, that was just a dream. 
AO: We don’t mean a complete automation. Don, all of us knew that it was just a 
dream. But, there should be a good level of automation. Otherwise, what is the use of 
it? If we integrate properly, we should also get a good level of automation. What is the 
problem Don? 
MIS: See this is a Linux based web program. They are using novel multi tier 
architecture. So there are a lot of technical limitations. That is what I understood from 
KK (Itech’s technical manager) and the boys. I think it is true to some extent. You 
both know well, the issues in developing a software. It is anyway impossible to 
automate many tasks using software.  
TO: Don, we are not looking for that kind of automation. I think the real problem is 
that the boys have no documentation; they cannot trace what they did since they don’t 
have any DFD (Data Flow Diagram) nor they know how to use professional tools. It is 
not their mistake, but they don’t have the experience. Anyway, this much only we can 
expect from them with the payment we made, right Don? 
 
As we can see from this representative discussion, in such discussions although MIS 
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was skeptical about the system limitation argument, he repeated the issue of 
impossibility to automate all operations due to inherent inability of software language. 
But, the employees who had IS background then redefined the complete automation as 
an expected level of automation. They also pointed to the lack of application of 
software engineering tools (expressed as “professional tool”) such as DFDs as the 
reason for not achieving the expected level of automation (as opposed to the inherent 
nature of the ERP software). In the interviews that I held with these employees at this 
point in time and in the conversations these employees had with other GovIndian 
employees, some of these office staff members resumed questioning Itech’s claim 
(and in turn management’s support of such claims) of the software being developed as 
ERP technology. This questioning spilled over to the plant side too. Still, this 
questioning of the meaning of ERP did not gain predominance.  
 
Along with this questioning, in the informal conversations among employees, the 
earlier discourse of anticipated failure of Itech came back to the front stage with more 
frequency. For example, see an informal discussion in one department between the 
HOD and a senior engineer (SE). 
 
SE: Sunny, I hear many people saying that this won’t work here. It’s doubtful whether 
it’ll be successful, right? 
HOD: My Gopala, that is for sure. It cannot take even our existing small functions into it. 
The boys are too fresh to do this job. Neither Itech has any professional approach. It’s 
just a third rate party got in through politics. 
SE: My doubt is this.  Isn’t it ERP for taking an optimum decision considering the 
importance of Finance, Production, Sales, etc? Will that be done?  Never. 
HOD: Why’ve you gone to such an extent?  It cannot even collect data properly.  Then what? 
It’s like operation is successful but the patient died. (Turning to the researcher), George, you 
got a fantastic patient here. 
SE: Don’t show such things to the US guys, okay? Don’t quote us anywhere, okay? 
HOD: Actually, we started eagerly looking for the growth of its hands and legs.  Now, 
the only place left is to write its obituary.  Many departments, which started with full 
enthusiasm, backed out by now. The so-called ERP is gonna be a failure, 100% sure. 
Georgekutty (researcher’s pet name), you ask around, most of us will say the same.  
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Such conversation went a step further and in the interviews some GovIndian 
employees responded like this: “The main reasons for the failure of ERP 
implementation here are the lack of the boys’ (Itech engineers) business expertise, and 
their inability to understand..”. Thus, these people tried to move the discourse of 
anticipated failure into a ‘matter of fact’ (Latour, 1999:307). Note the reflection of the 
anticipated failure discourse in terms of not only highlighting the possible/actual 
failure of Itech but also finding fault with Itech. This was a repeated pattern in many 
interviews that I had during this time.  
 
Finding-fault-with-Itech included complaining publicly and privately about Itech 
employees’ poor communication (in English) ability, low comprehensibility, poor 
documentation, lack of business knowledge (or “domain expertise”), employee turn 
over, and lack of knowledge about software engineering tools. For example, below is 
an excerpt from a tax officer’s interview. 
 
“ Then after we suggested it, when they did the modification the invoice became a 
replica of sales order. They froze even the tax components in the invoice! Also we 
can't amend the sales order. Even a layman would know this. Even in these simple 
matters we had to teach them means you can guess their domain knowledge.” 
 
Part of a discussion between Sales officer (SO) and Sales clerk (SC): 
 
SO: But, we need to enter the price only for the customers who don’t have sales order.  
SC: That would have been great. The problem is that they know nothing about our 
pricing policy or our procedures or our sales. Just now only they went to MIS to ask 
about these things. They didn’t know that the price (of the lime) varies with the 
variation in concentration. 
SO: I told them this point so many times. They just don’t get it.  Curse me! 
SC: Also, their communication is very unclear. Why do we have them here at all.. 
…………………. 
SO (to the interviewer): See, these are the issues. They still don’t know how we arrive 
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at the price. I explained all these procedures a year back to them. 
 
During a discussion between a manager (MM) and store clerk (SC) in Store: 
 
MM: This party came in through the backdoor (alluring to political influence)..it 
shows up in the quality of their work. Don’t you think so? 
SC: I heard that story sir. I think the issue is that they don’t have the expertise.  
 
Interestingly, the management did not respond to the employee discourses and 
arguments. The employees interpreted this management act as a conscious discount of 
their voice. For example, see an excerpt from a finance officer’s (FO) interview: 
 
“ (talking about office staff’s resistance) No doubt, very significantly. Because after 
we co-operated so much in the beginning irrespective of all bad things like lack of 
appreciation and the problems with the consultants if the management responds like 
this (referring to the discounting and forcing), what can we do but to resist. Their (the 
management) agenda is to bring the system into life within a short time. This is true 
with Itech too. We too share that desire but not by compromising our requirements. 
This is what we want to say. They should at least listen. Instead, they are just forcing 
us…. Somebody concerned [referring to the MD] should open his eyes and ears to the 
reality and the sincere voices. Otherwise, he himself should take the initiative to 
understand. If neither of these happens, we can do nothing. You know we can wake up 
the one who is really sleeping but not the one who is pretending to sleep.” 
 
This feeling of not being heard or discounted, an aspect of the second dimension of 
power in Lukes’ (1974) language or the exclusion of a different conception of 
technology in Laclau and Mauffe’s (1985) language, was mostly confined to the office 
staff. However, the plant staff recognized and supported the office staff’s resistance 
against this exclusion. For example, see an excerpt from the interview of an HOD: 
 
“From the plant side, we wanted them [office staff with IS experience] to be involved 
because they are the people who know the software. But, now they are sidelined. We 
want them to be heard. Many of us here understand their issues and their 
oppositions…We share their concerns and support them” 
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In addition to supporting the resistance of office staff, a few staff members from the 
plant questioned the management’s choice of Itech that was based on low cost. They 
argued that the management did not (and do not) consider the expense that GovIndia 
incurs by having Itech employees as company guests using company’s facilities 
including free food, accommodation and other privileges. GovIndian employees also 
reduced their support to Itech’s software development activities.  For example, there 
was a significant reduction in the frequency of employee attendance in the system 
room where the employees came for testing the modules that Itech developed so far. 
Noting this, as HPD instructed, MIS sent repeated memos to the office staff (involved 
in ERP implementation) in the departments of Administration, Finance, and Accounts. 
MIS marked a copy of these memos to the top management except the MD. This 
became an issue in the next meeting of heads (HODs and divisional heads) in which 
HPD attributed the reason for slow progress in the development of the office modules 
to the lack of office staff’s efforts. The office staff responded that since their workload 
had been increased (due to headcount reduction and year end work) they could not 
spend much time in the system room24. HPD then pointed out the drop in office staff’s 
enthusiasm from the initial level (during stage 1 and stage 2). The office staff retorted 
that they had spent good amount of their time in teaching the basics of Accounts and 
Finance to Itech engineers which was not expected. They pointed out that their 
modules were not progressing since Itech did not have the requisite experts present 
here. The MD instructed HPD to ask Itech to bring their Finance experts as soon as 
possible. During my interviews with these staff members, they initially projected the 
                                                 
24
 GovIndian employees called the room, where the ERP related hardware and software were kept, 
either system room or ERP room. The employees could not access ERP software from their sitting place 
(workplace) since ERP system was not yet networked with the employees’ computers that they used 
daily. Therefore, to test and trail use the ERP software, the employees had to come to the system room. 
Coming to the ERP room took 5 minutes for office staff and 15 minutes for plant staff. 
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same reasons for not going to the system room. But, later they told that their act was a 
protest against the management. Here is a representative example from the interview 
with an accounts officer who in the interview referred to the previously mentioned 
meeting: 
 
“The workload reason to some extent is a pretext. Non-cooperation is the main reason. 
The management knows it well. That is why they are pressuring us by sending notes 
and memos. If we don’t cooperate with the party whom they (the management) 
brought, it is certainly negative, it’s a protest. Knowing that there is such a negative 
side only they called us for the meeting. Then our approach was like this: yes, it is 
negative; but it can be turned into positive: either you give this to a professional party 
or this party should work hard and produce the result that we desire. They should meet 
our expectations. If the system comes, it is beneficial to us also. If the system works 
well, our workload will come down. We will need to do only 30% or 20% of what we 
do right now. That means, to get a good ERP is our objective, theirs too. In the 
company at an overall level there will be reduction in workload.” 
 
Note the employee expectation of work reduction through automation. Here is another 
example from the interview with a Finance Officer (FO): 
 
FO: See, the department, which sends the notes and memos, wants us to be in the 
system room daily for 2 hours and do the data entry. That is impossible. With heavy 
workload we are managing our work wonderfully. Normally, in such contexts, to 
boost employee morale the management will do something. Here, it is the opposite. 
The junior officer was given undue promotion. Leave it there. Apart from these, we 
have such heavy workload that we don’t have time to go there. Then they started 
forcing us. We decided not to go. 
I: What do you mean by force? 
FO: The HPD sent note to FC [the super boss of the office staff] complaining against 
us and reported our names personally to the MD as non co-operating gangs. When we 
are forced we have to go. But then we will think how not to go for the next four turns 
and even if we go, not to give valuable inputs. This is what is happening, but that 
should not be the way. If I feel sincerely that it is my issue also, I can easily manage 
all my daily activities in addition to the ERP work. 
 
As the accounts officer mentioned in the interview, the management was fully aware 
of this employee resistance. For example, see an excerpt from the MIS’s interview: 
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“But the most important reason (for the lack of involvement in ERP project), this you 
should not report, there is a general dissatisfaction and all the employees are 
demoralized. They take this project as an opportunity to give vent to their 
dissatisfaction. If they don’t do their routine work, they will be questioned; but if they 
don’t come for data entry, their heads won’t be cut off. Every one here knows that all 
other reasons are not very significant….Since the top (management) cannot easily take 
steps to increase employee motivation, they accept the reasons like heavy workload. 
These are known secrets.” 
 
Meanwhile, the consultants started projecting more system limitation issues. For 
example, below is an excerpt from the interview with an engineer (IE): 
 
IE: Take the example of card swiping data for system limitation.  We did the installation 
of Keltron Swiper.  It gives us a data file, which is downloaded to the existing, IS and we 
use it.  They (consultants) told that their system is not inter-operable with the swipe 
system.  Even they told that they can’t download the dat file into the oracle DB.  I did it 
in simple VB.  That is the way we do it now.  So it should be possible in Oracle.  They 
say it is a system limitation.  
I: What are the difficulties they mentioned? 
IE: Since it is not clear, HPD says that the existing clock (in the swiping machine) has 
no capability to generate the file required by ERP.  That is not right  (laughs).  The 
issue is not clock.  HPD doesn’t know that.  The boys say it’ll work only if we use 
biometrics.  They don’t know about it.  Biometrics is nothing but a reader unit.  It also 
generates the output file in dat format.  That is the way they project.  Actually, I had 
thought of installing biometrics.  These kinds of things they project in meetings.  Then 
the people who don’t know about it, most of the people here, will believe that the issue 
is either with the clock or ERP.  I guess there is some issue of knowledge gap here.  
 
Now, they increasingly added one more reason for system limitation that is the 
integration of various software modules that had already occurred. They argued that 
since ERP software is complex, and that through integration the data from different 
departments had been made dependent on each other, it would be difficult to 
incorporate the modifications suggestions in order to bring the coded practices closer 
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to the GovIndia’s work practices. Below are some examples to illustrate this point: 
 
During an interview, a plant engineer pointed out: 
“Now, when we make suggestions, they say that they have to make changes in so 
many places since they are all linked. Therefore, many of us dropped further attempts 
to make suggestions” 
 
Here is another excerpt from an Assistant Manager’s (AM) interview: 
 
AM: Now, take the issue of splitting of orders. In ERP you cannot split orders as they 
are linked to the MPR sub-module. That is the drawback of the system. That is what 
they said. As the integration progresses system gains a lot of constraints that you can 
do nothing about.  
I: Where did you hear this; who mentioned it? 
AM: The boys told us. It [the boys’ explanation] looks reasonable. But, perhaps, it 
may be due to their lack of experience, as some people say. But, to avoid all fusses I 
just pretend that I believe the boys. 
 
Below, is another illustration from one functional manager’s (MM) interview: 
 
MM: Yes, I told Don (MIS) so many times that it is not satisfactory.  Then, he says all  
the  time that it is an integrated system and so it has a  lot of limitations and we have to  
bear with such limitations. This is what the boys also say.  
I:  Do you believe that? 
 MM:  I don’t have the technical expertise to evaluate.  So I don’t get into it.  I don’t 
have much time to spend on it, and raise my voice.  My aim is just to get along, live 
peacefully without making much fuss, and not making any mistake and caught. So I 
pretend that I believe and make myself to behave so. 
 
The above excerpts show that at least in some employees’ case, the acceptance and 
reproduction of the consultant’s “system limitation” discourse was partly driven by 
perceived threat. These employees’ expressed conviction of the system limitation was 
partial.  
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The skepticism about the system limitations argument that appeared in the previous 
interview excerpts was partly produced by a counter discourse. The GovIndian 
employees with IT background (mostly in office side) spearheaded the counter 
discourse. These employees argued, even when the software is complex and that a 
significant amount of integration already occurred, still using software engineering 
tools software engineers should be able to trace easily the spots where the changes 
would have impact. They also argued that a software engineer with experience would 
be able to gauge the amount of that impact quickly. Therefore, the issue in their 
opinion was neither the inherent limitation of technology nor the path dependence of 
accumulated integration but the lack of experience of Itech’s software engineers and 
their lack of expertise. They added that to hide such limitations, these software 
engineers had been using “system limitation” as a pre-text. Thus, these employees 
interpreted the software engineers’ discursive attempt to shape technology non-
affordance as a political strategy. Note that these employees were directly involved in 
the development of the existing IS and that these arguments were based on their 
experience. Thus, their discursive resistance to the Itech engineers’ sensegiving 
discourse was an articulation of their practical experience (Haugaard, 1997; 2006). 
The counter discourse that the actors—some of the office staff members—formed had 
some effect. It did at least raise suspicion about the veracity of the Itech engineers’ 
system limitation argument, and in turn, reduced the strength of the discourse of 
system limitation. Still, many employees from the plant side and office side agreed 
that regarding the constraints of technology and its technical nature they had to believe 
the software engineers to a great extent since no employees in GovIndia had the 
technical expertise in the software language or the operating system that this ERP 
used. Thus, the discourses of system limitation had some effect on some of the 
employees. In sum, we saw the mobilization of the hegemonic sensegiving discourses 
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using technology frame and the responses to such hegemony, which varies, from 
resistance and accommodation to cognitive changes (e.g. change in the aspects of 
meanings attributed to the ERP software).  
 
In addition to projecting the system limitation based on the progressive integration, 
Itech engineers also asked the GovIndian employees to finalize their modification 
suggestions in one shot or with one testing and then not to ask for any significant 
changes after the testing. Some employees questioned the meaning of testing in that 
case. They argued that the employees could suggest changes only after repeated 
testing since they would learn the potential of software only through its use. This 
learning about the potential of technology is related to technology affordance 
(Nandhakumar et al., 2005) that I mentioned earlier. The consultants responded that 
such learning of technology’s potential might be imaginary since users actually could 
not know about the complexity of the software and had only a partial view of the 
software. The message was that even if the users think that the ERP affords execution 
of certain tasks in certain ways, due to integration or the limitations of the database or 
the architecture (a special architecture), it might not be feasible practically. The 
consultants told the employees that this was what had been happening and that it had 
unnecessarily delayed the project. The argument here is that for the perceived 
technology affordance to be of any pragmatic value, it has to be based on the 
knowledge of technology non-affordance. Therefore, technology non-affordance is 
more important. The knowledge of technology non-affordance rests with the ERP 
consultants (Itech engineers). Therefore the employees should believe the ERP 
consultants. This discursive attempt reinforces my earlier argument that the attempt to 
shape technology non-affordance is an exercise of ‘expert power’ (French & Raven, 
1958).  
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5.7 Stage 4: From automation to integration-ERP as an information integrator and 
an MIS report generator 
Perhaps due to the mounting resistance from office side or the non-availability of Itech 
experts, the ERP coordinators decided to change the implementation strategy. By now, 
Itech had been developing both plant side and office side modules simultaneously. 
Now, as the coordinators suggested, Itech started focusing only on the plant side. Also, 
the ERP coordinators convinced the MD that unless he took direct action, the project 
would not pick up, which had already been delayed by two years. Now onwards the 
MD started spending more time on the issue of the software implementation in the 
meetings and giving direct command to the HODs and their subordinates. This was 
unusual in GovIndia culture since the MD rarely gave direction directly to employees 
hierarchically lower than HODs.  
 
Within a week the MD called the next meeting (of HODs and departmental ERP 
facilitators) to discuss the ERP issues. In this meeting, the ERP coordinators projected 
the progress showing that on the plant side there was “good progress” while on the 
office side there was not much progress. The HODs from office side had no answer 
for the slow progress. In the meeting the MD asked whether the software would be 
able to offer the main functionalities in the existing systems and practices. The HODs 
said okay.  The MD, then directed that all employees, especially office staff, should 
put all efforts to get the ERP working as soon as possible irrespective of the level of 
automation it could achieve. He said that the consultants has assured him of meeting 
the main objective of the software, that is integration and generation of integrated MIS 
reports.  
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Thus, in this meeting the top management’s technology frame came out clearly: ERP 
as an information integrator that would generate MIS reports. In this frame, integration 
was more salient (Davidson, 2002) than automation. 
 
The MD also suggested keeping an attendance register (book) in the system room to 
record who showed up on what date for testing. For employees the attendance register 
symbolized a direct surveillance tool. For example, here is an excerpt from a 
functional manager’s (MM) interview: 
 
MM: In front of MD, we all told that there are only some problems that we can resolve. 
But when he left, behind the door, we all cursed this ERP project…for not meeting our 
expectation..some sort of significant work reduction..but the management’s interest is to 
finish it..somehow..get an information integrator.. 
I: And then what happened? 
MM: Frankly, the main issue   is lack of interest..you’ll show it by not  doing your 
work.  But, when forced you’ve to do.  They kept an attendance register (book to 
record) to monitor who is coming or not coming.  They’ll then take it to the M.D.  I 
rushed soon to say that I am present and doing my work.  It is simply due to fear.  
Still, I am doing my work…just trying to finish my part.. 
 
See another excerpt from my group discussion with the members of clerical staff: 
 
S1: Now if we don’t go when you are called, it is recorded. There is a  
register. I saw him recording yesterday. 
S2: If we don’t go when we are called, they think we are indifferent and non-
cooperative. So there is a recording device now. 
…. 
I: Sister, how do you feel about the attendance register? 
S3: I saw many people now rushing to the ERP room. Since the MD is involved, we  
got to be really careful. It is to monitor us. There was a strong complaint lodged in the  
last meeting about the lack of co-operation…Then this one came to tackle that non-  
cooperation. Here you see if somebody takes a leave, we’ll have additional work. That 
is what we mean by workload. But, another reason is we are a bit disappointed. We 
express it with our non-cooperation. 
S2: Just true. 
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In the above excerpt, notice the feeling of fear and a resultant tendency to accept the 
top management’s idea of getting an information integrator as opposed to a 
significantly automating tool. This feeling of being forced to accept the management’s 
idea was widespread in the plant side and office side (except Accounts and Finance 
departments). For example, see an excerpt from an assistant manager’s (plant side) 
interview (APM): 
 
APM:  We’ve reluctance in it.  Then due to compulsion, we go there and feed the data.  
I: What do you mean by compulsion? 
APM: See we have to do this job as an extra work outside of our routines.  So 
naturally there will be reluctance unless it gives us such a benefit. But, the committee 
(meaning MD & co-coordinators) is compelling us to finish this work somehow rather 
than doing it in the way we want. They want merely an integrated software. You just 
have to accept it. 
 
A clearer expression of the top management’s exercise of coercive power (French & 
Raven, 1956) came out in an interview with one functional manager (MM) and an 
HOD. See the excerpts below: 
 
MM: I am totally against it. We say we have already signed, it is brought here, this and  
that, etc..all floppy reasons. That is it. Anyway, now, the management is trying to get it  
the way they want it by force.  
I: What do you mean by that? 
MM: My Georgekutty (researcher’s pet name)….. The point is that none of us are 
satisfied with the party (Itech) and the way it is being implemented here. It should 
have been given to a good party and then our workload would have come down. Now, 
it is becoming just a linking software…that is what the management is imposing on 
us…if you oppose, you will be in trouble….they can play up your simple mistakes and 
issue you a serious warning memo..there are so many tricks…these things have 
happened here..there are living examples..see JK (MM went on with different 
individual’s story of management’s harassment)..the point is, better you pretend that 
you agree with them. 
 
Below is another illustrative interview excerpt. 
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HOD: Here the practice is that if the top management says something, even if it’s a 
folly you have to get done.  We can’t question the top management’s decision.  This is 
the concept of management here: the middle management is for execution of top 
management’s orders. The top management is to order and the middle management is 
to oversee and the operational staff including workers is to do the work. This 
implementation is coming to a stage that the management is forcing its idea on 
us..then we have to accept it or pretend that we accepted it. 
 
Again an excerpt from a corridor conversation among employees: 
“ These guys are simply integrating some hotchpotch stuff. Finally, we have to accept 
it. The higher-ups will get us to accept it.” 
 
At the same time, the top management, the ERP coordinators, and many middle 
managers started a discourse that since plant side did not have any IS, it should be 
satisfied with whatever IS it could develop with Itech.  They added one more logic to 
this discourse: since the plant side did not have an existing IS and therefore had no 
familiarity with IS, it would be better for the plants to get an experience with the ERP 
as early as possible. This would help the plants to make better suggestions. The point 
was that the plant should focus on getting the ERP work as soon as possible. Below 
are some representative excerpts from HOD meeting and casual conversations among 
employees: 
 
HPD (in HODs meeting): As all of us know, we don’t have any system in our plants. 
So getting a new system itself is a big advantage for plants. The management expects 
plant’s sustained and increased cooperation in this regard…We can easily see that the 
plants will be happy with the new system since we don’t have any system on that 
side…I believe that the plants’ urgent need would be to get a full-fledged ERP as soon 
as possible…This will also give more time for plants to be familiar with the ERP and 
create better suggestion for Itech engineers.  
 
Here is a part of a conversation among a group of managers: 
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MCR: I think what Nash25 (HPD) mentioned in the meeting is senseful..Hey, Rick 
(PM), it is really advantageous for you guys that you get it (ERP) run at the earliest. 
Forget the office. Their style of operation and their objectives are very different. First 
learn to stand up and then walk. You need just a system. 
MM (intervenes): Usually I don’t agree with Nar. But, in this case, I think he has a 
point. Maybe you guys should just go ahead with whatever you could get now. Then, 
you will know what you need.. 
PM: Ram (calling MHR), why are you silent..I kind of agree..What do you think Ram? 
MHR: Frankly, I don’t care. But, yah, I think even with what you have now (the ERP 
in the current shape) your work will get reduced. So why to create unnecessary 
troubles, just go ahead. 
 
Notice how this sensegiving discourse tries to shape the plant engineer’s interest and 
expectations of ERP. The discourse suggests that the plant’s interest should be ‘get the 
ERP working at the earliest’. Consequently, this sensegiving discourse had two effects: 
a) the objective of ERP implementation or ‘the problem’ (Pinch & Biker, 1987) was 
getting redefined as the problem of just integration and not automation that implied 
that the level of automation achieved through integration is good enough for the plant 
side26, and b) this redefinition, in turn, created a split in the employees’ monolithic 
focus on significant automation across plants and office. This, in turn, projected the 
difference in salience between the technology frame of the plant side employees (ERP 
as an information integrator) and the office side employees (ERP as a work 
automating tool and an information integrator). Note that in this process the plant side 
employees’ technology frame became similar to the top management’s technology 
frame, that is, the issue became predominantly information integration as opposed to 
predominantly work automation. Thus, there is a shift in the salience of technology 
frame (Davidson, 2002). Now, there was a difference between the interest of the plant 
side and the office side, which further isolated the office side from the rest of the 
                                                 
25
 To protect identity, all the employee names in this dissertation are pseudonyms. 
26
 The implication of the shift of focus from automation to integration is that the number of data that 
user needs to input and the amount of work that the user needs to put in to process the data (e.g. number 
of mouse clicks) would go up. Also, the number of links between data would increase. 
 133 
organization. Interestingly, knowingly or unknowingly, in an attempt to justify their 
lower enthusiasm with an information integrator as opposed to a significant 
automating tool, the office staff reproduced this discourse, and in turn, legitimated the 
plant side’s changed interest or the shift in frame salience. For example, below are two 
excerpts from office staff’s interviews. 
 
Finance Officer: These are all factors. Then if they say, accounts is not co-operating… 
the thing is they are comparing us with the plant side…plant side can cooperate since 
anything they get is a plus for them since they do not have an IS. They had been doing 
it manually. They will be happy if they get any kind of IS. Their workload and time 
will be reduced any way. So, they can reduce their transaction time from 15 minutes to 
10 minutes. Now,  our  need is different . We have fabulous ISs here. Our transactions 
take say only 3 minutes now. When the ERP comes it should be done at least in 5 
minutes, if not in 3 minutes. 
 
Accounts Officer: In the case of the plant there are no much problem since they don’t 
have any existing IS. So their criterion is to capture as much information as possible. 
Even just an information integrator is a big boon to them. But, our criterion is to get a 
system better than our existing systems. We have to look for a higher level of 
automation.   
 
Meanwhile, the work on the plant side progressed fast. The ERP coordinators and 
some other managers started positively commenting on the progress of ERP 
implementation (without specifying where it is happening: office vs. plant). But, 
during the discussion between the plant side employees and Itech engineers regarding 
modifying the software, there was a noticeable difference in the demands for 
automating work components. There was also a significant increase in the user 
intervention and user input (i.e., increase in manual work) in the software codes 
developed during this period. The increase in manual work, and decrease in 
automation, is a direct indicator of the shift of focus away from automation to 
integration. Thus, as far as the plant side was concerned the technology frame of ERP 
as an information integrator reached its ‘closure’ (Pinch& Bijker, 1987) through a 
 134 
combination of coercion and persuasion. 
 
The office side employees complained in the interviews that they are now being 
labeled as the problem makers both in the meeting and through flurry of notes. 
Meanwhile, the MD called the next meeting. One hour before this meeting, the office 
side employees who were opposing the management’s move met with Assistant 
Managing Director (AMD), the second man in the company (the first man being the 
MD) and the representative of office staff in the top management. The employees 
apprised the AMD of the status of the development of the Accounts and Finance 
modules and that they had not been satisfied with the modules. Initially, AMD was not 
ready to voice their concern in the MD’s meeting. Finally, the employees told him that 
if they were again labeled as “problem makers” which they anticipated, they would 
have to clash openly with the coordinators and the management with the support of 
political leaders. Finally, AMD agreed to take up this matter in the meeting on their 
behalf (Personal scribbles of an accounts officer, 2006; interview data). In the MD’s 
meeting, the MD asked for update on the progress of implementation and the ERP 
coordinators showed the “commendable progress” on the plant side and reasonable 
progress on some modules from office side (except Finance and Accounts). The 
coordinators added that for testing the modules, such as Accounts and Finance, the 
concerned officers had not been showing up. Then, the AMD told that the module 
testing was pending because the Accounts and Finance staff’s suggestions were not 
yet met and that no work had been done in that direction. The MD suggested a new 
format: Corrective Action Report that would show the modifications suggested (and 
who suggested it) and the corrective action taken by Itech engineers.  
 
Irrespective of such issues, on the plant side, the ERP implementation had been 
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progressing well. During the development, there were again discursive attempts to 
shape the technology non-affordance that were similar to the attempts I described 
earlier. The result of all these dynamics was a mix of the practices originally built into 
the “standard” software and GovIndia’s existing work practices. Employees realized 
this mixture in their trial use. In the grapevine conversations, they nicknamed the ERP 
software as “avial”, name of a local vegetable dish famous for its mix of varieties of 
vegetables. Perhaps, such nicknaming or cynical remark also was an expression of 
their dissatisfaction with the software or resistance to the management (Fleming & 
Spicer, 2003).  
 
5.8 Stage 5: ERP as a visibility and efficiency increaser  
By this time the consultants and the ERP coordinators declared that many plant side 
modules were ready for “final” testing and subsequent trial use. Through the repeated 
(earlier) testing and trial use many employees had developed another technology 
frame: ERP as an employee visibility increaser. The employees interpreted the 
increase in employee visibility as a result of integration.  I do not claim here that 
individuals formed this technology frame at this particular time or during this 
particular period. But, this technology frame appeared in the daily discourses 
increasingly during this particular period. The timing of this discourse perhaps is a 
signal that employees used this frame as a discursive resource, a political device. 
 
The employees interpreted the intended result of the visibility increase as increased 
monitorability of the employees by the management. They anticipated the unintended 
result as peer monitoring. For example, see a representative excerpt from an interview 
with an administrative manager (PM): 
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I: For what purpose or why do we need that kind of detailed breakdowns? 
PM: .. those in the top management..will become blind to small differences, for 
example, differences in the payment details. Unless they see the details, they can't 
question the subordinates effectively. They can't not only monitor but they also have 
to depend on the subordinates for explanation and take them in confidence. If they can 
see the details, there are no such issues. So the top management will become ignorant 
of so many activities unless there is a break down. So we need more break down.  
 
Below is another representative excerpt from a casual conversation between two 
middle managers: 
 
M1: ..Gop (MD’s nickname) wants to know what happens on the ground..eyes into our 
ativities..both an integrated view and a detailed view..seems we have and we’ll have 
more (work) breakdowns in ERP..Guy (the MD) can even screw us up..we’ll start 
pushing each other.. 
M2: yah..chance for pulling each other’s leg also will be then more..many can now 
peek into many others’ job.. 
 
Unlike other managers, the top managers did not connect the suggestions to have more 
breakdowns with the intention to increase monitoring. Instead, they connected it with 
an efficiency concern. For example, below is an excerpt from an interview with the 
DGM: 
“ We have more breakdowns..more detailed record of who did what at what point in 
time…how failed, etc..this is not to punish anyone or even to monitor..in government 
you cannot anyway punish anyone..we are at the engineers’ and workers’ 
mercy..therefore, such breakdowns rather will help us take quick action and 
remedies..more work efficiency…ya..but anyway MD has the right and privilege to 
monitor anyone’s task.” 
 
This rehashing of visibility into efficiency or coupling of visibility increase with 
efficiency increase occurred in many public talk irrespective of the hierarchical status 
of the speaker and listener. For example, see the part of a formal conversation between 
a manger (M) and a senior about the modification required in the ERP software: 
M: So we’ll have the machine or equipment breakdown: a record of who did the 
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maintenance, the history of breakdowns and a track of how many times the 
maintenance performed by a particular crew or employee failed. This will help us to 
monitor and take quick action. 
 
In the above interview excerpts, we can notice two points: a) the choice to increase 
employee monitoring is interpreted as MD’s right, and b) there is no mention of the 
negative impact of such potentially increased monitoring on employees. Many of the 
managers, engineers, officers, and TU representatives repeated the first point and 
mentioned that the issues such as the possibility of micro-monitoring need not be 
discussed with anyone since it is the privilege of the management to monitor employee 
activities. For example, here is an excerpt from a mechanical engineer’s (ME) 
interview: 
 
I: You mean your work getting more monitored or.. 
ME: (intervenes) certainly.  Our work will become more monitored. But we have no 
scope for monitoring anyone. That is a very big drawback. 
I: Monitoring whom? Your superiors or.. 
ME: (intervenes) What a joke! How can a subordinate monitor a superior..If you raise 
the increased monitoring, I mean by your colleagues, you must have noticed, you will 
be seen as a CITU guy27 or a lethargic government employee. 
 
The points such as a) the chance of getting categorized negatively (e.g., lethargic 
government employee) if one speaks against increased monitoring, b) the taken-for-
grantedness of superior’s right to increase the subordinate monitoring, c) the positive 
characterization of increased employee visibility and the resultant potential micro-
monitoring of employees, were repeated many times. Below is another representative 
comment by an Accounts Officer (AO) during his interview: 
 
                                                 
27
 CITU is a left wing trade union which in this state has a bad reputation for taking money from people 
without rendering any service (Heller, 1999) 
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AO: We will become answerable for each act. Now, there is a check to be given to a 
supplier. 30 days are over and is still not given. If there is a system, that guy (MD) can 
see from there. Then there will be question, why the check is still not gone. Then we 
will have to find a reason. Now it is not like that. No one will come to know about it. 
Even if the supplier calls we will say, “oh! check has come. It will proceed in its own 
way”. That is it. Instead, if the MD or the DGM calls you twice or thrice, on such 
matters, you will become extra conscious so as not to repeat such things. That is very 
good. That is not negative. The only negative aspect is cost. 
I: How is it good? 
AO: Haven’t you heard this saying, “the lethargic government of employees are the 
curse of our country”…Unless forced, here, people won’t work..such forcing will 
increase his efficiency, the company’s performance and our country’s performance.  
 
Here, there is obvious mobilization and reproduction of the hegemonic discourses 
about right of the superior to asymmetrically (asymmetric because subordinate cannot 
monitor superiors) and closely monitor the subordinate without even prior negotiation 
about such increase in monitoring. The legitimacy of such increased monitoring is 
linked to public good and individual good. Interestingly, some of the managerial staff 
members reproduced the managerial hegemony discursively, along with many other 
managerial staff members, but resisted it (the asymmetric relations of dominations) 
behaviorally. The resistance manifested as attempts to reduce employee visibility to 
superiors and peers.   
 
For example, here is a representative comment of an ERP facilitator from mechanical 
maintenance division during my conversation with him:  
“If I make my activities more visible, that will generate a lot of headache for me. 
Therefore, I decided to minimize the links. Why to put efforts to integrate more, make 
us more visible, and get the displeasure of the management?” 
 
Another facilitator, a plant engineer (PE)) remarked during his interview: 
“We thought if this becomes visible to Instrumentation (division), we’d be in trouble. 
So we decided to replace the effort we put and cut down its links.” 
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See another typical comment from a mechanical engineers’ interview:  
“If this thing gets to others, it’ll cause you troubles. So we decided to replace the effort 
we put and cut down its links.” 
 
There were other strategies than reducing the connection (and in turn integration) that 
the negotiating employees followed: a) they provided less breakdown of activities than 
they could have actually provided (for example, the activities that were already 
standardized and therefore easy to code into the ERP software), b) they reported many 
activities as non-repetitive and thus having more variations, making it difficult for 
Itech engineers to standardize and code them into the software, and c) some 
employees also tried to get the software modified in such a way that it would reduce 
visibility of their actions. For example, see what happened to a junior engineer’s (E) 
suggestion during ERP discussions in KOIN plant. 
 
E: I suggested an individual level login. …..Most people opposed individual log-in.  
I: What were their oppositions? 
E: Who knows! Maybe some people want to work while others don’t want…I came to 
know later..During our coffee break they scolded me for having behaved naively. 
They told the individual login would help the management pinpoint you individually.  
 
Still another example from MIS’s interview: 
 
I: We were talking about the non-separation of LT-HT sub-module… 
MIS:…they demanded separate sub-module login because they didn’t want to be 
observed 
by the peers.  They usually postpone a lot of work [I confirmed it through personal  
observation]…Now, at any time, anybody in electrical (department) and the superiors can 
check on the readings entered and know who entered it at what time. This kind of 
checking they didn’t want.  
I: Did  they tell you that reason? 
MIS: No,  they won’t tell. How can they tell this openly?  But I know since I was the 
HOD there. The objective was to avoid getting controlled. 
 
 140 
MIS was correct. When I raised this issue in the engineers’ interview (who demanded 
separate login) although they put forward flimsy technical reasons in the beginning, 
finally they told me that their main concern was about increased monitorability. 
 
From the above-described attempts of the employees to reduce their visibility to the 
management and peers, it seems that while the employees discursively agreed with the 
taken-for-grantedness of management’s right to increase monitoring without prior 
negotiations and the positive effect of such increased monitoring, they were also 
concerned about the potential negative effect, such as more employee control and 
work stress. Therefore, while the employees reproduced the hegemonic discourse of 
management’s right, they behaviorally resisted the effect of the management’s right 
and the espoused positive effect of increased efficiency.  The employees exhibited their 
resistance by modifying the software to protect their interests. Therefore, at least to 
some extent, the negotiators’ political interests decided the structure of the software 
codes (e.g. number of links) and thus constituted the software. That means the 
technology was not merely a symbol of employee resistance nor was the technology 
used as an immutable physical object to express employee resistance. Instead, the 
negotiators modified the technology to materially realize the employee resistance. In 
this sense, technology became a materialization of employee resistance. In other 
words, the ERP software by and in its constitution became another means for 
resistance, ‘resistance by other means’ as this chapter is entitled.   
 
As I mentioned earlier, I suspect that the employees acts of reducing their visibility, 
and in turn, the strength of integration (for example, reduced number of links between 
data within a module and across modules) could also be a resistance to management’s 
demand to focus exclusively on integration (against employees’ desire) and thereby 
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increase the strength of integration and get the software running somehow. This 
suspicion is reasonable given that a) the employees interpreted the management’s call 
to focus exclusively on integration (as opposed to integration and automation with 
more focus on automation) as the management’s objective to achieve an integrated 
view, a visibility into the impact of an employee action on different functions of the 
organization, and b) generally, the employees had understood that one of the 
objectives of integrated software is to generate an integrated view of various activities 
that included employees’ task related activities. In the next stage, the employees’ 
highlighted the weak integration without mentioning the role of their visibility 
reduction efforts in producing that result. 
  
5.9 Stage 6: From an exhaustive information integrator to a weak information 
integrator-ERP as a weak information integrator  
The visibility reduction efforts had one more effect, perhaps unintended. It helped 
increase the cooperation between the consultants (Itech engineers) and the negotiating 
employees. The consultants had been trying to reduce the number of connections 
between different modules in order to reduce the complexity they had to handle and 
thus to save their time and effort. The resultant reduction in integration (due to 
employees’ visibility reduction efforts and consultants’ time and effort saving attempt) 
led to a dilution in strength of integration. This led to the emergence of a new 
technology frame—ERP as a weak information integrator. As in the previous cases, I 
generated the dimensions and properties by analyzing the data using Atlas ti software. 
 
Before the weak information integrator frame appeared frequently in the daily 
discourse, the consultants had started the accounts module, finance module, and sales 
module. The consultants complained to the ERP coordinators about the “non 
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cooperation” of some finance and account staff listing down their names. The 
consultants also showed these staff members’ regular absence as recorded in the 
attendance register. Subsequently, the coordinators sent memos to the staff members 
with a copy to the top management, FC and DGM. This further irritated the staff 
members. In general, the office staff interpreted this series of events as an attempt to 
reinforce the “problem maker label” or to scapegoat the office staff for the anticipated 
failure. For example, see below the excerpts of interviews with an administrative 
manager (DFM) and an accounts officer (SAO). 
DFM: ..so far spent good amount of money..therefore, they need some one to 
scapegoat when questions come up. That is the fact. I mean finding a scapegoat. So we 
decided to oppose more sternly (long pause). 
I: Sorry, am still not clear. Can you please explain? 
DFM: Now, I can say that due to purchase department’s lack of co-operation, I am 
unable to implement. Actually, if it is teamwork, it will be done nicely. But, in a 
government setup, it needs a scapegoat. It is a necessity here. What do we need? A 
system better than  the existing system. No compromise on that. But, everyone knows 
that it (implementation) is going crappie…The blame will come upon MIS and HPD 
[who are the coordinators]…They are now pressed to pass that buck on. This is the 
game.  
 
In the interview with SAO: 
“Don’t you see the flurry of notes (shows the file with all memos): “accounts 
department, come and check”, “so and so from accounts department is not showing 
up”. These memos go to the MD. What will he think? The accounts department is the 
problem maker. It reinforces the label they stuck on us in the meeting.” 
As DFC indicated this group, the finance and accounts departments showed their 
resistance in many ways. Here is a description of such resistance (from an interview 
with a Finance Officer): 
“ Of course, such resistance is the central point…If I should go there (the system room 
where the development and testing are going on) and enter all these reconciliation 
data, it is impossible; I won’t do it. Not only I, most of us are not motivated enough to 
put such efforts. Instead of being motivated and rewarded, if I get only the blame and 
responsibility without any authority, anybody would only resist by doing our work 
like data entry slowly at our convenience. This is what is happening now—you know 
well the famous go slow strike in the government departments, don’t you?” 
See the same point in more detail (from an interview with an accounts officer): 
“ Once ordered, we have to go. So what we do is.. say one of my tasks takes normally 
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4 hours to complete. I will take that complete 4 hours and a little bit more, maybe 30 
minutes, to finish it. Then, office hours (4:30 pm) will be over. Then, I will leave as 
soon as possible so that I don’t need to put any extra effort. See it’s not an intentional 
lagging…I mean it will appear..We truly have daily responsibilities for which each 
one is solely responsible…I cannot leave that aside. If some thing goes wrong in my 
daily work I am answerable. Also, by the nature of my task my higher ups cannot ask 
me to leave my work. Since I don’t have enough time to finish my daily routines I am 
not going so frequently. It is not intentional. You got the point?” 
Again, in another interview (with a finance officer): 
 
SFO: ..when we are commanded, we have to go.. But then we will think how not to go 
for the next four turns. Even if we go, we won’t give valuable inputs. But, that should 
not be the way. If I feel sincerely that it is my issue also, I will work even 24/7/365 
days. I can easily manage all my daily activities even if I put such an effort. [I:. right , 
right….] 
SFO:  The problem is that there is no such support, no morale boosting, and no 
involvement.  
By this time the consultant had requested GovIndia to make part payment for the 
“successful work” that they completed so far. The payment had to go through the 
finance department. I overheard the telephone conversation between the coordinators 
that expressed a concern that the finance officers might delay the payment due to their 
opposition with Itech’s ERP implementation. The MIS (one of the coordinators) soon 
enquired the main finance officer of the status of the payment. The finance officer 
bluffed that he had already made arrangement to courier the payment check to Itech’s 
headquarters (in another state). Then MIS asked the finance officer to handover the 
payment check to the consultants present in GovIndia. Although the finance officer 
did not agree first, against his will (as he mentioned in an interview), he handed over 
the check.  
In another incident, it seems that a finance officer and an accounts officer influenced 
the network maintenance contractor who was networking the computer on employees 
work desk to the ERP server. The contractor told me that they asked him to delay the 
networking so that they would not be asked to put more efforts into the ERP 
implementation. In return, they offered him to expedite the payment that GovIndia 
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owed to him. The contractor delayed the networking by one week on some flimsy 
grounds. As the ‘payment of bills’ record showed, the contractor’s pending bills were 
passed in a week. Recall that one of the reasons the office staff cited for not turning up 
in the ERP room (to do testing/trial use) was their unavoidable physical presence at 
their work location. They had complained about the lack of network between their 
personal systems and the ERP server. They had mentioned in the meetings that 
networking would have saved their time and enhanced their enthusiasm to test the 
software and trail use it. As a response to this complaint the management had taken 
steps to expedite the networking.  
During this period some of the plant engineers as well as office staff who had been 
testing and trial using the software started highlighting the weak inscription of the 
information integrator, that is, the dilution of the strength of integration. For example, 
below is a part of a conversation among some plant engineers during their lunch in the 
company canteen: 
E1: Hey Ram, you are right. I think they have not programmed the links we mentioned 
in the SRS. I also felt the same (weak integration) when I used my workspace (a portal 
in the ERP web page) in the morning. Then, what is the use of it..God knows..anyway, 
we can say we also have ERP. 
E2: It’s funny. I can send the data to the Technical. But, I cannot get the data I want 
from them. I think the boys [the ERP consultants] either didn’t understand it or ..no, 
some of them seem to be technically okay..they know the software..at least, what it 
cannot do..[Note that the last sentence refers to shaping of technology non-affordance] 
E3: (intervenes) I am not sure about their technical competence..did you hear the 
stories from office side..it is an utter failure there..the boys don’t know what to do..I 
don’t know what is happening..but I figured out this much: some legs and hands have 
been cut off…finally, we’ll have some boxes [meaning independent programs] here 
and there.. 
E1: I don’t know whether the Center [meaning the top management] knows it. Or 
maybe they are pretending that they don’t know..because the guys [meaning the 
coordinators and the top management] have to make it a success, somehow. That’s the 
move now. 
From the above-described conversation, a representative of some grapevine talks that 
was being mobilized, it may appear that there is an ongoing sensemaking exercise—a 
 145 
sensemaking of ERP as a weak information integrator.  But, that is only one part. 
Given that a) the employees’ efforts of visibility reduction partly caused the weak 
inscription, b) this point was not mentioned in the weak inscription discourse, c) 
instead the causality for weak inscription was exclusively attributed (although 
skeptically) to Itech engineers’ lack of skill and understanding, d) some employees 
interpreted the top management’s directive to get ERP as an information integrator 
and the management’s associated acts as coercive and in conflict with the employees’ 
interests, the discourse of weak inscription could well be a politically strategic 
‘sensegiving action’ (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) to influence others’ interpretation of 
ERP.  Note that in this sensegiving attempt the employees were using a previously 
appeared technology frame, ERP as an information integrator.  But they used this 
technology frame with a slight change that highlighted the weak translation of this 
technology frame into software codes. Thus, the modified technology frame became, 
ERP as a weak information integrator, the result emerged from employees’ 
sensemaking about the change in the strength of inscription. Therefore, the employees 
strategically used technology frame as an emergent sensegiving discursive resource to 
influence others’ interpretation of ERP, and in turn, the ongoing negotiations about 
ERP modification. I made the same argument during the analysis of the earlier stages 
too. In this particular context, the employees’ sensegiving attempt seems to be an act 
of employee resistance as well. In the following paragraphs, I give more details to 
support these arguments. 
As it occurred in the case of other employee discourses, the morning chat near the ID 
card reading machine (swiping machine) served as one of the instruments for 
mobilizing the weak inscription discourse. Now, this location of grapevine achieved a 
special significance since the ERP coordinators identified it as a ‘dangerous spot’. 
Consequently, as per HPD’s request, the Personnel Manager issued a memo to 
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GovIndian staff that read: ‘The management has recently noticed that the area near the 
swiping machine in the main building has increasingly become a place for holding 
unwanted and unproductive discussions during shift change. Therefore, all employees 
are requested to use this area exclusively for the swiping purpose and to abstain from 
any unproductive discussions and comments’ (GovIndia Memo 16/345-08 dated 
November 5, 2007). Some of the office staff members as well as plant staff members 
responded to this action negatively. See a typical comment: “So they [the 
management] are trying to crush our spirit. I am not going to stop my chat! That is the 
only place where I relax quite well”.  
Meanwhile, in the next meeting (November 7, 2007) the ERP coordinators claimed hat 
the plant side implementation was almost complete. Left out were some modules in 
Accounts and Finance. They added that if the Accounts and Finance put its sincere 
efforts, the implementation could be finished in a month. Therefore, the MD fixed 
December 4, 2007 as the date when the ERP system should go live in GovIndia. 
Before fixing the deadline he did not check its feasibility with the employees involved. 
Even if the MD had checked the feasibility in the meetings,  
“here, no one usually dares to say we cannot meet the deadline when MD or DGM 
fixes it. Saying you can’t meet deadlines will bring you all troubles….But, you know, 
the other side..that everyone including the MD knows that it is impossible to meet 
deadlines. The deadlines are just for namesake. You need to hit somewhere around. If 
you can’t even hit around, no worry, just give some explanations” (excerpt from an 
interview with a store officer).  
Since the MD had another meeting outside of GovIndia, he asked DGM to continue 
with the meeting. Although the office staff and the plant staff kept quiet when the MD 
was present, just after the MD left, they started pouring out their complaints. The plant 
staff reported that many of their functions had not been coded into the software. The 
accounts and finance staff argued that they could not progress as much as they planned 
due to the absence of data from other modules. They complained that the absence of 
links unnecessarily increased their effort, for example by necessitating entry of 
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duplicate data, and as a result, ERP had become a weak information integrator. 
Subsequent to the meeting, many employees started talking about the “missing links” 
and “weak information integration” more frequently. For example, see a complaint 
from an HOD in an interview:  
“Now, what is done for us? --the MPR.  The issue is we can raise the MPR but the 
purchase or any other department cannot come back to us with queries or 
modification.  Then, what is the use of it? There is no integration as we 
expected…After the meeting [the meeting mentioned above], people started realizing 
this fact”. 
The Finance and Account staff vociferously complained about the weak integration in 
informal discussions with their colleagues. Here is a part of a coffee time conversation 
between an administrative manager (DFM) and two functional managers (PM1 & 
PM2) in the company canteen. 
DFM: The links are missing.  Why are they missing? Due to our bad communication 
or no communication, or they [ERP consultants] are unable to comprehend what we 
explained or something else.  
PM1: Maybe there are some limitations too as the boys say. They are now working 
hard. I think they cannot reverse the earlier integration efforts. That is a big constraint. 
DFM: I agree. There might be some limitations with the system. But, as Reemy and 
others said, that could be a pretext to mask the boys’ lack of capability….but the point 
is that the integration has become very weak…but, what we wanted..and what we 
want..is a fully integrated system. Don’t you think so? 
PM2: What is the point in holding on to that. They are forcing it to success. Be 
prepared to accept whatever way it comes out..weak or strong, information integrator 
or coffee maker.. 
The issue of weak information integrator came up frequently in the interviews, 
especially in the interviews with Accounts and Finance staff. Here is an excerpt from 
one senior finance officer’s interview: 
“Computer can take care of duplication of work; but the problem is that they [the ERP 
consultants] have not understood the link [so same data is captured many times or 
users are asked to enter the same data]. This is causing work duplication. Something 
we are purchasing. P.O. is raised, the same thing comes to the store, the data from 
store comes to bills, the data from bills goes to payment.  All these should be linked 
properly.  Those links are not properly made and the lack of the links leads to dilution 
of integration.” 
In a meeting with Itech’s business manager, the officers from Accounts department, 
Finance department, and Purchase department threatened Itech that none of them 
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would sign off on the customer satisfaction sheet until Itech had met their 
expectations. As per the work contract, Itech could get the second term of payment 
(50% of the total payment) only after they got the customer satisfaction sheet signed 
off by each senior officer in the department.  Therefore, Itech had no option but to 
meet the customer expectations. This expectation was a ‘system better than the 
existing IS’. In my interviews and other meetings the staff expanded this criterion of 
better IS in terms of a) integration: number of data transferred across modules, number 
of data that the system could automatically transfer across modules without user 
intervention, number of existing sub functionalities covered by the ERP, b) speed of 
data processing, c) degree of work automation, and d) user friendliness. The office 
staff continued with its strategy of ‘finding fault with Itech’. One of the major faults 
was Itech’s lack of understanding about the GovIndia’s existing system, which in turn, 
the office staff argued, resulted in a weak information integrator.  
 
Meanwhile the top management held its internal meeting. Based on the meeting, MD 
distributed ‘the responsibilities for further implementation’ from the ERP facilitators 
in different departments to the ‘others who had been more involved in the 
implementation’.  These ‘others’ included the Accounts and Finance staff who had 
been propagating the weak information integrator image.  The memo from the top 
management asked these individuals to report directly to the MD.  See an accounts 
officer’s response to the management’s act (during an interview): 
“After we co-operated so much in the beginning irrespective of all bad things like lack 
of appreciation and the problems with the consultants, if the management responds 
like this, what can we do but to resist? Their ( the management) agenda  is to bring the  
system into  life within  a short time. This is true with Itech too. We too share that 
desire but not by compromising our requirements… See, last time, MD fixed a new 
deadline, December 4 (2007). MD is least aware about the problems and the ground 
reality. Some modules are still under development. Without at least 3-4 months 
parallel run the system cannot come into life. Instead of pressing us, as I told you 
sometime back, somebody concerned should stop pretension of sleeping, rather open 
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his eyes to the reality. This is part of the pressure tactics. We told our boss that right 
now 95% of our works are beautifully running on the existing systems. Although it is 
on an obsolete platform, it brings about results. True that we have only trial balance 
not actual balance sheet. But, in excel I have developed another code to prepare 
balance sheet automatically from the trial balance. What I am trying to tell is that it is 
running well and so we are looking now as a compromise for a system at least as good 
as this one. Otherwise, if some problem comes up tomorrow, there will be questions 
like how you singed it off, then we will be answerable”. 
The same officer along with other officers had been projecting another expectation 
until now. See an excerpt from his earlier interview: 
“In case of other department (mainly from plant side) there are no much problems 
since they don’ have any existing IS..But, our criterion is to get a system better than 
our existing IS. Unless we get that we decided not to sign off. There is no compromise 
on it”.  
The lowering of expectation, from a system better than the existing system to a system 
at least as good as the existing system, is more visible if we compare the earlier 
interviews with the later interviews. Below, Table 5.1 (next page) shows some 
representative quotes that reveal the spread of the lowering of expectation across the 
office staff.  
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From the analysis of the data (using Atalas ti software), I found that the reasons 
attributed for change in the evaluation criterion and the corresponding image of ERP 
(from strong information integrator to weak information integrator)--two elements of 
Expectation 1 vs. Expectation 2 
(representative quotes) 
Status of the 
respondent 
Attributed Reason 
for the change in 
expectation 
This is what we heard and we expected: 
a system better than our existing ones. 
But, now I know it is impossible here. 
Now, our expectation to get at least what 
we have in our existing system 
Accounts 
Officer 
Realization that 
Itech is incapability 
to meet the “better 
than expectation” 
 
We have a brilliant system, We need one 
better than this. (quote from time 1)…at 
least one that matches our existing 
system (from time 2) 
Functional 
Manager 
Realization of 
Itech’s incapability 
(#1) 
Management’s force 
(#2) 
We should these things at any cost since 
they are already available in our Flicker. 
Our earlier expectation was to get a 
system better that Flicker…yes, we had 
to change this 
Accounts 
Officer 
Realization of 
Itech’s incapability 
(#1) 
Management’s force 
(#2) 
Our criterion is to get a system better 
than this existing one (quote from time 
1)..As a compromise, now we are 
looking for a system as good as our 
existing system (time 2 quote) 
Finance 
Officer  
Realization of 
Itech’s incapability 
(#1) 
Now, they say it is not possible to do 
that..this is a blow to our expectation, a 
system better than the Paradox in some 
aspects..(time 1 quote)…they have to do 
this..we need a system that gives at least 
the existing features and speed 
Assnt. 
Administrative 
Manager 1 
Realization of 
Itech’s incapability 
(#1) 
 
Here we are getting a 3+ (with the 
existing system). Now, we need a 4+ 
(time 1 quote)…Now our transaction 
takes only say 3 minutes..we are 
compromising..in ERP it should not take 
say at least more than 5 minutes 
Assnt. 
Administrative 
Manager 2 
Realization of 
Itech’s incapability 
(#1) 
 
TABLE 5.1 LOWERING OF ERP EXPECTATION AMONG OFFICE STAFF 
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technology frame--are a) sympathy towards Itech’s “boys” because of their precarious 
position, b) disappointment over Itech’s incapability to meet the expectation and 
consequent adjustment of expectations to make it more “realistic”, and c) force by the 
management. The third reason, the management’s force, was mentioned less 
frequently (frequency of a: 30%, frequency of b: 50%, frequency of c: 20%) compared 
with the other two reasons. Interestingly, although not in connection with the change 
in the expectation (from a better IS to an IS as good as the existing system) and the 
image (from strong information integrator to weak information integrator), the office 
staff had mentioned that they had felt being forced by the management to accept 
management’s suggestion to make the system work somehow. Therefore, the role of 
coercion in bringing about the change in technology frame and its gradual acceptance 
warrants more clarity.  
 
If we look at the first two reasons, they are closely related. The first argument was that 
by this time the GovIndia employees realized that the “boys” a) were not paid well 
(salary was USD 2400/year while average salary of fresh software engineers was USD 
3600/year), b) were pressed by their MD to finish the job as soon as possible, and c) 
had been putting much effort to meet the GovIndian employee expectation. In this 
precarious situation, even if these software engineers had been putting much effort, 
given the time constraint and the lack of monetary incentives to motivate them, setting 
higher levels of expectation seemed practically not feasible.  The second reason is just 
an expansion of the first reason—the assessment of the consultants’ incapability 
reinforced the practical infeasibility in getting a better system. But these pieces of 
information were not new to the office staff. The interview data show that they knew 
the ‘boys’ ‘precarious situations’ (about eight months back). If the availability of these 
pieces of information is the reason for the change in expectation and the acceptance of 
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a weak information integrator, it is not clear why the office staff took eight months to 
lower their expectation. Moreover, the assessment of Itech’s incapability is not a 
recent exercise. GovIndia employees had made Itech’s incapability an issue during 
stage 2. Therefore, although the realization of practical infeasibility might have been a 
reason for lowering the expectation, it is not the proximate reason with respect to the 
time of occurrence of the expectation lowering.  
 
The next attributed reason was the issue of sympathy toward the precarious boys. This 
is an interesting point since during this stage the ERP coordinators, some members of 
the top management, and some managers had been pointing out the precarious 
situation of the “boys”, hailing the efforts these boys had been putting. For example, 
see a representative comment during casual conversation among managers:  
 
MIS: One should also take into account the boy’s situation. Still, they have been 
putting sincere efforts. I saw them burning their midnight oil..At least their effort is 
worth the money we paid them” [This comment was partly targeted at the argument of 
some employees that GovIndia wasted money in giving contract to Itech] 
SS: Hersh has a point. I agree. We need to consider these boys more fairly. I think we 
got back some of our investment. 
DM: But the point, Hersh, is that in software implementation it doesn’t matter how 
much effort you put. What matters is whether your are able to produce the desired 
result…they are putting more efforts because they don’t have the capability to do 
faster..very simple. 
 
Like DM, many employees who cited sympathy as a reason for the lowering of their 
expectation, had publicly talked against the need for sympathetic consideration. 
Therefore, we should at least suspect the genuineness of these employees’ causal 
attribution to sympathy. Moreover, as I pointed out in the beginning of the above-
reproduced conversation and as it is obvious from the conversation, it was the top 
management and ERP coordinators and their supporters who propagated the sympathy 
argument. Also, this discourse interpreted the ‘stickiness of Accounts and Finance 
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with a system better than their existing system and the corresponding non-cooperation 
with the boys’ as unsympathetic and unethical. The discourse juxtaposed this unethical 
behavior with three other points: a) it is the top management’ right to command the 
subordinates, and in the  GovIndian culture, it is the duty of subordinates to obey such 
commands, b) those who delay ERP project with unreasonable demands are putting 
GovIndia into a worse financial situation while it is already reeling under financial 
pressure, c) unnecessary opposition to modern technology implementation is the 
traditional belligerent TU style which has proven to be destructive. See some 
representative examples below: 
An excerpt from my interview with a mechanical engineer (ME):  
ME: ..[a]ctually, what they (managers including the top management) say is correct. 
We have no right to resist because it is there in my work definition that to do whatever 
the management demands from time to time is my duty. Therefore, even if we get 
more work through this computerization, we have limitation in resisting. No one can 
and should go overboard… 
I: When will you say someone or a group has gone overboard?  
ME: That just all of us know..from our experience. We can air our oppositions, but if 
the management compels..we should yield. The responsibility of the final decision, 
anyway, lies with them. They have the right to compel and then we should not oppose 
further..Maybe that kind of overshooting occurred in this computerization…I don’t 
want to judge others and name them..yes the office side had to have a different 
criterion..but maybe it is time to wrap up too..otherwise it is running into too much 
(financial) loss! 
 
An excerpt from my interview with a functional manager (MM): 
MM: “As far as a GovIndian employees is concerned, the owner is the MD.  From the 
first training onwards we have been told  when you pass the gate of GovIndia, remove 
your cap and put on the company’s cap.  Cap means policy.  That means if the MD is a 
thief, we have to help him steal.  That is our duty. Here, the policy of the lower rung is 
the policy of the higher ups.  This is the tradition. Whether you like it or not..you have 
to accept what the top says.. no point in sustaining with belligerence..now it’s no good 
to anyone.. 
I: Why? 
MM: Anyway, now it ’s working fine in plants.. so you should assess these boys on a 
fair basis..modern technologies are a necessity..so why to fall again into the old trap 
(referring to TU’s opposition)..it’s time to go forward now.. 
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This discourse not only characterized the management’s commanding and coercive 
acts positively while the resistance of office staff negatively, but also signaled that the 
top management’s action against office staff’s resistance had been legitimate. In other 
words, the discursive attempts to shape the employees idea about what factors should 
or should not be considered in technology implementation, and in turn, what 
technology frame should be accepted and what actions should be considered right or 
wrong legitimated the management’s coercion of the office staff, especially of 
Accounts and Finance staff. There are two more points to note here: a) the use of the 
hegemonic discourse (e.g. belligerent TU style repeated, the opposition to 
managements’ stand adds to financial loss, the management’s right to force/command 
and the employee’s responsibility to obey) that tried to legitimize the management’s 
action, and b) a reduction in these staff members’ support to Account’s and Finance’s 
opposition. In other words, as these excerpts indicate, the use of the hegemonic 
discourse led to de-legitimation of Accounts and Finance staff’s resistance (towards 
the acts of the consultants and the management).  
 
Coupled with the awareness about the loss of support, the Finance and Account staff 
came to realize that they were getting isolated and increasingly seen as the “problem 
makers”.  See some excerpts from the interviews/casual conversations with the 
Finance and Accounts staff from different divisions: 
 
DFM (Finance dept.): I told you earlier, right? The game is clear now (referring to the 
game of scapegoat). One stage is done. We became the scapegoat…We did this 
(referring to oppositions) not just for ourselves, as now people project. We wanted a 
better system for all of us, for GovIndia..But, now things are not going that 
way..people lost interest in it..except we at Finance and Accounts..why should then we 
fight?  
 
SAO (Accounts dept.) : Everyone here now knows that the ERP did not meet our 
original objectives. So now they need someone to bear the blame. And they found 
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it..unfortunately, in us..this is the government culture..finally, those who are really 
sincere will be left alone..none will be there to support you..Then..finally you too 
change your stand..why shouldn’t you change? What do you get if you don’t 
change?..only blames from all sides.. 
 
SFO (Finance dept.): Their (the staff from plants) criterion had been different. Unlike 
us, they don’t have any IS. So whatever they get is good for them…but, you should 
not and cannot apply the same criteria everywhere…but you know, this is a 
government company, unlike in multinationals, the normal reasons don’t work here. 
Politics, only politics work here..you should know how to play the game. So far we 
played it pretty well.not for retaliating..but for the benefit of everyone..now the battle 
is nearly lost, but not completely...we became the problem creators..now in everyone’s 
eyes!..better we yield now..we can demand a system as good as the one we have..that 
should be and that is appropriate. Don’t you think so? 
 
SAO (Accounts dept.): So now, we don’t say that they (the consultants) don’t have the 
capability to give output (which these staff members projected during earlier stages). 
We just say that in the current situation we have not got any output. We shouldn’t 
reject some one outright. That is unfair. That is why we now say to bring people who 
can do things faster and better. We can’t say get out to the people who came here to do 
ERP. Since it is the top management’s decision, we cannot say so. We can just say that 
we are not getting what we expect…we did compromise our expectation to avoid 
unnecessary fight. This is our current stand. 
 
The same staff members had mentioned earlier that the reason for lowering their 
expectation (from a system better than the existing ones to a system at least as good as 
the existing ones) as sympathy towards the hardworking consultant boys who were in 
precarious situation. But, the above excerpts make me suspect that the Accounts and 
Finance staff members’ awareness about their losing legitimacy motivated them to 
lower their expectation. Thus, perhaps, the lowering of expectation was either a 
strategy to regain the losing legitimacy or a give-up, or simply a change of mind. 
However, its unintended paradoxical consequence was that, in fact, it further 
legitimated the management’s coercive actions. Many people interpreted Accounts 
and Finance staff’s change in stand as their understanding about the situation, the 
situation as the management defined it (e.g., the three points in management’s 
discourse: the ethical treatment of the consultants, the financial loss to the company, 
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the management’s right to force). This interpretation, in turn, reinforced the taken-for-
grantedness of management’s right to command and the management’s legitimacy to 
coerce vis-à-vis the Finance and Account’s de-legitimacy in exhibiting sustained 
resistance to such coercion.  
 
Below are some representative excerpts from the interview with an accounts officer 
(AO) and Assistant Manager from plant side (APM): 
 
AO: I heard it straight from the horse’s mouth that they had decided not to cooperate 
with this project. I too supported. But, now they realized that they have gone a little 
too much, if not too far..These poor boys were made scapegoat in the fight of egos and 
personal interests. That is not right..The IS experts here now started feeling the loss of 
their grip over so many things. The point is that they were kings here, who are now 
becoming pawns. So they wanted to slow down the project to the possible extent and 
play all possible ways to do that before they yielded…Everyone expects and accepts 
that politics...but they went a step beyond..once the MD commands, you should 
understand it..Now, they are getting it..see how they are cooperating now..they want at 
least a system good enough for their work..that is fine. 
 
APM: Many of us are now clear.  One of the factors that contributed at least 50% or 
even more to the delay of the project is our own non cooperation, especially from 
office side. …Also, projecting the issue of the consultant boys’ technical inability has 
gone way beyond without considering their situation…Yah, all of us did that.. Now, 
you see there are apprentice girls doing all that input…It’s financial burden on the 
company and the public. Now, office side, and we too, realize it. Management had to 
simply force the office staff to cooperate…But, that is what the management is for..get 
things done.. Now, you see recently the MD himself has been tackling them. That is 
the way it should be done when it goes beyond a limit…I am don’t mean they are bad 
and we are good or anything like that..We all play and played..now, our friends (office 
staff) and all of us understood that we went a bit above..    
 
In short, as a result of this legitimating-delegitimating activity, Accounts and Finance 
staff members not only lowered their expectation and accepted the increase in user 
input (manual work) but also increasingly cooperated with the Itech engineers to 
encode a “(weak) information integrator” and trial use it. Below is a representative 
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example from my discussion with an administrative manager regarding the increase in 
the user input for billing module: 
“Right, right. So we suggested like this: put code at least in the case of items that are 
frequently repeated. For example running of the ambulance [which is a contract work] 
for which payment has to be made. At least to that extent our work will be reduced. 
We understand that it’s a compromise. Okay. As they (consultants) argue, in the case 
where there are many small works grouped together, we’ll work manually. Now, we 
are ready for that. Our aim is not to put others in trouble, neither the boys nor the 
management.” 
 
Note that during this stage the management used hegemonic discourse to create 
legitimacy for its coercive actions. It is obvious that when legitimated, coercion could 
be effective in producing a consensus, but not genuine or normative (Haugaard, 
2006), about what the technology should be (automating tool vs. integrating tool). 
Therefore, apparently shared consensus about what technology should be or perhaps 
what technology is may be constructed through an institutional mode. It means that 
apart from the cognitive mode of creating shared consensus on meaning of technology 
or in the social construction of technology’s parlance “redefinitional closure” and 
rhetoric mode of creating closure—“rhetoric closure” (Pinch & Bijker, 1987), there 
may be [the default option is] an institutional mode of creating closure. I call this 
closure, “institutional closure28”.  
 
5.10 Summary and discussion 
The hallmark of ERP implementation in GovIndia is employee resistance. The case 
study illustrates how technology becomes a resistance by other means. I summarize 
my analysis of this resistance through an action-response-result framework in table 5.2 
(next page), and I boldface and italicize my findings in the following paragraphs.  
 
                                                 
28
 I am indebted to Prof. Trevor Pinch who suggested this term. 
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TABLE 5.2: SHIFTING TECHNOLOGY FRAMES 
AND THE RESPONSES IN GOVINDIA 
Actors  
Employees 
Coordinators 
Itech employees 
Action-
Response  
A1: Bidders’ 
sensegiving: 
their ERP as 
significantly 
customizable 
R1: Employees’ 
accept and 
make sense in 
same way 
A2: Itech & 
coordinators 
sensegiving 
integrated s/w 
as ERP 
R2: Employees’ 
accept and 
make sense in 
same way 
A3: Itech’s 
manipulation: 
attempt to retain 
SQC standards 
R3: Employee 
opposition & 
insistence on 
completely 
customizable 
ERP 
A4: Itech’s 
opposition 
R4:  GovIndia’s 
threat 
A5: Itech yields 
and presents 
their response 
as responsibility 
to customers 
 
TF: 
Exhaustively 
automating 
custom-made 
info integrator 
Stage 1 
Actors  
Employees 
Itech 
engineers 
Itech 
manager 
 
Action -
Response  
A6: Itech 
manager-
Itech 
engineers’ 
sensegiving
: their 
novel ERP 
software 
(s/w) as 
rigid & 
complex + 
intentional 
distortion 
of 
information 
R6: 
Employees’ 
reprodn of 
the 
discourse 
 
TF: partially 
customizable 
info 
integrator 
Stage 2  
Actors  
Employees 
Coordinators 
Management 
Itech engrs 
Action-
Response  
A7: Employees 
semsemaking- 
sensegiving: 
ERP partial 
automation, 
resistance to 
partial 
customization 
& demand for 
more 
customization 
R7: 
Coordinators’ 
use of Itech’s 
“system 
limitation” 
discourse 
A8: Accounts & 
Finance staff’s 
assessment of 
the discourse as 
political (to hide 
Itech’s 
incapability) + 
questioning of 
Itech’s claims 
of ERP + 
Discourse on 
Itech’s 
anticipated 
failure 
R8: Repetition 
of R5 & A6, 
mgmt. issues  
memos & 
employees 
reduce cooprn 
 
TF: partially 
automating info 
integrator 
Stage 3 
Actors  
Plant staff 
Office staff 
Management 
Action-
Response  
A12: 
Employee 
sensemaking 
–sensegiving 
using the 
frame ERP as 
visibility 
increaser-
efficiency 
increaser 
R12: 
Employees’ 
attempt to 
reduce 
monitoring 
through 
reduction of 
integration 
(resistance to 
mgmt’s 
frame 
imposition)  
 
 
TF: visibility 
& efficiency 
increaser 
Stage 4 
Actors  
M.D. 
Employees 
Itech engineers 
Action-
Response  
A9: Change in 
implementatio
n strategy 
(office 
modules in 
low profile) + 
MD’s directive 
to focus more 
on integration 
(than on 
automation) + 
Institution of 
attendance 
record  
R9: Plant 
employees & 
some office 
staff increase 
cooperation 
with Itech’s 
focus on 
integration 
A10:Mgmt.’s 
sensegiving: 
Plant needs 
just an 
integrator soon 
R10: Plant’s 
increased 
cooprn. 
A11:Coordinat
ors  label A/c-
Finance staff 
as “problem 
makers” 
R11: The staff 
oppose, delay 
Itech’s 
payment   
 
TF: (Mostly) 
an information 
integrator 
Stage 5 (*) 
Actors  
Plant  & 
Office staff 
A/c-Finance 
staff 
Management 
 
Action-
Response  
A13: Plant 
staff’s 
sensegiving: 
ERP as weak 
integrator + 
Office staff’s 
reproduction 
& use to 
project it as a 
failure + A/c-
Finance staff 
insist on 
meeting their 
expectation 
R13: Top 
mgmt gives 
staff 
individual 
responsibility   
& direct 
reporting to 
MD + 
legitimation 
of mgmt 
coercion of 
A/c-Finance 
staff, de-
legitimation 
of the staff’s 
resistance 
using 
hegemonic 
discourse 
 
TF: weak 
information 
integrator 
Stage 6 (*) 
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In the figure, the link between the action-response cells--a picture of the political 
strategies that various actors played—and the result cells suggests that the ERP 
implementation in GovIndia was significantly an outcome of a power play among 
the actors. This power play was a process of multiple actors shifting technology 
frames over time in their attempt to impose the frames that embody their interest 
over others’ frames. Thus, in this process, actors used technology frame as an 
emergent sensegiving discursive resource to influence others’ interpretation of the 
ERP.  For example, during stage 1, Itech-ERP coordinator coalition proposed Itech’s 
software as a “significantly customizable ERP software” (as opposed to other ERP 
software programs available in the market). Itech also tried to manipulate around the 
popular meaning of ERP (ERP as a standard software) in order to retain the practices 
they had already programmed into their “standard” software. When GovIndian 
employees resisted Itech’s manipulation attempt, through sensegiving discourses Itech 
shifted the frame to a partially customizable software (stage 2) due to the inherent 
nature of their novel technology (“system limitation”). This was against the employee 
expectation of a completely customizable ERP and the employees responded to Itech’s 
strategy by framing ERP as partially automating software (stage 3). Such framing 
implied that Itech’s software is a failure to meet GovIndians’ (including the 
management) long-held expectation of exhaustive automation. The employees used 
this frame also to demand for more customization, and Itech repeatedly used the logic 
of “system limitation and the frame that embodied this logic. Some of the employees 
(particularly, Accounts and Finance staff who had IT exposure) questioned the 
“system limitation” logic assessing this discourse as a political strategy to mask 
Itech’s incapability. Here, note that along with the technique using frames (or 
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framing), the employees employed other discursive techniques such as counter 
discourse to Itech’s system limitation discourse, discourse on Itech’s anticipated 
failure that also questioned Itech-coordinators’ claim of Itech’s software as ERP. At 
this point, the management starts using coercive means, for example, issuing warning 
memos to the opposing employees for on the grounds of their no-show for testing the 
software. Consequently, these employees reduced their cooperation with Itech 
engineers.  
 
Now (stage 4), the Itech-coordinators coalition changed the implementation strategy 
bracketing out the implementation of Accounts and Finance modules where they faced 
maximum opposition. But, perhaps, as the coalition claimed this change was due to 
functional reasons (e.g., non-availability of Itech’s Accounts & Finance experts, and 
Account and Finance modules’ need of more data from other modules). Whatever is 
the reason, at this point, the M.D. explicitly framed ERP as a mere information 
integrator and MIS report generator that carried the top management’s interests. This 
frame shifted the salience from automation (in the employee frame) to integration. The 
M.D. “directed” (Minutes of HOD meeting, October 22, 2007) the employees to 
cooperate with Itech to realize this frame as soon as possible. The management used 
this frame to mobilize a sensegiving discourse that shaped plant employees’ needs as 
just an information integrator. This was an attempt to align plant employees’ interest 
with that of the management while bracketing out the office staff. The management’s 
labeling of the office staff as the “problem makers”, which the staff resisted through 
various means, is an example of such bracketing. Further, the top management 
combined this discursive technique with coercive means (institution of attendance 
record to monitor the employee cooperation) as they did earlier.  
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The next two stages (stage 5 and stage 6) occurred nearly simultaneously. The 
employees resisted the management’s coercion by framing ERP as a weak information 
integrator (stage 6) and using the frame to show that Itech had not met what they 
agreed to in the contract—to develop an ERP better than the existing information 
systems, a strong information integrator and a significant automation program. Thus, 
in these employees’ interpretation the management was permitting a contractual 
violation. Interestingly, the weakening of integration was partly due to the employees’ 
own efforts to reduce the number of links between different modules and within 
modules. The attempt to reduce integration was a manifestation of employee 
resistance towards the management’s attempt to impose its frame of “ERP a (mostly) 
information integrator” that shifted the focus from automation (employees’ demand) 
to integration. The attempt was also a manifestation of employee resistance in the 
sense that they intentionally tried to reduce the potential of the software to monitor 
their activities closely. Thus, the frame of “visibility reducer” implicitly carried the 
employee concern for the ERP’s potential to increase employee monitoring.  
 
In sum, actors used technology frames as an emergent (in the sense that it emerged 
from actors’ ongoing sensemaking) discursive resource through framing it in a way 
that embodies their interests and employing it for sensegiving purpose. The intended 
(as well as actual) result was a shifting of technology frames over time. Although this 
persuasive discursive technique was a significant repeated strategy, whenever the 
actors assessed that the persuasive strategy was not as effective as they expected, they 
also combined it with use of coercive means to realize their goal--acceptance of their 
technology frame (that manifests as a “consensus”), and in turn, its translation into the 
ERP software. For example, in stage 1 (refer table 5.2, column 1-stage 1: R3-A4-R5-
A5), when Itech opposed the employees’ demand for a completely customizable ERP, 
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the management threatened Itech and made them accept GovIndia’s technology 
frame—ERP completely customizable software without built-in standard practices. 
Similarly, in stage 4 (refer table 5.2, 4th column-stage 4:A9-R9), the MD’s directive to 
accept the top management’s technology frame of ERP as mostly an information 
integrator (as opposed to the employees’ frame of ERP as an automating tool) was 
explicitly supported by use of a coercive means, attendance record that was expressly 
used to monitor employees for their cooperation with Itech engineers. The employees 
too perceived it as a coercive tool and responded to it pretending that they agreed with 
the management’s technology frame. Further, the management issued warning memos 
to those who opposed the management frame, for example, the office staff and in 
particular the account and finance staff. When the resistance increased the 
management legitimated this coercion using hegemonic discourses (for example, the 
discourse about the management’s right to increase employee monitoring and the 
employees’ duty to obey; opposition to modern technologies such as ERP is the 
destructive belligerent TU style). The result of the legitimated coercion (and the raw 
coercion) was an apparent (or non-genuine) employee consensus with the top 
management’s frame. The social construction of technology (SCOT) literature and the 
information system literature show that such shared consensus is created through 
cognitive problem solving (called redefinitional closure in SCOT’s language) and use 
of rhetoric, (called rhetoric closure in SCOT’s language). In addition, my analysis of 
GovIndian implementation suggests that shared consensus on the meaning of 
technology (broadly technology frame) could also be created through institutional 
coercive means. That means there is a possibility of an institutional closure. In 
GovIndian case, it is the combination of discursive persuasion and coercion (raw and 
legitimated) that generated and sustained a consensus on technology frame. We can 
see a parallel argument in the Industrial Relations literature. For example, Graham 
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(1991) and Kawano (1993) show how the worker consensus to management strategy 
in Japanese automobile industries is an outcome of both persuasion and coercion. In 
critical sociological studies, the argument about the combination of persuasion and 
coercion, particularly legitimated coercion, in generating and sustaining consensus is 
still older. For example, in the context of analyzing hegemony, Gramsci 
(1924/1975:762-63; 1971:170) notes: “hegemony…is characterized by the 
combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without 
force predominating too greatly over consent ….force will appear to be based on the 
consent of the majority”. In this process consent is manufactured (Burawoy, 1984), 
consensus is mobilized, and popular support is attained. In sum, I suggest a possibility 
of institutional closure and the use of force (or coercion) and consent (or persuasive 
rhetoric) to create a consensus on technology frames. There is an implication in order. 
The role of coercion in creating consensus could limit the spread of sharedness of 
consensus (how widely it is shared), and in turn, sensemaking (how collective the 
sensemaking is) to a minority of actors. Thus, it could question the breadth of 
sharedness, a fundamental assumption in the sensemaking literature (Weick et al., 
2005).  
 
I started this summary discussion with the broader argument (the first bold-faced 
argument in this section) that cuts across all the stages of implementation. 
Subsequently, I presented an argument that is confined to a few stages. In this 
paragraph and the following paragraph, I sustain with this style of narrowing down. In 
the detailed analysis, I noted a particular characteristic of the sensegiving discourse—
the “system limitation” discourse--that the ERP consultants (Itech employees) 
employed.  For example, in stage 2 (refer table 5.2, 2nd column A6-R6), in order to 
reduce the customization efforts, Itech’s business and technical manager “educated” 
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the GovIndian users that Itech’s novel technology has a lot of limitation that imposes 
constraints on the level of customization and automation. Itech engineers used the 
same discursive strategy that was intended to create a perception that the technology 
by its inherent nature does not afford certain actions. Drawing upon human-computer 
interaction literature, I called this perception as “technology non-affordance”. Itech 
engineers used this discursive technique repeatedly across the stages (stage 2, stage 3, 
and stage 4). During stage 3 (refer table 5.2, 3rd column, A7-R7) the GovIndian 
coordinators also used this discursive technique to soften the employee resistance and 
the employee demand for more customization. These discursive techniques had its 
intended effect only to some extent. Instead, it met with employee resistance  (see A8 
and R8). It also had an intended indirect effect—the generation of a new frame, ERP a 
partially automating software. In short, the attempt to create technology non-
affordance was a repeated significant strategy that the system professionals (Itech 
engineers) employed. In technology implementation literature as well IS literature, 
scholars have described various strategies that the system professionals use to protect 
their interests during technology implementation. For example, Bloomfield and 
Danieli (1995) show that IT consultants (or system professionals) discursively create 
and reaffirm the boundary between the technical and the social that supports their 
professional identity as both technical experts and organizational (social) experts. 
Thus, the consultants create an independent existence for the technology as well 
themselves. Adding to this stream of research, my study shows that down the line, the 
consultants create a perception of technology non-affordance about the “independently 
existing” technology that they created. This, the creation of a technology non-
affordance, is one of the prominent ways system professionals exercise their expert 
power over other actors through discursive means.  
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Now, consider stage 4 (refer 4th column in table 5.2, A12-R12-Results). During stage 
4 when the visibility increaser discourse was at its peak, we have seen how GovIndian 
employees’ interests to protect their privacy against the increased peer and 
management monitorability resulted in reduction of number of links between data, and 
in turn, a weak information integration. The employees realized their resistance to the 
peer and management monitorability through changing the basic nature of the 
technology (one of the basic nature of ERP software is its strong integration of data). 
Thus, the new ERP software was partly a direct result of the material realization or in 
other words the materialization of the employee resistance or the political interests of 
the negotiating employees. In this sense, partly, the ERP software was a material 
expression of the employee resistance. Such a change was easier or even perhaps 
possible partly due to the willingness of the ERP consultants to make such changes, 
the willingness that came out from the consultants’ self interest (interests to reduce 
their time, effort, and expense). This is the context in which the materialization of 
political interests occurred. In short, in certain contexts, technological artifact may 
become a material realization or materialization of the political interests of the 
negotiators involved in technology modification.  
 
Having used the action-response-result diagram (table 5.2) to describe my detailed 
analysis more parsimoniously, and to evince my findings, in this paragraph, I further 
abstract the political process of implementation (refer figure 5.1) from table 5.2. 
 
In table 5.2, in each column, there is an approximate sequential flow that starts at the 
top with framing of technology frame (a structure that carries the framer’s political 
interests), which is an outcome of an actor’s (e.g., consultants or employees or 
management) ‘cognitive sensemaking’ (Weick et al., 2005). Since either technology 
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frames or some aspects of technology frames emerge in this process, I call this phase 
‘emergence of frames’. This is followed by political strategies that various actors play 
in order to mobilize other members’ (or groups’) interest to form coalitions and to 
consolidate their interests and interpretations, where in consolidation means the 
attempts to not only legitimate one’s interests and interpretations but also exclude the 
interests and interpretations that are in conflict with one’s own even through coercive 
means. The mobilization of interest and its consolidation leads to creation of a 
consensus (that may not be widely shared) about what technology is/should be (a 
collective normative understanding) and the corresponding expectations or in other 
words a consensus on the frame among actors. This frame is then translated into 
software language and entered into the body of the software, a process that I call 
“encoding”. Drawing on social constructionist literature on technology, Joerges and 
Czarniawska (1998) conceptualize the creation of a collective normative 
understanding about technology and the conversion of this understanding into material 
medium (such as software language or text) as “technical inscription”.  Therefore, the 
creation of the shared consensus on the frame and the subsequent encoding can 
together be considered as technical inscription. The inscribed part of the software 
(called a module or sub-module) is put into testing and sometime trial use since the 
software has a modular structure. From a structurational viewpoint, the testing or the 
trial use (a form of practice) is an instantiation of the frames (that is structure) and the 
underlying norms encoded into the software through daily use, and thereby it is a 
process of an “enactment” (Giddens, 1979; 1984; Orlikowski, 2000) through 
practice29.  This pattern is repeated in each column of table 5.2. Now, using the above-
mentioned abstract labels, we can describe the pattern of the process as cognitive 
                                                 
29
 In enactment through practice, I exclude the discursive production of structures (and the meanings) 
and confine the enactment to practical reproduction of the structures embedded in the ERP software 
through its daily use. 
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sensemaking and framing--use of political strategies--technical inscription--enactment 
See figure 5.1: for the sake of convenience I have shown only three stages that repeats 
in other stages.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now, I trace the connection between the vertical columns in figure 5.1, which will 
lead us into the relationship between the micro processes I mentioned above. In stage 
1, the coercion of Itech, and Itech’s realization (that was based on their current 
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experience of encoding) that meeting GovIndian employees’ demand for significant 
customization would be more time consuming than expected motivated Itech to frame 
ERP as party customizable complex software. Thus, both the political strategies and 
the encoding in stage 1 led to frame formation in stage 2. The enactment of partially 
customized and automated practices and Itech engineers’ sensegiving that a complete 
customization and automation would be impossible resulted in the employee 
sensemaking and the framing of ERP as a partially automating software (in stage 3). 
The employees increased non-cooperation and demand for automation led to the top 
management’s discursive formation of their frame, ERP (mostly) an information 
integrator (in stage 4). In both stage 5 and stage 6 that occurred in parallel, it is the 
political action and the enactment that led to the emergence of frames. Thus, except in 
the case of the frame that the consultants formed discursively (ERP a partially 
customizable software), it was the political strategies and the enactment that led to the 
emergence of frames. This cycle was repeated (see figure 5.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the following chapter, I take my findings and the processes I identified in this 
chapter to a radically different implementation context. The implementation context is 
FIGURE 5.2: THE CYCLICAL POLITICAL MICRO PROCESS OF 
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the implementation of a “branded ERP” software in a Western multinational 
organization that is culturally, politically, economically, and technologically different 
from GovIndia. In addition to the emergence of frames and political strategies, I pay 
more attention (than I did in this chapter) to technical inscription and enactment. Thus, 
I use the case study in the next chapter to reinforce my findings and the processes.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
INSCRIBING POLITICS INTO TECHNOLOGICAL ARTIFACTS AND THE 
POLITICS OF TECHNICAL INSCRIPTION: ERP IMPLEMENTATION IN 
WESTINDIA 
This chapter presents the analysis of the implementation of ERP in WestIndia using 
negotiating technology frame as the analytic lens. As I did in the previous chapter, I 
present the episodes of implementation as changes in the aspects of technology frames 
that occurred through negotiating technology frames in an approximate chronological 
order. In this chapter, I expand as well as reinforce the arguments I made in the 
previous chapter. That is ERP implementation is a process of multiple actors shifting 
technology frames, which carry their sensemaking and views of the ERP technology, 
in their attempt to impose their respective frames over others as well as resist others’ 
imposition, and the final ERP software becoming an outcome of this power play. The 
actors, while shifting the technology frames in order to gain predominance, use 
technology frames as an emergent discursive resource. They also resort to coercive 
institutional arrangements to exclude the resistance to their frames (or views).  In such 
context, the seemingly shared consensus on technology frames could well be an 
outcome of such institutional coercion and exclusion. I introduced the notion of an 
institutional closure to denote such consensus. I also introduced the notion of 
technology non-affordance to explain a prominent way ERP consultants (or arguably 
the technical experts) exercise their expert power through sensegiving discourses that 
use technology frame as a discursive resource. In this chapter, I further expand these 
two concepts.  
 
In the previous chapter, I had argued that ERP technology and the implementation 
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were a means to express employee resistance in other ways. I also presented a process 
model that could explain this political process of implementation.  One of the 
processes I identified is technical inscription. Using the concept, I indicated how 
negotiators “inscribe”30 their political interests into technological artifacts or machines 
such as computer (or software programs) affecting their functionality (for example 
employee’s efforts to reduce visibility leading to less integration).  Following Joerges 
and Czarniawska (1998), I call this process of inscribing as “technical inscription”. 
Technical inscription consists of two processes: a) abstraction of the daily technical 
practices into shared technical norms--‘legitimate collective expectations and 
prescriptions for actions’ (Joerges & Czarniawska, 1998:373), for example, a shared 
consensus of ERP as an information integrator, and subsequent b) materialization of 
such technical norms, for example conversion of the technical norms into material 
medium such as written documents or texts that include software or machine 
languages (Joerges & Czarniawska, 1998: 370). In the previous chapter, we have seen 
the politics of technical inscription and instances of inscribing politics into the ERP 
software at a macro level (e.g., generalized across work practices and business 
functions). In this chapter, we will see the same process at both a macro and a micro 
level (e.g., the case of specific work practices within a business function).  The 
objective of the examination of the politics of technical inscription at the two levels is 
to strengthen the overall arguments.  
 
The use of the notion, technical inscription, not only helps me abstract further (from 
                                                 
30
 Inscription refers to the fact that an artifact embodies the developers’ beliefs, social and economic 
relations, previous patterns of use, legal limits, and assumptions as to what the artifact is about (Akrich, 
1992). The term inscription is used when designers formulate and shape technology in such a way as to 
lead and control users. Inscription, in particular, “technical inscription” (Joerges & Czarniawska, 1998) 
can also refer to the way technical artifacts embody patterns of use, including user programs of action. 
The term also encompasses the roles users and the system play (Monteiro, 2000). Since inscription can 
guide users to join or behave in a way that forces a definition of the form and function of the 
technology, many actors actively seek to inscribe their vision and interests into the artifact. 
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the concrete details in the previous chapter) but also is aesthetically more appealing 
since the technology I study is a software program--a textual body—that suits the 
notion of inscription in its literal sense. Moreover, the use of the concept, inscription, 
also suggests that in this chapter I take ERP software as a text, a conceptualization of 
technology that has characterized recent technology studies (e.g., Spicer, 2005). In 
short, in this chapter, considering ERP software as a textual canvass to inscribe 
political interests of the actors and the power relations among them, I will examine the 
politics involved in the technical inscription. As we did in the previous chapter, to 
investigate the political process of technical inscription effectively we need to 
understand the historical background of the implementation.  
 
6.1 Historical background  
WestIndia is the Indian manufacturing unit of a European private sector manufacturer 
of specialty transformers and associated accessories. The European multinational 
organization has four manufacturing units across the globe. It is one among the top 
five European transformer market leaders (Global Industry Analysts, October 2008). 
Unlike other manufacturing units in the European group, until the year 2000, 
WestIndia had been focusing mainly on Indian markets as opposed to international 
market. But, as evident from Table 6.1, the focused market is shifting from domestic 
(Indian) to international.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proportion of products sold out in Period 
Indian market International market  
1996-2000 80% 20% 
2000-2005 60% 40% 
2005-2008 50% 50% 
TABLE 6.1: SHIFT IN THE CUSTOMER BASE 
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This shift as well as the increased presence of global players in the domestic market, 
especially from China, also introduced WestIndia to more market competition, which 
the management assessed as moderate to high (Company document, 2007). WestIndia 
realized this shift in market not by proportionately reducing Indian customer base but 
by introducing more specialized products. Thus, during 1996-2006, the number of 
products leaped from 10 to 100. At the time of data collection, nearly 70% of the 
products were custom made as opposed to mass-produced. 
 
The European business group took over WestIndia in January 2006 from another 
multinational European business group that founded WestIndia in 1996 as its sole 
manufacturing unit in India. When the company was founded, the European owners 
took it as a backup to its Sri Lankan manufacturing unit (Company document, 1996) 
that had troubles from the turbulent Sri Lankan politics—the fight between migrants 
from Tamil Nadu and Sri Lankan government.   Taken as a back-up unit, it seems that 
the owners did not put much effort in WestIndia to mould its work processes and work 
culture compared to what they had done with the Sri Lankan unit. Thus, WestIndia 
had less ‘founder’s imprint’ (Stinchcombe, 1965). Instead, the owners left the 
responsibility to develop the work processes to the Indian managers who were present 
in WestIndia. Although a European Managing Director (MD), one of the owners of the 
company, had been present in the company until January 2007, an Indian female 
business manager (55 years old31), formally the second person in the company (and 
one time the MD) who resigned in June 2007, took most of the strategic, business, and 
operational decisions. According to the employees, the manager adopted a “traditional 
                                                 
31
 The difference in age between the manager’s age and the employee’s age is important here 
since in the State’s culture, which is high on power distance (Witteveen & Enserink, 2007), 
more aged persons are assumed to have more knowledge, and thus to be respected and obeyed 
by less aged persons. 
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approach” to business compared with the “better modern professional and scientific 
approach” that the new owner group seemed to be supporting. The employees used the 
term “traditional” to negatively characterize some aspects of the earlier management 
style.  See some excerpts from my interviews:  
 
She (the ex-Indian MD) was traditional…didn’t like information sharing between 
depts.,..decision based on whims and fancies,..no formal plans..we never bothered 
about delays..” (Assistant Manager 1) 
 
(H)ad no concern for cost..is traditional..to plan, you need a satellite view…they [the 
top management] didn’t get the need for it. (Manager1) 
 
 
The Manager1 was right: three years back the middle managers had proposed 
‘implementation of an integrated software or ERP’ to ‘modernize the business 
operations’. The earlier management did not take it up. But, the new (European) 
owners asked WestIndia to implement the ERP technology that WestIndia’s counter 
part in Sri Lanka had already implemented in 1998.  Unlike the ERP software that 
GovIndia implemented—an ERP software of a local vendor that came to be custom-
developed for GovIndia, WestIndia was asked to implement a globally reputed off-
the-shelf ERP product32 from a leading ERP vendor33 in international market (5th in 
market share at the time of implementation). WestIndia gave the implementation 
contract to the Sri Lankan consultant group, which implemented ERP in WestIndia’s 
sister company in Sri Lanka. Subsequently, the implementation started in June 2007.  
 
 
                                                 
32
 Unlike GovIndian ERP that operated on a Linux platform with a multi-tier architecture and java as 
the software programming language, WestIndian ERP operated on Windows platform with .net as the 
software programming language and client-server model as the architecture. Both used Oracle 11i as the 
RDBMS.  
33
 To protect privacy, I do not mention either the name of the vendor or the Sri Lankan consultant.  
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6.1 In the beginning……. 
In the kick-off meeting (2 hour duration) where most of the staff members except 
supervisors were present, the consultants spent more time (almost an hour) on the 
methodology of implementation. In line with the usual project management approach, 
the contents were partly different stages of implementation with deadlines, milestones, 
and deliverables during each stage.  WestIndia also constituted a project team with a 
‘project coordinator’ as the leader of the team. To discuss the configuration and the 
customization of the software, nine formal meetings and a number of discussions 
followed. While the consultants were punctual in these meetings, most of the 
WestIndian employees came late. One consultant expressed his disappointment about 
the lack of employees’ punctuality in these meetings: “Getting these guys in time is 
impossible!” As the project advanced, the consultants frequently pointed to the 
slippage in the schedule and the milestones, highlighting that unless the “users” 
complete their work and respond in time, the project would not finish in time. No one 
seemed to care much about it.  One of the consultants commented to me publicly: “In 
Sri Lanka the company pressed us to finish in time. They do not have much slippage 
in whatever they do, be it customer delivery or meeting production due dates. Here, 
you see just the opposite. See we are pressing the company to finish in time. Didn’t 
you see how frequently we have to remind them of the timeline? They neither worry 
about production delays nor missing committed delivery (to customer) date. They 
neither plan nor record. They have a ‘leisurely do’ culture here.”  
 
From a cultural perspective, it might look that the consultant was frustrated about the 
mismatch between his expectations of some ‘temporal norms’ (e.g., punctuality and 
adherence to schedules) (Ballard & Seibold, 2003) and the temporal norms that the 
 176 
organizational members enacted. This may be true; a point I will revisit. But, in its 
effect, such negative comments that highlighted time delays and schedule slippages as 
a part of WestIndian culture was an appropriation (intentional or non-intentional) of an 
ERP related discourse that some WestIndia employees had mobilized before the 
implementation of the ERP software. The discourse reveals the technology frame, an 
image of ERP software in general (what ERP technology is, and in turn, what it should 
be for WestIndia), that WestIndia employees shared. In the following sections, using 
negotiating technology frame as the analytical lens, I present the five stages of the 
ERP implementation in WestIndia in a linear sequential manner (neglecting overlap 
for the sake of simplicity). This will highlight the technological frames that emerged 
during these periods, their interaction with the exercise of power and the political 
strategies, and the subsequent apparently shared consensus. I examine the political 
dynamics around the technology frames that various relevant social groups (Pinch & 
Bijker, 1987) (with fluid boundary) advanced. The relevant social groups I identified 
(see Figure 6.1) are: a) the Sri Lankan ERP consultants, b) middle managers (except 
purchase manager), c) engineers and officers, d) supervisors, and e) operators (line 
workers). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Managing Director (MD) 
Operators 
Supervisors: Production, Store 
Officers & Engineers 
Middle Managers: Finance, Production & Materials, 
Purchase, Design & Sales, Logistics, CS cum ERP 
project coordinator 
Sr. Manager (HR) (Not 
directly involved in ERP) 
ERP consultants 
Group 1 
Group 2: middle 
managers (Purchase 
manager: exception) 
Group 4: 
some 
officers 
& 
engineers 
Group3 
Group5 
FIGURE 6.1: ORGANIZATIONAL CHART AND RELEVANT SOCIAL GROUPS 
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6.2 Stage 1: ERP a delay reducer  
Before the implementation began, most of the managerial employees were aware of 
the ERP objectives. Thus, there was a shared understanding about the broad objectives 
of ERP implementation at this point in time. The analysis of interview data show that 
these objectives were: a) integration of the silos of information that resided in different 
departments and the accessibility of the consequently isolated information which was 
not shared across departments prior to ERP implementation, b) elimination of the 
mismatch between the pieces of information that different functional units used to pass 
on to the group owners, and c) delay reduction through automation of the routine 
tasks. Let me explain the mismatch first. Both material division and finance division 
used to send annual stock value data to the owners. Finance division calculated the 
stock value from purchase orders while materials division arrived at the stock value 
via physical stock verification. These two values were expected to match each other. 
But, usually they did not. Therefore, the group owners were upset about the difference 
in the stock value. WestIndian employees expected that the ERP would solve this 
problem.  
 
Regarding the objective of delay reduction, many interviewees pointed out that until 
the take over, delay was not a very serious issue. Instead, as I mentioned in chapter 
four, delay was a normal part of WestIndian work culture. After the take over, the 
group owners had pointed out the issue of delay and delay had become a central 
concern for the top management as well as other managerial employees. The middle 
managers had mentioned the ERP objective of delay reduction in the managers’ 
meeting. They expected that the task automation would lead to reduction in various 
kinds of delays that included delay in production such as that resulted in slippage of 
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the production due dates, delay in financial processing such as delay in making 
payments to the supplier, delay in material procurement such as not getting the 
material to the store in time, delay in material issue such as not getting the material 
from the store to the shopfloor in time, delay in completing the quality test, delay in 
product delivery to the customer.   
 
As the ERP implementation began, out of the three initial objectives, the delay 
reduction received significantly more attention in the daily discourse of the 
employees. The management expressed their expectation that reducing delays would 
result in efficiency and time saving. Most of the interviewees including the middle 
managers interpreted ERP as a “modern solution to delays in production and data 
processing” that would provide WestIndia with a “systematic planning and 
scheduling”. Accordingly, some of the main expected outcomes were “increase in over 
all efficiency” and “time saving”. Gradually and more consistently, the managers 
started projecting ERP as a delay reducer, which became the predominant technology 
frame during this stage. For example, see part of the M.D.’s note to the WestIndian 
ERP team: “ ..concern is to get rid of delays...learn from others..look at the software 
companies around..”. Some managers and engineers projected the software engineers 
who surrounded them (recall the physical location of WestIndia in a local silicon 
valley) as admirable embodiments of professional (task) efficiency who, for example, 
meet tight project deadlines without any delay. See one manager’s comment: 
“..objective is to be as (task) efficient as the folks around, prompt in meeting 
deadlines..no more delays..”. To understand the implications of such pointers to the 
targeted model temporal behavior and professional identity (software engineer), we 
should situate the comments in the wider work environment and the ongoing 
discourses in India, particularly this state.  
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6.2.1 The discourse of esteemed software engineer 
Over the years 1990-2004, India had seen a tremendous growth of IT industry 
(Dossani, 2006; NASSCOM data, 2004; 2005). Both scholarly and popular media had 
been projecting India as an emerging economic power, and at the centre of this 
discourse is a new professional identity: Globalized Indian software engineer—an 
identity that is celebrated as an icon of Indian success that combined Indian values 
with global values (Radhakrishnan, 2008). Both academic and popular media have 
projected such successes and the identity behind it as a role model for other industries 
(Radhakrishnan, 2008).  The State government with its peculiar economic crisis (for 
details, see chapter 4) had identified IT as the ‘engine of industrial growth’ (State 
vision 2008, 2000). In turn, the globalized software engineer was seen as the prime 
mover of the new economy of the State. Scholars have noted that in India, software 
engineer has become an esteemed symbol of middle class people’s professional 
success (Radhakrishnan, 2008; Upadhay, 2008; 2009). Given that the majority of the 
population of the State falls in the category of Indian middle class (Economic review, 
2004: 20-28), it is very likely that the esteem and high status ascribed to software 
engineer was widespread among the society of the State. For example, it was usual in 
the matrimonial market34 to mention software engineer as a desirable status for the 
person to get married. At some point in time, the media reported a public concern that 
it had become difficult for a non-software engineer to get a suitable person to marry 
(Malayala Manorama daily, March 16, 2004). The researcher himself had faced such 
challenges. See a comment from one of the WestIndian production engineers (during 
                                                 
34
 Unlike in may Western countries, in India, particularly in the State, the institutional arrangement for 
finding a person to marry is not through dating. Instead, the well-wishers (mostly parents) of the person 
who is desiring to marry advertise desirable features of the person they are looking for in matrimonial 
columns of daily news papers or the web sites of marriage bureaus—business institutions that brokerage 
marriages.    
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an interview) who had been recently on the matrimonial market: 
“See George, all of them wanted a software engineer. This is the sixth time I am 
rejected…just fed up now…if you aren’t a software engineer, it has become so 
difficult to get a girl” 
 
6.2.2 Effect of the software engineer discourse: Identity formation 
The effect of the ascription of high esteem and social status to software engineers was 
more significant for WestIndian employees since it was the only hardware firm 
operating in the ‘software park’, the local Silicon Valley. Software engineers had 
literally surrounded WestIndian employees. Even all the firms that were located on the 
same floor where WestIndia was located were reputed software firms. All these had 
significant impact on WestIndian employees. For example, during the interviews 
many managerial staff members commented on the disparity between the reception 
they got in the software park and that their software engineer colleagues got. Here is a 
typical comment (an excerpt from a manager’s interview): 
 
“There is a big issue of ego here. When those around us (referring to software 
engineers) come in coat and suit driving their cars, our poor engineer boys come in 
ordinary dress catching the crowded buses. They already have that hurt ego in their 
minds…. Even in the canteens (restaurants) our children and we too are treated like 
third-rate citizens…also put as at inferior positions vis-à-vis our friends (software 
engineers)”  
 
As the series of data (including the comment) I presented above indicate, it is highly 
likely that WestIndian employees were sensitive to the identity formation process 
(Alvesson and Willmott, 2004; du Gay, 1996), the discourse around this desirable new 
identity. A step further, it is also probable that they were influenced by this identity 
formation discourse that the management reproduced in WestIndia, for example see 
the MD’s and the managers’ comment suggesting to emulate the efficient, professional 
software engineers. As mentioned during the interviews, while working in WestIndia, 
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the managers and assistant managers as well as some engineers had attempted to 
switch to software engineering profession since it had more professional status and 
salary. Many of them took software engineer as a coveted identity. See a typical 
comment: “We would love to be like the guys around—professional, (task) efficient, 
and up-to-date”. While I am writing this report, some of the engineers and supervisors 
left for software engineer positions. Interestingly, in the recent telephonic interview I 
had with an assistant manager, the manager remarked about having the ERP 
implemented, “now, at least we have become more professional .and (task) 
efficient..like the guys around us”. He was referring to the new identity they had 
developed by this time, an ERP enabled employee. I will revisit this identity 
formation, a central concern in the studies on politics of organizational change from a 
Foucauldian perspective (Alvesson & Deets, 2003). I will argue that some of the 
WestIndian employees expected that the ERP implementation would help them 
emulate the desirable software engineer identity by producing a similar identity, ERP 
enabled employee.  
 
As we have seen in the WestIndian employees’ comments that I reproduced in a 
previous passage, a central theme was task efficiency, which was expected to come 
through reduction of delays and timely performance of activities.  Previously, I had 
indicated that doing tasks in time (a temporal norm), in WestIndian employees’ 
opinion, had not been a part of their work culture. My analysis of the enactment of 
WestIndian work practices corroborated this point. But, adherence to schedules and 
doing tasks in time had now become important in WestIndia especially since the new 
owners valued it. At the same time, in the society around WestIndia, such new 
temporal norms which are qualified as “Western” by popular literature (e.g., Chopra, 
1990; Khera, 2004) and academic literature (e.g., Lee, Hui, Tinsley, & Niu, 2006; 
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Sahay, 1998) had been increasingly highlighted as part of being professional and 
thereby desirable (as far some WestIndian employees are concerned). Next, I present 
this discourse around temporal norm in the wider society.   
 
6.2.3. The temporal norm discourse 
It seems during 1994-2004 there was a significant growth in the number of time 
management course and corporate training, and academic and professional literature 
that taught the trainees how to make detailed plans and do tasks in time bound manner, 
and thereby become more professional and efficient (NIEM data, 2006). Similarly, 
broadly in Indian media (daily news papers, TV shows, and films), and specifically in 
the media in the State where this study was conducted, there might be a significant 
increase in the focus on detailed planning and time bound actions as a part of 
becoming more professional and efficient (Kumar, 2003). Also, in the urban part of 
India there was a tremendous increase in the number of projects, especially short-term 
projects and outsourced projects with tight deadlines (NASSCOM data, 2004; 2005). 
These projects mostly follow typical project management style (of Western origin) 
with strictly followed milestones, deadlines, and detailed schedules and thus see task 
efficiency as primarily important (NASSCOM data, 2004; 2005). The spread of 
internet and its increased use, increase in the number of call centers, and outsourced IT 
projects (Batt, Doellgast, & Kwon, 2005; NASSCOM data, 2004; 2005) all put the 
working professionals of this State not only in close and continuous contact with the 
so-called Western notions of time but also presented such notions to them as part of a 
profession (Srinivasan, 2007). Given that WestIndia was embedded in such an 
environment, it was easier for both the managers as well as the consultants to 
appropriate such discourses irrespective of whether these actors were influenced 
and/or convinced by such discourses. As the earlier quotations show (p: 199), in 
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WestIndia, the managers along with the consultants pointed to the enactments of the 
so-called Western temporal norms in the wider environment as a model temporal 
behavior and software engineers as exemplars of such temporal behavior. In this 
context, the existing delay was framed as a significant problem that the ERP 
implementation would solve, and in turn, increase task efficiency of employees. We 
can see the use of this frame (ERP as a delay reducer and task efficiency increaser) in 
the discourses I present in the following paragraphs. 
 
6.2.4 ERP a delay reducer and task efficiency increaser 
Before implementing major modules, the production manager sent out an internal 
memo that read: ‘[T]his is our main objective of [ERP] implementation: to make..the 
dates we give to customers more reliable…Then, we should be able to stick with them. 
Now, whenever there is a change, there is re-scheduling..and that creates delay’. Many 
interviewees interpreted ERP as a solution to the pervasive delay problem. See an 
excerpt from a store staff member’s interview: “Delay is the main issue.. that is due to 
material shortage and lagging in production…we have unsystematic and unreliable 
material planning and production planning ..we don’t stick with them [the planned 
dates]..ERP solves these issues.”  
 
In addition to posing ERP as a delay reducer, the memo and the quote together 
suggest: a) that the lack of time boundedness might be resting on unreliable 
estimations, b) the positive expectation that by improving the reliability of the 
estimation ERP technology may improve time boundedness, and c) that the existing 
system/practices have negative attributes, like unsystematism. These three points were 
repeated many times. For example, below is a part of an interview with one of the 
managers that shows the belittling of the existing time orientations, and the manager’s 
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expectation of “improving” some aspects of these orientations through ERP 
implementation: 
 
“ I told you earlier; ERP makes us perform better, and forces us to record data timely 
and properly. This increases predictability. This makes customer delivery dates more 
accurate and feasible, as it should be. This is very important in the case of WestIndia. 
Many customers see us as a traditional company that never does things in time and 
never keeps its promise. Always there will be delays. This is because we don’t have 
proper records, time sensitivity, and that we are unable to trace. ERP improves these 
aspects. Now everyone is coming to realize this.” 
 
See an excerpt from assistant manager’s (APM) interview: 
 
“ The main problem is delay. That is a frequent here. The main reason (for delay) is 
materials (shortage). Sitting in Production (department) you can say materials. Main 
issue is lagging. The approach to Indian customer is to say, “go and come tomorrow”. 
In many places it is so. When it occurs many times, saying that it has been happening 
many times, they (Indian customers) put pressure on the Design and Sales (Design & 
Sales dept). Design comes and tells the AE (Assistant Engineers). The AE stops other 
orders and diverts the materials to the pressing order. Thus there is lag, lag of 3-4 
days. In that way when there is lag in say 4 lines (production lines) suddenly there 
comes a requirement from 50-60 orders…that needs just one week. That (order) also 
gets lagged. This carries forward from one month to the following. Thus it goes on and 
on. We hope that ERP will take care of such delays.”  
 
This sensegiving discourse that employed a technology frame of ERP as a delay 
reducer had some effect. Other WestIndian employees (than managers) also 
interpreted ERP as a delay reducer that would increase efficiency. Below are some 
representative quotes that indicate this sensemaking of WestIndian employees (from 
my interviews): 
Accountant: So the benefit is time saving and efficiency..by reducing delays and 
reduction in some workload. That is mainly automation of existing work. 
 
Production engineer: In TIS (existing IS) info is limited to a section. To make it 
available to another department we have to manually copy it to that department. This 
also causes delays. In ERP, it’s automatic.  It connects all sections and departments. 
Thus it saves time and increases efficiency also. 
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Store supervisor: It reduces the time to fish out a piece of information. Thus increases 
the (task) efficiency. Fishing for information causes a lot of delays here.  
Quality staff: ERP is for the reduction of production delays..through automation of 
tasks 
 
Store staff member: ERP will reduce our cost and delay in processing, and saves time 
in processing and increase (task) efficiency. 
 
Note the repeated point of delay reduction and resultant increase in task efficiency. 
Appropriating this ongoing delay reducer discourse, the consultants framed time 
saving, and in turn task efficiency--two ERP benefits that they had projected--in terms 
of reduction in various delays. Below is an example:  
“The main benefit is time saving..and increase in efficiency...reduces all delays..when 
you replace..traditional elements..with the ERP practices..industry accepted and so 
professional..to reduce delays..ERP helps with its built-in professional practices..that 
you cannot modify at your will..” (An ERP consultant in the first implementation 
meeting called project education).  
 
From such sense giving discourse the employees directly involved in the 
implementation reinforced their sensemaking using the frame of ERP a delay reducer 
and task efficiency increaser. Further, they furthered their sensemaking by expanding 
this frame, taking ERP as a less modifiable delay reducer that has objective 
universally applicable standard professional practices. The adoption of the ERP 
standards was expected to result in delay reduction. See an excerpt from a manager’s 
interview:  
“That time I thought that our (meaning employees’) input was insignificant, a bit of 
modification and nothing beyond that. It’s like SAP [a reputed ERP] comes to the 
company and the company has to fall into the SAP line..That time when we came out 
from the meeting we thought that is the only way..[ERP] has universal standard 
practices..we have to just adopt it…and that leads to delay reduction” 
 
But there were a few other managerial employees (directly involved in the 
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implementation) who contested such an image of the technology or the technological 
frame. A functional manager became the informal lead of that group.  For example, 
see an excerpt from his interview:  
“ERP..by itself cannot reduce delays..that is the consultants’ fake claim..to dump their 
practices on us..need to accommodate our practices..they have to modify the software 
..fine-tuning our procedures..will reduce delays”.  
 
The functional manager (PM) strongly expressed his opposition in the next meeting (3 
hours long), which was the first meeting to discuss implementation of inventory 
module, accounts module, and purchase module. WestIndian employees labeled this 
meeting as ‘PK (the functional manager’s name) sir’s fight with the consultants’.  See 
a typical comment about this meeting: 
 
APM (during an interview): It was actually a fight. PK sir suggested a lot of 
modifications including having four PO formats, which are different from their 
standards. He also told that Purchase division was not ready to change the existing 
practices just to match the standard practices. The consultants sternly told then it 
wouldn’t work since changing the software significantly is impossible and that 
WestIndia itself would be in great trouble. For example, PK sir suggested…..Then N 
and S (the consultants) rejected it outright saying that it was unnecessary and was 
difficult to make in the ERP…they asked us to justify if we make any suggestion for 
change..and they repeated many times that they can do nothing that touches the 
core..the system won’t allow it..all of us then thought we have to just yield to the 
system procedures… After a heated debate of about an hour, finally they (the 
consultants) agreed to change the standard code. Still, they did not change it 
fully..perhaps there are some serious system constraints too..this is what many of us 
got from that meeting.. 
 
The sentence in bold indicates that in this meeting, as we have seen in the previous 
case study (GovIndia), the consultants were trying to create a perceived technology 
non-affordance. Below are some representative quotes from my interview that show 
the consultant’s (C) attempt to create technology non-affordance perception and its 
effect on the users. 
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APM: Can we treat the assembled machines as three parts? 
C: No; only as a single machine since there will be problem with depreciation. You 
know, this system is not so flexible. It poses a lot of constraints. 
 
Store officer: When you link all these, there will be a lot of limitations (system 
limitations). That means we have to yield to the demands of the software to some great 
extent. This is the common approach, now. 
 
Below are a few parts from purchase module discussions (PM: The functional 
manager, PC: Project Coordinator, C: Consultant): 
PM (murmurs to me and a purchase staff): In Sri Lanka these guys (consultants) 
dumped their system on the company’s head. The same trick they are playing 
here…the label is system limitations. That won’t go here. 
PC: When you suggest modifications, you should keep in mind the limitations of 
ERP. We cannot do anything with the limitations. 
………………….. 
PC: We have to standardize it. That’s the only way possible to go ahead.  
C: The issue is that the system is pretty much complex. We already have put a lot of 
efforts into it (modification), when we implemented it in Sri Lanka. So there are a lot 
of limitations built in by what went on earlier. Also, the database and the language 
have its own limitations. No one can do anything with those things. To be realistic, 
we have to take these things into account or else nothing will move.  
………………….. 
The argument between PM and consultants went on for half an hour. Finally, the 
consultants told:   
C: I can give the due date field editable so that you vary the date description 
depending on the vendor. But it is always better to standardize. Otherwise, because 
this system works in a particular way, you only will have problems. The links won’t 
work. For example, you won’t be able to use the material planning utilities and the 
later patch ups will cost you more. It’s not that we are reluctant to modify, but the 
system doesn’t permit.  
 
Gradually, PM, who opposed the adoption of ERP practices as well the consultant’s 
attempt to create technology non-affordance came to be seen as a “traditional 
nuisance35” and was apparently excluded from some critical meetings. During the 
                                                 
35
 This usage was also relevant with respect to his age. He was about 62 years while the age of 
the consultants and all other employees involved in the implementation ranged between 26-35.    
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implementation of the modules that occurred during this stage, the standard ERP 
practices were adopted without significant36 modifications in the standard modules. 
Such standard practices when enacted were assumed to result in reduction of delays. 
The employees started trial using the modules, enacting the encoded standard 
practices. PM’s and others’ opposing views to interpreting ERP as an automatic delay 
reducer as well as the move to implement other modules such as materials 
management and production management triggered further discourses about how ERP 
would/would not reduce delays. Meanwhile, the consultants started highlighting 
WestIndia’s “lack of records”, “late recording”, and “insensitiveness to time” in 
negative terms, thereby making them more salient. The interview data showed that 
most of the employees also felt that “the late recording”, and “lack of time sensitivity” 
of the “existing culture in WestIndia” should be changed, which in turn, would help 
them become more professional.  The negative characterizations of the aspects of time 
underlying the existing practices looked probably stronger as they were seen in the 
light of, and sometimes grouped under, existing “traditional approach”, an approach 
that the employees themselves characterized negatively, for example, as unsystematic. 
This discourse suggested that the ERP’s standard practices with its temporal norms 
were more desirable than the local practices with its local temporal norms since 
adoption of ERP’s standard practices would lead to delay reduction, and in turn, 
increase in task efficiency, a hallmark of the desirable identity--software engineer.  
This discourse was overlapped by the discourse on how ERP would/would not help 
reduce delays, and in turn increase task efficiency, that generated a different political 
                                                 
36
 In ERP parlance, the changes in the appearance without changing the underlying database or 
in other words changes in the front end is considered not as a significant change. If there is a 
change in the database or the mathematical algorithms underlying the tables, such a change is 
considered significant.  
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dynamics and changes in delay reducer technology frame. Therefore, I consider it as 
the next stage: stage2.    
 
6.3 Stage 2: ERP a disciplining agent-enabling face 
In this stage, there occurred an expansion of the earlier sense making that delay 
reduction occurs simply through the adoption of ERP’s standard practices and the 
replacement of the existing traditional practices.  In addition, now the employees 
started realizing that to materialize the delay reduction through ERP technology they 
(employees) need to enact the standard ERP practices and, that the temporal norms 
and other such work norms that they need to enact are quite different from the 
temporal norms and other such work norms they had been enacting so far. As I have 
noted previously, employees claimed that the trial use and the discussions with the 
consultants as well as colleagues triggered this expanded sensemaking. For example, 
below is a manager’s (DSM) reflection on his and his subordinates’ trial use of the 
Sales module: 
 
I: What was your picture just before the ERP implementation started, that is before 
middle of June? 
DSM: If you press a button you get the over all picture. This was my ideas until 
now…you don’t have much role…just the software would resolve our issues..[earlier, 
during the interview the manager had mentioned delay as one of the major issues]  
I: Now? 
DSM: Now it got changed after the implementation of the Sales modules. I see some 
other issues (silence) 
I: Means? 
DSM: That means are we utilizing the opportunities, infrastructure or utilities that we 
already have? ERP will only show us the things. We ourselves have to implement, 
right? I mean we need to carry out what the ERP suggests. I doubt that there is a gap 
between ERP’s suggestions and our implementation. I doubt that it will occur 
repeatedly. 
I: Can you please explain a bit more? 
DSM: The machine (ERP) will give the output of the machine. The planning needed 
for daily activities, we ourselves have to do. This means, on the basis of the ERP 
output we have to carry out the tasks, we have to implement the plans (ERP plans). If 
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there is a gap between what ERP suggests and what we implement, it will adversely 
affect the performance. We have been executing our tasks differently for a long 
time..for example, we didn’t train ourselves to do tasks in time..or do it 
systematically..we didn’t have such a system here..now we are bound to do 
systematically in time. 
 
See another similar message from an assistant manager’s (APM) interview: 
APM: Before starting the implementation, this was the image: anything you need, will 
be there in the system. Anything you need, you can get from the system let it be 
regarding production or any other such function. From my seat itself I can get any 
information I need. This was the idea, the concept. 
I: What is the current idea? 
APM: Now, this is the image: if it is not implemented properly, it will be an utter 
failure. See there is a big difference between what we have been doing and what ERP 
has. I mean it all depends on how well we use the ERP and to what extent one can 
input data and extract it. I mean it has a lot of human factors. Unlike we had been 
doing so far, we have to do a lot of detailed planning, and adhere to the schedule, etc. 
ERP is a standard tool. But it (the success) depends on how well we use it and 
manipulate it. So we need to put the ERP’s suggestions into practice. That only can 
give us benefits like say delay reduction and work efficiency. Earlier the concept was 
that if we have ERP, we have everything. It will do everything including all kinds of 
planning. We can just sit and watch. 
 
Below is still another interview excerpt (from another manager’s (PM) interview): 
PM: In ERP it cannot be done. Now..we’ll be more time-bound... It’s not possible that 
different (production) lines take different tracks or function differently.  
I: Can you please explain it? 
PM: ..(In the existing local practices) there are start dates and finish 
dates..flexible..guidelines..you could change them. Now, you can’t... It is hourly 
based..and make us time bound..more efficient..and reduces delays [I: uh..].. 
PM: ..(In the existing practice) We don’t go for line production… 
I: What do you mean by line production? 
PM: That means start with line 1 and then follow the sequential steps keeping the 
same line..Now..it’s (in ERP) sequential..have to adhere to it (the sequence).. 
 
Here, managers point out that the ERP’s work norms such as temporal norms (e.g., 
time boundedness, detailed planning, and schedule adherence) (Balrad & Seibbold, 
2004) and spatial norms (e.g., adherence to activity sequence) that are enacted or to be 
enacted are different from WestIndia’s existing local work norms. More importantly, 
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they suggest that the adoption of ERP norms is beneficial in the sense it leads to delay 
reduction, efficiency increase and systematic approach.  The essence of this discourse 
is not merely a repetition that the ERP may be interpreted as a delay reducer and an 
efficiency increaser but this discourse also tries to generate a new sense (i.e., 
sensegiving) that to make that technology frame working, one should favor ERP 
practices with the underlying work norms over the local work practices with its 
underlying work norms. Thus, this sensegiving discourse was in alignment with the 
consultant’s discourse on the necessity to accept ERP standards and its benefit over 
the local practices including its underlying temporal norms. The reproduction of the 
consultant’s attempts (this time by the employees also) to qualify the temporal and 
spatial norms of the ERP practices as positive and simultaneously that of existing 
practices as negative made this sensegiving discourse stronger. Here is an excerpt 
from a WestIndian ERP project team member’s interview (TM):  
 
TM: [A]lso, we have many unsystematic traditional practices. We can’t get these 
things into a system…. 
I: What do you mean by unsystematic? 
TM: See, ERP has a sequential way of doing. That is a very systematic, disciplined, 
and professional way—step by step. If there is nothing like that [sequential way], it is 
unsystematic, undisciplined. They are not normal. See we usually do here many things 
at a time with no plan of what should be done at what time. This is the problem. 
I: Sorry; I’m still not clear about the meaning of unsystematic and undisciplined. 
Please elaborate. 
TM: (appeared deeply thinking) If it has a logic, it’s normal and systematic. We just 
have only a broad plan. That is itself changeable. We have some sort of no-logic in the 
way we do things or we don’t know our logic or maybe we don’t even know whether 
we have a logic at all. However, ERP has a clear logic. So it’s normal.” 
 
The points that were vague in the managers’ interview—the negative characterization 
of local work norms (in TM’s interview it is temporal norms) vis-à-vis the positive 
characterization of ERP’s work norms—is clearer in TM’s interview. The temporal 
norms include delay, (lack of detailed) schedules, (lack of) precision or time 
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boundedness (Ballrad & Seibold, 2003). Gradually, the ERP’s global or so-called 
Western spatial-temporal norms and their enactment (e.g. time bound data entry, 
creating detailed work plans, and schedule adherence: temporal norms; sequence 
adherence: spatial norm) became the normal, logical, and professional way while the 
local spatial-temporal norms and their enactment were taken as non-logical 
unsystematic. Many times, the consultants fuelled such discourses. See part of a 
discussion between WestIndian ERP Project Coordinator (PC) and the consultant (C) 
during testing of sales module: 
   
PC: Is there any way for raising the invoice not going through so many steps 
(seemingly irritated)?  
C: Hey, [PC], now you already know that if you want a better system [means ERP], 
you have to follow the sequence strictly…no jumping..All these data are required to 
link..(different modules). So the concept is to follow the sequence strictly for your 
good or you have to do it manually. Do you want to go back to .. your jumping 
traditional way? (scornful voice and facial expression) 
 
As I noted previously, here again, there is the juxtaposition of negatively characterized 
and categorized (as “traditional” approach) local temporal norm and its enactment 
with the positively characterized ERP’s global temporal norm and its expected 
enactment. This strategy of positive-negative characterization, juxtaposition, and 
categorization formed a pattern and made the sensegiving discourse predominant. 
Sometimes, to comment on specific employee behavior, the consultants drew upon the 
discourses in the wider society that projected the global so-called Western temporal 
norms and the people who epitomized it favorably: 
 
C1: Do you guys read Khera [popular Indian author on time management, success, and 
task efficiency]?  He taught us to make better daily plans..this increased our 
efficiency; why are you guys like this? 
……….. 
C2: “Recently, I read an Indian magazine.. the success of Indian business people..the 
essential elements to succeed in business or life is to plan and do in time...Did any of 
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you read it? You should”  
PC: (laughs) That is why we have your [ERP]..to give us good plans, and to make us 
prompt, right?” 
 
Note the reproduction of the taken-for-granted favorableness of ERP’s global notions 
or so-called western notions (and its proponents such as the consultants, vendors and 
so on) over the local notions to mobilize the active consent of the locals, a group of 
WestIndian employees. The use of such hegemonic sensegiving discourses (Foucault, 
2002) mobilized around the technology frame of delay reducer and efficiency 
increaser highlighted that the “fault” (e.g. causes of delays) lies not only with the local 
system of practices (as projected in stage 1) but also with the actors’ behavior—their 
enactments of the practices. Therefore, beyond the mere adoption of ERP’s standard 
practices, it was necessary to act (or behave) in a new way and habituate the new set 
of behaviors through enacting the ERP norms without any deviation.  In this context, 
some employees interpreted ERP as bringing out a positive change in their behavior 
while some others interpreted it as rendering the employees more visible to peers and 
superiors, and thereby increasing employee monitorability. Therefore, I used 
Foucault’s (1977) notion of discipline to label (or code in grounded theory analysis) 
this theme and to interpret the technology frames that emerged around this theme 
during this stage and the next stage. Also, note that this disciplinary formation ties it 
back to identity formation.  Following Foucault (1977) I use discipline37 to denote 
both its creative aspect that shapes the desired individuality or subjectivity (for 
example, ERP enabled employee equivalent to a professional task efficient software 
                                                 
37
 I chose the label discipline also because this is the term WestIndian employees used (in vivo code), 
which has deep meaning in the local culture of the State. For example, in the local culture discipline 
means that the disciplining agent (e.g. a parent or a teacher) has the legitimate right to punish. Such 
punishment is taken for granted to be for the good of the disciplined and the disciplined has no right to 
question such punitive action. A typical example frequently used in the local culture is a teacher 
‘disciplining’ a student or parent/elders ‘disciplining’ the children/younger ones.  
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engineer—a desirable identity for WestIndian employees) and its constraining aspect 
that renders one to a panoptic surveillance (which we will see in Stage 3).   
 
By this time, the consultants, the managers, and some other staff members began 
suggesting that ERP had the capability to bring out the positively shaping discipline. 
See a representative comment during an interview: 
 
As I told you earlier, ERP forces us to record data timely and properly..improves our 
performance…the delays occur because we don’t keep proper records and don’t have 
time sensitivity..we need more discipline... ERP helps here..disciplining us and 
making us more professional (DSM: a manager). 
 
Again an excerpt from DSM’s interview: 
DSM: Since the whole lifecycle is captured in the system, one can easily identify who 
is lagging behind others. I think people will start working more out of fear. (of 
monitorability). People will become more responsible and more disciplined. …This 
may help increase the personal efficiency. But, I don’t know whether it is going to be 
positively or negatively affecting Toroid because people like me have been working 
here in a passive atmosphere for past 10 years. From that a quick shift to an active 
atmosphere-I don’t know whether it is going to be positive or negative.  
I: What do you mean by passive and active? 
DSM: That means earlier performance and efficiency were not issues for us. Similarly, 
we were not sensitive to delay in customer delivery. Now, when there is increased 
accountability, the performance and the efficiency become issues, timely delivery to 
customer and in that the concern for number of product delivered..I mean such focus 
on efficiency and time will force us to be always active and disciplined-we will be 
made more time concerned and efficiency concerned. As a result, our individual 
efficiency and our discipline also will increase..we’ll become more professional..like 
the folks around us. 
 
Recall that during the delay reducer discourse (and even before) in the previous stage, 
the management had pointed to software engineers as the exemplar of (task) efficient 
professionals. Therefore, perhaps, the message here is that ERP is disciplining the 
users into a new desirable identity that is equivalent to software engineers.  Although 
the same manager, along with other managers, had been projecting the transformation 
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into a more professional like the software engineers, at the same time he is also 
skeptical that costs involved in that transformation may outweigh the result, the 
achievement of the desirable identity. We will revisit this point. Also, as in the case of 
delay reducer discourse, in the above discourses also we can see how the manager-
consultant coalition used technology frame as a ‘sensegiving strategic’ (Spicer, 2005) 
device. Perhaps, as a consequence, gradually, the employees other than managers also 
came to interpret ERP as a disciplining agent (not merely a tool). Here, agent means 
one with a capability to transform, which in turn, indicates attribution of a causal 
agency (capability to cause a change) to ERP technology. This point is evident in the 
above comments: a perception that ERP forces employees to behave in a time bound 
manner transforming them into more professional.  
 
As ERP implementation continued, “disciplining” and “systmatism” were added as 
expected outcomes of ERP implementation. Here is a typical expectation:  “..one of 
the desired outcomes is disciplining our work. We used to violate or jump over 
sequential steps. ERP will discipline us to work correctly according to the procedure.” 
(Design engineer).  
Notice the italicized words violate and discipline, which indicated a deviation from the 
normal, the “normal” “right” way being the sequential way—the ERP way--as we 
have seen in the interview with the ERP project team member (TM).  Below, I give a 
few more representative quotes to show how the sensegiving discourse mobilized 
using the technology frame, ERP as a disciplining agent, became the sensemaking of 
other WestIndian employees: 
 
Assistant manager (in an interview): It (ERP) won’t allow you to issue materials from 
the latest lot. So you are forced to issue the material from the earlier slot…this is part 
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of a good discipline..strictly following FIFO38 
 
Sales engineer (SE): (t)he material forecasting we do is manual. When ERP comes 
that will become more systematic and disciplined… 
I: Systematic and disciplined..means? 
SE: Systematic means bring to a single platform in an orderly manner..disciplined 
means keeping that order and doing things properly in time. 
 
(ERP) Project coordinator (in a meeting): Similarly, bettering the production planning, 
delays can be avoided. In that way we can get an order and become more systematic 
and professional…the system will force us to a discipline. 
 
Engineer (during a casual conversation in the corridor between an account and an 
engineer): Now if you are not doing the job the way system tells you and within the 
time prescribed by the system, the system will catch you. You get a discipline that we 
lack here..both with respect to time and adherence to procedures. That is the good part 
of it. 
 
Assistant engineer (in an interview): Here, we have a lot of flexibilities. When ERP is 
implemented fully such flexibilities will vanish. It should vanish. That is one of the 
aims of ERP…thus, we become more systematic and disciplined…for example (of 
flexibility), now if we plan to deliver for December 1, even if deliver say by December 
4 or 5 that is okay-there is such a generally accepted concept in this company. That 
goes on and on. Since it is not affecting the running of the company or anything else, it 
is going on. 
 
Overtime, the new technology frame that interpreted ERP as a disciplining agent was 
stabilized (Pinch & Bijker, 1987). In turn, the ERP’s global practices with its global 
spatial-temporal norms were kept intact in the modules that were being implemented 
during this period. While using these modules and thus enacting the embedded ERP 
practices, the employees felt that they were forced by the system to adhere to the 
prescribed sequence, perform tasks in time, and to see time as a scarce resource. See 
an excerpt from a Sales Engineer’s interview: 
 
                                                 
38
 FIFO: First in First Our is an material stock inventory policy.  It means the material that is received 
first (in the order of receiving) into the stock should be issued first. 
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Now, it [time] has become some thing that runs out. After using (ERP), that feeling 
has become much stronger..we have to finish in time, and more tasks in short time. It 
is like the system forcing us to do so—may be a good disciplining…more professional 
and more efficient. 
 
Moreover, many employees felt that their “traditional ways” of executing tasks, such 
as the “sequence jumping”, is “not a good” practice and “should be avoided”, and that 
it is better to follow the “more scientific”, “professional” and “systematic” way such 
as adherence to sequences and schedules, and time bound actions. At this point in 
time, keeping the ERP’s sequential way of doing intact, in the software, it was made 
impossible for “users” to “violate” any sequence. We should note here that it is 
possible to provide a user intervention through which users can override the sequence 
adherence and schedule adherence depending on their access rights. There was such a 
suggestion but it was neglected since it would drive WestIndia backward. As one 
purchase officer expressed, although the practices such as sequence jumping had no 
written rule or a visible pattern of occurrence, the employees knew the “rule of the 
game” (Haugaard, 1997). Now, the ERP was bringing a new rule to the game: a new 
task execution discipline—a new order in performing task (e.g., adherence to 
sequence), a new temporal discipline, and a new cost related discipline (e.g. more 
focus on profit, and more cost consciousness). Consider the task execution discipline, 
for example, adherence to the predefined sequence of activities. Such sequence fixing, 
when it is ordering the activities carried out, has spatial-temporal aspects (Schriber & 
Gutek, 198; Zerubavel, 1981). The activity gets fixed in space. By fixing the position, 
the possible pattern of activity occurrence in time (for example, at any time A will 
always follow B) is also fixed and made easily predictable and controllable. Put 
differently, time is bound (time boundedness) and made controllable through binding 
space (Sahay, 1998).  
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Out of the three disciplines, the most frequently appeared in the daily discourse was 
temporal discipline. Therefore, I consider the temporal discipline in more detail. For 
the sake of simplicity, let us focus on the two most frequently mentioned (in the daily 
discourse) temporal norms39, time precision (e.g., entering data in time) and adherence 
to schedule, two aspects of time boundedness. That is time boundedness in data 
recording, and time boundedness in task execution-with respect to starting and 
finishing a task, that is scheduled adherence. First, we consider the time boundedness 
with regard to recording the data (time precision).  This means, in contrast to the 
earlier practice of recording data at their convenient time, now many employees felt 
that they were forced by the system to record the data at the moment the data are 
produced. In an interview, the ERP project coordinator (PC) described the situation as 
follows:  
 
PC: Change in rhythm means..eh..now, you can’t complete the following activity 
without completing the previous activity. Earlier [in existing system], we could do all 
such things in all different ways. See, without completing production and recording it 
[now] you can’t raise invoice. Then, if there is a delay in recording completion of 
production, that will affect invoice raising [In the exiting system employees used to 
take invoice when production nears the completion].  
I: uh..uh.. 
PC: Means our old rhythm will be broken. There is no point in setting process right. 
This [the new rhythm] should evolve. When it becomes a pressure that you can’t 
record the sale, it gets escalated and it becomes a serious issue, naturally production 
will fall in line. The style will change to record the production in time—they will be 
forced to become so, more disciplined and efficient.  See a system has its own self-
rectification. This [the forcing] will be done as a part of it… Of course there will be 
conflicts. Then, naturally we’ll find a new rhythm….Then, the case of filled invoice: it 
is posted in logistics. They do it purely for custom requirements so it is done only 
weekly. Now, that is not sufficient. Invoice can be done only after recording. No delay 
is possible. Then won’t it break their rhythm? Then, they themselves [will] find a 
rhythm.... Now, unless you enter the GRN (Goods Receiving Note) timely, you can’t 
issue materials. There also it will generate a new rhythm. Everyone has to find this 
new rhythm. They will be compelled to find it…there comes a beautiful discipline. 
                                                 
39
 Also, I think these two norms had maximum impact on the work life of organizational members. This 
point will become clearer as we continue with this analysis.  
 199 
 
Notice two points in this discipline discourse. First, from the multiple evidence we 
have above, it seems that the manager-consultant coalition’s attempt to discursively 
shape other employees’ technology frame through sensegiving discourses was 
effective to the extent the other employees used the technology frame, disciplining 
agent, as a cognitive device to make sense of the ERP technology. Second, in this 
process, the role of managers in structuring the employee behavior (through 
disciplining) was subtly transferred and attributed to the ERP technology. In the 
following passages I analyze these two effects, starting with the latter one. 
 
Scholars have consistently observed (and debated) the transfer of the labor control 
from bureaucratic structure to technology (Edwards, 1979; Knights & Willmott, 1990; 
Sewell, 1998; Thompson, 2003).  Beyond the transfer of the labor control, the debate 
also raises a question of responsibility for control or who is actually controlling. Note 
that there is a frequent appearance of an attribution of a causal agency, which is the 
capability to cause transformation, to the ERP technology through out the WestIndian 
discourse of discipline. For example, in the above-reproduced interview excerpt, the 
PC defines the change in the rhythm as a force by the system. The attribution of this 
causal agency was embedded in the discipline discourse that the consultant-manager 
coalition initiated. Thus, the attribution of causal agency was a discursive political 
construction. Some students of sociology of technology (e.g., Callon, 1986; Latour, 
1992) have been vociferously arguing for considering technology (or non-humans) in 
its own right as equivalent to humans (humans and non-humans together called 
actants) with respect to cognitive and causal agencies. This argument has gained 
increased currency in recent technology implementation literature (Wagner, 2004).  At 
the same time, critiques have observed the change in perspective of these sociologists 
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of technology from a social construction perspective to a realist perspective while 
ascribing agency status to technology. Marxist scholars who adopt a realist approach 
have criticized these works of sociology students for their neglect of the mediational 
role of technology (e.g., Mutch, 2002; Reed, 1997; Volkoff, et al., 2007). Based on my 
earlier observation, I suggest that one of the ways to address these criticisms is to 
examine the socio-political construction of agency attribution.  
 
Through developing the discourse of causal agency attribution (to technology) and 
reproducing that discourse, the managers’ role and responsibility in making the choice 
of practices, and in turn, bringing out the employee discipline by means of 
technological force was written off to the background. Instead, now, ERP became 
responsible for the act of instilling discipline through force into the employees. The 
excerpt from project coordinator’s interview is a typical example of such discourse 
that reflected the public discourse that was going on in WestIndia. As it occurred in 
the case of WestIndia, in certain context, the discourse of holding technology 
responsible or accountable may be used to produce ideological hegemony (Lukes, 
1974). That is to discursively mask the taken-for-granted relations of managerial 
domination and to mobilize the active consent of the dominant reproducing the 
hegemonic discourse. Given the employee (non-managers) expressions that favor 
ERP’s global practices (over local practices) and their reproduction of the discourse of 
the agency attribution, it is tempting to argue that the manager-consultant discourse 
was hegemonic. But, since I cannot eliminate the confounding role of coercion in 
producing the indicators of the consent, I do not argue so. However, the attempt to 
produce hegemony is ethically significant since it tries to reproduce and reinforce the 
taken-for-granted relations of dominations and the negotiators of technology were 
mostly managers. Also, one class of users (e.g. supervisory staff) was totally excluded 
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from the negotiation by fiat. But, it was equally these users’ task related behavior 
(also) that the ‘ERP was going to discipline’ or structure, while they had no formal 
voice in this decision-making process.  Later, we will see the muting of this class of 
users’ voice that tried to informally influence the decision-making process of 
technology modification. Thus, as far as WestIndia is concerned, to a significant 
extent, the managers made the choice of practices to be encoded (So far the choice has 
been ERP’s disciplining practices over WestIndia’s non-disciplining local practices). 
Moreover, the managers were well aware of the potential drawback (in managers’ own 
evaluation) of their choice to adopt ERP work norms and practices. For example, see 
some interview excerpts from the managers’ interview: 
 
PM (a manager), about the decision to adopt ERP’s sequence adherence: In ERP we 
don’t give such an option (clustering) to the supervisor. In planning itself we decided 
that job should go sequentially; not possible to club. Operators and the supervisors, 
those who work at the bottom most, know that clustering would be better. Clustering 
would bring better utilization. Also, in line-wise operation the discretion and 
importance of the supervisors and operators will be reduced…they may lose the vigor 
of their work.  
 
DSM (another manager) about time boundedness: “I think people will start working 
more out of fear. People will become more responsible and more disciplined. This will 
help increase the personal efficiency. But, I don’t know whether it is going to be 
positively or negatively affecting WestIndia because all people including me have 
been working here in a passive atmosphere for past 10 years. From that, a quick shift 
to an active atmosphere-I don’t know whether it is going to be positive or negative…I 
can see that the monotony and the work stress of supervisors and operators 
increasing.” 
 
At the same time, some of the employees who reproduced the discipline discourse 
interpreted it as reducing the existing valuable freedom. Below is a representative 
example, an excerpt from an interview with a member of the Finance department:  
“One advantage of ERP is that if we don’t do the things we should do today, 
tomorrow it will cause a lot of trouble to a lot of people at a lot of places. In the old 
system if I don’t do my job a day nobody will come to know….Say I got a PO 
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[Purchase Order] today. I didn’t feed [entering the price details into the existing 
Finance package] it today; rather I’ll feed it tomorrow. What’ll happen? Nothing! If 
that guy is not paid then only questions will come from the Purchase. Till then ’am 
safe. I have the freedom to decide when to enter. We have a lot of freedom that we 
value. But, once ERP comes (to full use) that freedom is gone. Tomorrow the other 
person has to know that this data is fed. He’ll look for that.”  
 
Thus, some of the employees assessed time boundedness—a new temporal discipline--
as advantageous, though it may cut into an existing valuable freedom. Occasionally, 
time boundedness also became the only way to increase performance. See a comment 
during the inventory module testing: “Who wouldn’t know that the only way [to better 
the performance] is to do it [the tasks] in time?”. We should note that for many staff 
(except design and production staff) members from Finance, Sales, Purchase, and 
Store, data entry was the main content of their work. Thus, for them it was not only 
the data recording that became time-bound but also the execution of their actual tasks. 
In other words there was a significant change in the way these employees perform 
their tasks. This change had potential negative (in employees’ evaluation) impact on 
their work life such as increase in work stress, increased monitorability, and loss of 
discretion over how their work is to be done. As the interview data showed many 
employees were aware of such negative impacts, although they did not express it 
publicly. Still, many employees did not question the “time boundedness” in data 
recording that the system “forced” upon them. Instead, as we have seen in the above 
interview excerpt, many employees who bore or anticipated to bear the “negative” 
impact interpreted such disciplining as advantageous or desirable. Why? 
 
I consider three plausible explanations. First, one might think that these employees 
were not aware of the potential “negative” impact on their work life and/or its 
significance. Nearly 50% of the employees who I interviewed from this group (6 
engineers/officers out of 14 and 4 supervisors out of 9: total 10 out of 23) had 
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expressed their awareness about the potential “negative” impact. We already saw an 
example previously. Below are a few more interview excerpts: 
 
Production supervisor: MD can come to know about all activities and can even 
monitor directly..will affect our performance negatively…will loss our discretion and 
the vigor of our job 
 
Store officer: Now, if I don’t enter it in time, it will raise a red flag somewhere…and 
all who have the access can see it..work like a machine.. 
 
Production engineer: In the case of ERP, when FG also is entered into the ERP, 
anyone from anywhere can come to know how much FG we have in the 
Store..monitoring could stretch you out. 
 
Accounts officer: In the existing (system) no one will come to know. We can do it 
later ourselves.. In ERP, if you enter at one place it will automatically reaches all other 
places…too much stress..how is it good? 
 
We will see similar quotes in the description of the next stage. Given the daily 
interaction between these employees, it is probable that more employees were aware 
of the negative impact. Therefore, the lack of awareness explanation does not hold 
good.  
 
Another plausible explanation is that given the employees were aware of the benefits 
and costs in their evaluation the benefits they considered might have outweighed the 
costs. Although they were aware that it cuts into their freedom and that the expected 
enactment (and the embodied temporal norms) were different from their habituated 
practices (and the embodied temporal norms), they were ready to be forced by the 
system to change, as it was the way to become more “professional” and “efficient” as 
opposed to the “traditional” way. This point is evident in the discourse I reproduced in 
the earlier paragraphs.  
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Thus, these employees took the sequence fixing and time boundedness as one form of 
desirable disciplining. They were optimistic that the effect would be an increase in 
their efficiency as well as the company’s efficiency. Given the efficiency discourses in 
the wider society and its continuous appropriation in WestIndia (that we have seen in 
stage 1 and in stage 2), this is not surprising. More importantly, as I mentioned when I 
indicated an identity forming effect of the discourse (see pp: 181-182), such increase 
in efficiency through the new discipline was also related to the increased 
professionalism. Recall that the employees as well as the discourses in the wider 
society considered the increased professionalism as a hallmark of software engineers. 
Therefore, I suspect that in the assessment of these employees the desire to have the 
features of the desirable identity (such as high task efficiency, frequent use of 
software) outweighed the cost. This partly motivated the employees who genuinely 
believed that the new discipline was advantageous irrespective of its costs. Thus, it 
seems that in the case of some non-managerial employees (who belonged to group 3 
and group 4) their preferences (for example, of work norms, practices, work style) 
were formed discursively. 40 
 
However, it is difficult to ascertain whether all these employees a) were open in the 
expression of their assessment or were just pretending, and b) genuinely believed that 
the new discipline was enabling or were these employees simply pretending. I do not 
consider the conviction as zero-sum or a binary (0-1) variable. I suspect that there 
were employees who were partly convinced or less significantly convinced but still 
                                                 
40
 Given that a) the managers in their discourses underplayed the negative (in their own assessment) 
impact and selectively highlighted the outcome (in managers’ own assessment) they expected (of 
employees) as positive, b) in some subordinates’ assessment such expected outcome outweighed the 
negative impact (which shows these employees’ internalization of managers’ values), it is an exercise of 
ideological hegemony (Lukes, 1974). 
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reproduced the discourse of enabling discipline. I suspect that, even in my interviews, 
it was the perceived threat or coercion that drive these employees’ consensus (that 
manifested as the reproduction of discipline discourse) on the technology frame of 
ERP as an enabling disciplinary agent. For example, see some representative interview 
excerpts: 
From a casual conversation with an accounts officer (AO): 
AO: In the existing (system) no one will come to know. We do it later ourselves..at 
our convenience…In ERP, if you enter at one place it will automatically reaches all 
other places. If we don't do things in time or commit a mistake won't we be caught 
immediately? Please tell me…(AO goes on) 
I: What are the positive and negative sides you see in that? 
AO:  Positive are these things…like I told you the efficiency increase and the 
systematic discipline.. But, I don’t think it will happen in our case…Here, but, it is 
wiser..to just join the folks.. Negative means..see if we don’t enter (in time), all things 
will go wrong and we will be in trouble. Similarly, since editing is not possible, if say 
instead of 1 piece, if I enter 2, it will create troubles in so many places..can’t make 
errors.... 
I: Isn’t it the same with existing IS too? If you commit mistakes 
AO: (intervenes) there we can edit ourselves. No one will come to know. But in this 
(ERP), we won’t be given the authorization to edit…everyone can see what 
happens….. 
……. 
I: By implementing ERP, any other change? 
AO: I think when ERP comes (to full use), headcount reduction will occur. So you 
have to show up your efficiency. I think that there will be some terminations (again 
tensed voice and face). Now I feed and compile. That work is no more required. 
System will take care of that job. Similarly in Purchase..that way in so many places.. 
 
AO gives indications that he did not interpret the ERP discipline as resulting in 
efficiency increase but still he ‘joins the folks’ to reproduce the enabling disciplining 
frame probably because he foresaw some harmful consequences (including 
termination) had he not done so. Also, he did not see the efficiency resulting from 
ERP’s discipline. Instead, he saw the efficiency increase at least in these employees’ 
case as a result of ‘showing up’ to avoid the possible termination.  
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Below is another interview excerpt from a production supervisor’s (J) interview that 
indicates that the reproduction of the discipline discourse might be a result of the 
combination of conviction (due to the discursive formation) and coercion.  
 
J: I think if we have to just execute according to the ERP plans, we may be more time 
pressed. One way, it is good since we will become more time-bound. Now, there are 
no such things. There are those kinds of unsystematism and inefficiencies. But, we 
can't become so hard on the production targets and also so time bound, I think. It 
will improve efficiency and will make us more professional. That is a welcome part. 
But at the same time such time compulsion also will generate quality problems. I 
think we may have to enter a lot of data and then if we have to finish the data (entry) 
in time, we may have to focus more on the data (entry) completion than on the line 
(production). This will create quality problems. Also, since the procedures and 
methods will be set in the software (standardized), we may not be able to deviate from 
that as we do now. Bringing into the system, make it more systematic and people will 
become more efficient. I can understand that and I like it. See I am developing 
software. Like a software engineer, I can understand that well. We will become 
more disciplined. But at the same time since what we do will be more visible to the 
superiors, I think no one will question the ERP plans and the procedures. Also, due to 
integration, we won't be able to deviate from the set in procedures. It will be difficult. 
The system won't allow you. See the visibility can go up to the MD within this 
company itself. All operations can be archived. I think we will be stressed. I mean 
there will be increase in work stress. We will also be in a predicament. We will be 
forced to hit the ERP schedules. It means we have to be hard on the operators, which 
is quite hard in this situation. We will be between the operators, the system, and the 
management. 
I: [Jaffer], I am quite curious. You see a possibility of difficult time for supervisors. 
Still, none of you talked about this to your managers, engineers or the management? 
J: See I told you earlier, they are not accessible…Also, they may give us some 
opportunity when it comes to we start using it. 
I: I have two doubts: See Mark (assistant production manager) discuss with you guys, 
right? ("yes"). Then, why you didn't talk to him about your concerns? Also, you are 
familiar with software development, right? Do you think that it is possible to modify 
the ERP when it comes to the stage that you guys start using it? 
J: It may not be possible to modify the program. Rather, I think it is not possible. But, 
then we are not in a position to talk about these things to the management. From our 
position it is really a bit dangerous at least. See bluntly, the point is that if you start 
doing such things, tomorrow you may have no job. None of us will want to take such 
risks....See you made me tell things openly.   
 
Employees like Jaffer were obviously swayed by the identity discourse (notice the 
reference to software engineers, desirable increased professionalism and efficiency). 
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They also believed in the discourse that favored ERP’s global “professional” practices 
vis-à-vis “unsystematic” traditional” practices. Thus, to this extent, the identity 
discourse and the ERP discourse favoring its global practices were hegemonic in 
nature. But, at the same time, they did not consider it as a benefit without costs. 
Interestingly, over time some of these engineers and supervisors (group 4 in Figure 
6.1) who half-heartedly reproduced the discourse of enabling discipline, increasingly 
focused more on the constraining aspects of the discipline in their daily discourse. 
This marked the emergence of a different interpretation of the ‘disciplining’ 
technology frame, that is ERP as management’s disciplining tool that constrains 
employees’ actions (in contrast with the earlier frame ERP as a disciplining agent that 
enables employees’ actions).  
 
6.3 Stage3: ERP a disciplining tool-the constraining face 
Here is a quote, which is a representative of this group’s expression (from an interview 
with a production supervisor): 
“Once we are time compelled, we cannot focus well on the quality parameters. We 
will be pushed to enter the data in time and it takes a hell lot of time. Now, 
[WestIndia] competes on quality not on cost..our cost is pretty high... it will impact the 
performance only negatively” 
 
This group interpreted that the new “time compulsion” would lead to poor quality 
adversely affecting the performance. More importantly, this group’s understanding 
was that the ERP was the owners’ idea to gain more control (that included labor 
control) over the plant since they are geographically away from the plants. In this 
group’s understanding, in ERP, this central control was achieved through setting 
standard procedures from which the plant should not deviate. Further, sitting in the 
owners’ country they can monitor whether the plant is deviating from the standards. 
For example, below is part of a group discussion. 
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One of the supervisors explained: (B)ringing the procedures into system makes it more 
systematic, standard, and difficult to violate. In the existing system, we can violate the 
procedures and no one will question it. In ERP, it will be visible to others (superiors). 
Also, 
Another one intervened: ..when you’ve to enter in time and that also hourly data, 
certainly it makes you more visible to all who have access, right?”.  
The first one continued: “Also, due to integration, I think, ERP won’t allow you to 
violate the procedures…So the system itself will force you to follow its procedure and 
do things in time…In the plant, the reach of such monitoring goes straight up to the 
MD.  
 
This group interpreted that the effect of the changes in the temporal aspects such as 
time boundedness and adherence to sequence would be more employee visibility. 
They also projected that the change would result in “loss of flexibilities” (for example 
the flexibility of customer push-in). At this point in time, the managers and the 
consultants interpreted such “flexibilities” (e.g. customer push-in) as “unsystematic 
practices”. For example, see an excerpt from an assistant manager’s (APM) interview: 
 
APM: We know that our system is wrong.. 
I: means? 
APM: Means everyone is following one’s own style. There are no standards and no 
systematism..The production is completely in the hands of individual AEs (Asst. 
Engineers) and supervisors. Whichever AE comes in the morning (in the morning shift 
or generally at the beginning of a shift), everything depends on that individual. If he 
decides that today this (order) should not be run rather I will take it up tomorrow, he 
will divert the whole stuff into another (order) production (referring to material 
diversion practice). He will take up the production (of the order) of the customer who 
pressures him more…we have such unwanted flexibilities. 
 
Thus, at this point in time, in the managers’ discourse, the flexibilities were signals of 
inefficiencies. But, for some engineers and some supervisors (group 4), these 
flexibilities were facilitators of customer responsiveness. Further, while attributing 
disciplining agency to the management and ERP as a mediator of this agency (in 
contrast with the earlier image—ERP as a disciplining agent, not a mediator---that the 
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consultants and the managers propounded), this group defined discipline as making 
employees’ activities more visible to the management and thereby more monitorable, 
while the management’s activities hidden from the employees. Thus, for this group 
ERP was management’s panoptic surveillance instrument (Foucault, 1977). But, given 
that they took the strict procedures (which implies time boundedness) as the owners’ 
requirements, and suspected that the MD himself may be involved in the monitoring, 
and perceived that any voice against the management could lead to the termination of 
employment as it had occurred with the “opposing” functional manager, PM, and 
some operators, and given this group was placed at a structurally lower position in the 
formal organizational hierarchy (see Figure 6.1), many group members felt it wise not 
to speak up. In other ways as well, this group (mainly production supervisors) was 
excluded from the ERP negotiations by fiat, and thus their voice was cut-off formally. 
As a result of the exclusion and perceived coercion (due to the institutional 
arrangements and preceding events), the technology frame that interpreted the ERP as 
the management’s panoptic surveillance instrument, and the associated call for 
retaining the local temporal aspects (e.g. flexibility in timing of data recording, 
shiftwise report as opposed to more broken down hourly report, provision to skip 
sequence) did not last long. Instead, it appeared that there was a shared consensus on 
the enabling disciplinary agent technology frame. At this point in time, it seems that at 
the organizational level, the disciplinary agent technology frame was stabilized and 
closed through the effect of a combination of perceived coercion and sensegiving 
discourse that related the technology frame with a desirable identity. We may also 
conclude that at the individual level, the combination was applicable only to some 
members of group 4. I suspect that the perceived coercion was more diffused. To 
understand the likelihood of a more diffused perception of coercion, we should look at 
WestIndia’s labor relations and its current changes.  
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6.3.2 Ongoing changes in WestIndia’s labor relations 
In chapter four, I had presented a brief sketch of WestIndia’s history of labor relations. 
I had mentioned that WestIndia had faced employee strike in the years 2004 and 2006. 
The 2006 strike had turned violent and the police was called in. Both strikes had 
invited media attention. In the media the then MD (one of the owners of WestIndia) 
had threatened that in the event of one more labor unrest he would relocate the 
company to Sri Lanka. Given that WestIndia was seen as a back up to Sri Lankan unit, 
for WestIndian employees, this threat had significant plausibility. Moreover, the high 
unemployment rate (10% in 2007) and low job opportunity made such plausibility a 
disaster. The comments of some employees related this plausibility with the 
disturbances and the ongoing ERP implementation, though such comments were very 
rare41. For example, see part of a conversation during testing of accounts receivable 
sub module: 
Accounts officer: If we don’t implement this properly, we may get a salary cut 
Administrative assistant: If things don’t go smoothly, the white man will take his bed 
and leave (referring to the possibility of company closure and the current labor unrest) 
Project coordinator (laughs): Here, even God doesn’t know what will happen. Let us 
do our best now..the guys there (referring to machine operators) don’t get it. 
 
Let us look at what “the guys there” had been doing this time. In WestIndia, as my 
interviewees mentioned, the awareness of owner (or owner representatives)-worker 
division was deep. The staff members took them as owner representatives when they 
dealt with the operators, and in turn, the operators took the staff members as owner-
representatives. The relationship between them as well as between the management 
and operators was “explosive” (as a production engineer remarked). The operators 
                                                 
41
 I had only two instances in my data 
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came to vehemently oppose the recent standing orders. Below is a slice from an 
employee council meeting (a meeting that the management held with worker 
representatives) that discussed the standing order issues:  
 
Worker representative (in shouting voice): Sir, (addressing HR manager) when you 
talk, you highlight only the laws and rules that are harmful to us..Have you ever 
spoken of the laws and the rules that are favorable to us? Have you ever made any 
changes in our work according to those rules? Never! 
………. 
When the HR manager mentioned that like TUs in the State, the operators came to 
take management’s every move as capitalistic and hence were trying to exhibit an anti-
capitalistic spirit, worker representatives responded sternly:  
 “……sir, it is our desire also that WestIndia runs well. Don’t think that we are 
ideologically against the management and the company. No! Not at all!! We too don’t 
want the company to be closed.  But, you have to stop behaving badly with us; learn to 
behave decently.”  
 
Meanwhile, the management was trying to fix the salary of operators as 35% 
performance based and 65% fixed. The worker representatives rejected the 
management formula of salary calculation. Instead, they stuck with 5% performance 
based and 95% fixed which the management rejected.  Subsequently, the operators 
staged a ‘lightning strike’ (a wildcat strike) followed by a two-day strike. The 
operators also staged a public protestation and manhandled the HR manager. The 
salary fixing issue was taken to the district magistrate’s office. There were rumors 
flying around about the immanent closure of the company.  See a production 
supervisor’s comment during his telephonic conversation with a friend in another 
company who had resigned from WestIndia. “Gopal, you escaped. See we are sunk to 
our nose…Don’t know when the shop would be closed.” 
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By this time the management had terminated the functional manager, PM, who 
opposed the adoption of ERP practices vehemently on the ground of irresponsibility 
with respect to cost. In local stories, the employees connected his termination also 
with his opposition to ERP practices. All temporary workers had also been terminated. 
In this situation, it is highly likely that the perception of coercion was more 
widespread. It then seems that many employees, especially the employees at lower 
hierarchical position such as supervisors, reproduced the enabling disciplinary frame 
partly due to the perceived threat or coercion. Therefore, it is plausible that the 
stabilization and closure of the enabling technology frame was a result of the 
combination of the sensegiving discourse, which was hegemonic in the case of some 
employees, and coercion (institutional), both rhetoric and institutional.  
 
Meanwhile, the labor relation was getting worse day by day. Given the labor unrest, 
although TU with political affiliation was not allowed within the premises of the local 
Silicon Valley (software park), the management was apprehensive that the operators 
had been secretly trying to form a TU with clandestine political support.  The 
management’s fear would look reasonable if we look at the incidents at other 
workplaces as the media reported it. Most of the worker unions had political 
affiliations and were called TUs. For the past 25 years, media had been replete with 
the story of “anti-capitalistic” TUs (especially with Marxist communist affiliation42) 
opposing the “capitalistic” management, resulting in closure of companies. But, there 
had been a change in the recent years (Malayal Manorama daily, January 9, 2008). 
Still, the managers at WsetIndia strongly believed that the operators were driven by an 
anti-capitalistic Marxist-communist ideology and the political support. As the 
                                                 
42
 From its inception in 1956, the State has been ruled by Marxist Communist coalition in almost all 
alternative periods. 
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production manager told me in a casual conversation, to operators, they did not want 
the ERP to look like a “monitoring tool of the capitalist”. Such a picture, they fear, 
would precipitate worker resistance since they thought the operators had subscribed to 
an anti-capitalistic or Marxist-communist ideology (for example, see the discussions in 
employee meetings). Hence, they were careful about what was getting inscribed into 
ERP and how ERP was talked about.  
 
While these developments were going on, almost in tandem with the technology frame 
of ERP as a disciplining tool, another technology frame appeared in the daily 
discourse, ERP as a transparency increaser. In the context of managers’ concern about 
the worsening labor relations, this frame seems to be managers’ yet another 
sensegiving discursive attempt to redefine the disciplining tool frame into a neutral 
technology frame. At the same time, the transparency increaser frame was based on 
the managers’ ongoing sensemaking that occurred at some point in time43.   
 
6.4 Stage 4: ERP a transparency increaser and an objectivity provider 
To better understand the overlap of transparency increaser frame with the disciplining 
tool frame, and in turn, the path dependence of the transparency increaser frame, first I 
take stock of the past occurrences.  
 
By this time, the implementation of the production module had picked up more 
momentum. The consultants had completed mapping the links between different Bills-
Of-Materials (BOM) and the production control plans into the ERP software. The 
production staff had populated some sub-modules with production data to start the 
testing of the sub-module. Also, the trial use of the sales module, accounts receivable 
                                                 
43
 I do not have data to know when this sensemaking occurred 
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and payable sub-module, and inventory module were going on. In none of these 
modules were there significant changes from the standard ERP software. The only 
exception was the tax system since the sales tax system and the income tax system of 
the State as well as the government of India were significantly different from what the 
standard ERP offered. Thus, as far as the production staff was concerned, the main 
modules, which they would use, such as inventory module had the ERP’s global work 
norms. The production engineers had started trial using some sub-modules of the 
inventory module. It was during such trial use that the frame of enabling discipline 
stabilized. Before its stabilization, the manager-consultant coalition’s sensgiving 
discourse of enabling discipline met with the supervisor-engineer coalition’s 
sensegiving (counter) discourse of disciplining tool. Meanwhile, there was ongoing 
labor unrest over the issues of salary fixing (performance based pay vs. fixed pay), 
which in turn, was evocative of the conflicts between the supervisors and the operators 
over the subjective nature and the lack of transparency of performance appraisal 
procedures. Until 2004, there had been frequent clashes between the supervisors and 
the operators over the lack of transparency in performance appraisal. It was said that in 
2004, the managers made the performance appraisal more objective. Yet, the tension 
over the transparency of performance appraisal was still there (for details, see 
Appendix 6.1). Moreover, as we have seen in the discussion about the worsening labor 
relations, the operators were also concerned about the increasing labor control (by the 
management) in the form of increase in number of standing orders and of the checks 
on labor productivity. In this context, I argue that the manager’s sensegiving 
discourse of ERP as a transparency increaser was a strategy to not only dilute the 
strength of the disciplining tool discourse but also align the supervisors’ interest with 
that of the management by cleverly using the   supervisors’ current concerns. Below, I 
explicate the grounds for my argument. 
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During the discussion of the discourse of ERP as a disciplining tool, I had explained 
how the disciplining tool frame emerged. The logic was that the ERP increases the 
employee visibility to the superiors making the employees more monitorable and 
thereby more disciplined. The concept of visibility lies at the heart of this discourse. 
Now, the managers focused more on the visibility of operators (as opposed to 
supervisors) and implied that the increased visibility leads to more transparency.  
Thus, they shifted the focus of technology frame. For example, below is a part of a 
manager’s casual statement when two production supervisors and a production 
engineer were present.   
“Now, we will get actual facts and figures (through ERP). Those may be different 
from our assumptions..not assumptions, may be our desires or wishes and our 
viewpoints. Instead of all these an overall picture will come out..as the data input 
increases…Now, say about an operator, everyone thinks that he is smart and 
generates a lot of output.... When you look at the facts (that ERP produces), he may be 
cheating. Same thing could happen in stock, etc. I mean when you get actual 
figures…can use these facts to convince people, even operators, more easily.” 
 
See a reflection of the two main points--ERP as a fact producer for which more data 
entry is required and the facts can be used to convince operators--in an interview with 
a production engineer:  
“ Now we have a lot of delays in production. But we don’t know the reasons. We 
make only guesses that it is due to material shortage, it’s due to underutilization of 
resources (this refer to operators too), etc. But ERP will show the exact reasons for 
the delay. We need to just enter more data and the data correctly without any error. 
It may show that the operators did not work full hours.. When we show them 
(operators) the output, they will get convinced. Then we can counsel them or do some 
thing like that. The issue now is that they don’t know the mind of the management. 
They don’t trust the management…We have to convince them. They (operators) think 
that the top always try to crush them and to exploit them. They don’t understand that if 
the company grows it’s is good for everyone…But if we convince them, these will be 
resolved. When there is a system like ERP, it is easier to convince them. Since they 
will trust the system, we can use the system to generate trust in the management…will 
be especially beneficial to supervisors.” 
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In such statements, unlike the discourses we have seen so far, the central actors came 
to be the operators and supervisors, and the supervisors and the management came to 
have the same goal--convince the operators and gain their trust. To reach that goal, 
both had the same means- ERP produced facts.  This is obviously an attempt to align 
supervisors’ interests with that of the management (Bacharach, Bamberger, & 
Sonnentshul, 1996), and in turn, to produce a ‘normative consent’ (Haugaard, 2006) to 
managers’ actions. 
 
Below is another slice from a production engineer’s interview: 
“ERP is a transparent system. It has no mask and you can’t mask things in that 
system. So everyone including the operators will automatically believe ERP. Since 
they don’t know this right now we can convince them through training…greatly 
helpful to supervisors”.  
 
As the implementation progressed, the frequency and the clarity of such statement also 
increased. Below are slices from the interviews of a senior engineer (QD) and a 
functional manager (FM) from two different departments. 
 
QD: Their (supervisors’) work will be smoother since production flow will be 
balanced and well planned, and they will have objective transparent measures of 
(operators’) performance. They won’t be asked to work hard during the fag end, 
usually towards the end of the month to meet the given KUSD (turn over in USD) 
operators will be tightened and the production will be pushed hard. It will help the 
supervisors too (in addition to operators). Also, once you have all information in the 
system and the system is able to perform the analysis, the measures will be more 
objective. Since it is there in the system it is transparent. We can show to anyone at 
any time…will become a big help to the supervisors. 
 
FM: You raised their (supervisors’) concerns (about lack of involvement and increased 
work). They are the people who have been involved from the very beginning as it is 
helpful mainly for them…Theirs, if they have, is a wrong impression. If any of them 
have expressed such concern to you, you should notify us…See, we have been telling 
them that it is for their benefits that we implement this software…It (ERP) makes 
things transparent, automatic, and easy for them.  
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The excerpts above show clearly that the managers (and some engineers) were 
mobilizing a sensegiving discourse that suggested implicitly and explicitly that the 
supervisors should be ready to input more data for their own benefit of increasing 
transparency and objectivity. But, what this discourses pushed to background were the 
following.  
 
Note that there was a change in the nature of supervisors' work. Earlier, they had more 
materials, machine, and man management activities. Now, the managerial nature of 
their work is changed into more data entry. The increased frequency and amount of 
data entry rendered the supervisory acts more visible, and in turn, closely monitorable 
by the superiors. As we have seen earlier, the managers were well aware of this 
increased monitorability and the potential negative impact. For example, see some 
managers’ interview excerpts that I reproduced earlier (p: 212). They mentioned 
possible loss of supervisors’ discretion, increase in monotony of their work, and 
increase in work stress as negative consequences. The point is not just that whether the 
supervisors agreed or not with such a change. More importantly, neither the 
management negotiated the potential micro-monitoring before hand with the 
supervisors (and operators) nor did they listen to the supervisors’ concern about the 
potential negative impact (for example, see p: 206).  Instead, the management 
excluded the supervisors from the technology modification by fiat and when the 
supervisors tried to mobilize their concerns, the management discounted such informal 
influence. The supervisors were expected to simply “obey” the superiors’ “command”.  
 
See a supervisor-turned-assistant engineer’s comment during an interview: 
“This is my thinking. In the case of production, till and including supervisory level, 
people should have an idea about from such and such days we are going to have such 
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and such things in such and such manner making such and such changes. They should 
have been involved in the discussions..atleast they should’ve been given input..then 
give them time to change and thus gradually it should proceed. The other way, on a 
fine day if commanded to enter only in ERP, everyone will obey. We'll force us to 
obey. But which way is better, one should think. Nothing may happen here even if you 
adopt the latter way…Instead, demanding me to act in a particular way on a fine day 
onwards is like creating a smoke shield before me. I will know only the 3-4 windows 
that I enter the data into. And this doesn't increase the transparency! That (short 
pause) is not good. But since a team is assigned this duty, we can’t speak…we have to 
keep our mouth shut..Our voices are not heard… I am not blaming the team. They 
may have their own schedules and ideas. But, we have no idea about it, and no 
information.” 
 
In sum, a) although the management knew the potential negative impact of their 
choice (that they made during the technology change negotiation) on the supervisors, 
the management did not hold prior negotiations with the supervisors, b) instead the 
management excluded supervisors’ voice from the negotiations about technology 
modification, and discounted their attempts for informal influence, c) at the same time 
the management tried to discursively align and shape the supervisors’ interest with 
that of the management. In that attempt the managers knowingly downplayed the 
potential negative impact of increased data entry and highlighted that as beneficial to 
the supervisors. This is the unethical part of ERP implementation that occurred in a 
reputed Western multinational organization.  Also, this instance shows managers’ 
attempt to gain ideological leadership (Gramsci, 1971).  
 
From the data and analysis I have presented so far, it may seem that the transparency 
discourse was related only to the production activities or performance appraisal. The 
transparency increaser frame increasingly gained more dimensions such as 
transparency in costing, transparency in reporting, and transparency in decision-
making process of departments. For example, see an excerpt from an assistant 
manager’s interview:  
“Now, I can manipulate a report to safeguard my interest…Sometimes people do that 
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here. In ERP since report is already there, it will show up all hidden interests, if at all 
anything is there. There is a transparency in reports.”  
 
By the time, the frequency of the disciplinary tool frame reduced significantly in the 
daily discourse and that of the transparency increaser and objectivity increaser frame 
increased (gaining predominance), the implementation of the production module was 
running in full swing. The managers had several discussions with the consultants. 
Initially, the consultants went ahead with the usual approach of minimally changing 
the software. But, when it came to the discussions regarding the release of customer 
orders for production and the assignment of jobs to machines, the production 
managers argued for incorporating the “flexibilities” that the local work practices 
provided. This marked the emergence of a new technology frame, ERP a flexibility 
reducer.  
 
6.5 Stage 5: ERP a flexibility reducer 
So far the manager-consultant coalition had grouped the customer push in and the 
material diversion as a part of the “unsystematic practices” that WestIndia followed. 
But, now, the production managers and some other managerial employees came to 
interpret them as “flexibilities” of the WestIndian system. In turn, there was a new 
sensegiving discourse mobilized around the technology frame of flexibility reducer. 
This discourse presented ERP as an imposer of rigid standard practices and 
consequent reducer of the valuable flexibilities that some local practices provided. 
Below are some representative quotes:  
 
An assistant manager (APM): It (material diversion) is not be available. This is the 
system limitation. Actually, we are loosing a lot of our flexibilities.  
 
A manager (PM): As I said in the meeting, we are loosing the flexibility to push-in 
customers 
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Production engineer: Now, we can redeploy the operators across lines and functions. 
That flexibility is lost.  
 
The flexibility reduction discourse highlighted different types of flexibilities such as 
flexibility with respect to a) manpower (e.g., flexibility to re-deploy operators across 
different production lines while the production was going on), b) materials (e.g., 
flexibility to use alternative materials instead of the materials that the ERP software 
assigned to a particular job), c) machine (e.g., flexibility to use alternative machines 
instead of the machine that the ERP software assigned to a particular job). 
Correspondingly, there were negotiations over some of the practices, which the 
employees perceived to have provided flexibilities. These practices included customer 
push-in and material diversion—the two local practices that I analyzed for 
understanding the underlying temporal norms (see chapter 4, pp: 80-101), clustering 
through redeployment of machine operators, and manual variation of oven annealing. 
In the following paragraphs, I examine the content of negotiation, the negotiation 
outcomes, and its implication for existing power relations. I take up the two local work 
practices, which I think had more bearing on the work life of people and the 
technology modification. These work practices in the reverse order of their negotiation 
are a) material diversion, and c) customer push-in.  
 
6.5.1 Pushing in the customer push-in 
We have seen that by this time the production managers came to interpret certain local 
practices as flexibility providers. Further, they assessed such flexibilities as valuable 
necessities. For example, during an internal discussions of production department, the 
an assistant manager said, “We saw the ERP job scheduling in Sri Lanka: from this 
time to this time transformer 1; then from this time to this time another transformer 2.. 
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I don’t know how they can run it so correctly. What if they miss some? What if an 
unexpected order comes?  What if an emergency order comes? ..The complete 
schedule is gone!..I think we got to have more flexibility in our planning. That is an 
essential necessity”.  Some production engineers echoed the necessity of these 
“flexibilities” in order to meet unplanned production demands or emergency customer 
orders, which from their experience they expected as a part and parcel of WestIndia. 
Below is a part of an interview with a manager:  
 
“Take the September example that you observed. …[Due to customer push-in]…we 
could not meet the due dates. We could inform the customer only after we slipped. In 
ERP, if this happens, we’ll be able to inform the customer in time. But, the flexibility 
to change the order preference [the “pushing in”] will not be and cannot be 
eliminated.”  
 
It was the same manager, who in his internal memos, expected WestIndia to ‘stick 
with the dates’ since the dates would be based on reliable estimates that the ERP 
would provide (see p: 183). Now, he took customer push in as necessary, though it 
might “disturb the planned completion dates”. These were the same managers who 
chose to inscribe sequence adherence and time boundedness although some engineers 
and supervisors had interpreted that choice as leading to reduction of flexibilities. 
Now, although the consultants sternly warned that “accommodating the flexibility” 
(push in) would upset the adherence to production plans and schedules, highlighting 
the possibility of getting unexpected and emergency mandatory orders from the Group 
owners and others, the production managers (and some engineers) insisted on 
encoding the customer push in. To understand the reason for the flip as well as the 
influence of politics on the decision-making about technology modification, we need 
to first examine what went on during the negotiation. 
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Before analyzing the negotiation, I briefly describe the customer push-in (for details, 
see chapter 4, pp: 81-85). In WestIndia’s production system, the customer push-in 
occurred in two ways: 1) before the release of the customer order for production, that 
is, production engineers change the rank order of the customer order in the ‘ready for 
release’ list of customer orders, and 2) after the release of the customer order for 
production, that is, during the production of the customer order the production of an 
ongoing customer order is temporally suspended, and instead the ‘emergent order’ 
which was pushed-in is taken up for production. Below, is an empirical example of the 
second way, the preference change after release (an excerpt from a manager’s 
interview): 
 
“ Take the September (2007) example that you saw. One order took a week more than 
we expected to complete since we got a new order in between. Night he just rang me 
up. That moment itself I asked [the shift engineer] to start. In our calculation we could 
finish both order together in the next week. That delay was negotiated with the (first) 
customer and was fine with him. We did not reconfirm the second order. Anyway, this 
(second order) got lagged and overflowed to the next week. Consequently, we could 
not meet both the orders in time. Also, we could inform the customer only after it 
happened.” 
 
During this interview, I drew a picture in my field note to understand this situation 
better. Subsequently, the manager verified it. Below is that picture (see figure 6.2).  
 
Week1      Wk2 Wk3        Wk4 
---------|----------------|------------|------------ expected finish was in Wk2  
Order A 
             |----------------|------------|------------ expected finish was in Wk 3 
 Order B 
 
FIGURE 6.2 AN ILLUSTRATION OF CUSTOMER PUSH-IN PRACTICE 
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[Order B was pushed in replacing the production of Order A. Note: a) 2 weeks 
production cycle time for both order A and order B, b) skipped steps in the sequence 
of order release: a) in the system no order booking, no freezing of order, and no 
confirmation of order—these were activities of the Sales division] 
 
There was an internal debate among production staff (managers, assistant managers, 
engineers), purchase managers, store officers, and the project coordinator.  One 
production manager (PM) articulated the essence of the production staff’s argument 
succinctly:  
“If we follow ERP procedures, it will reduce our flexibilities. Also, we have to 
completely rely on the system. In our situation, we may not be able to strictly follow 
the ERP plans [production plans that ERP suggests]. Then, we may have again 
unplanned production at least in the beginning. So better we keep the flexibilities, at 
least for the time being, may be, later we can change it. If we don’t keep it, we will 
lose customers. It might also upset all other plans”. 
 
Even though others argued that it would take WestIndia back to the old pathetic 
situation, given the well-accepted unquestionable expertise of the production manager, 
the group agreed to ask for incorporating the customer push-in into ERP. After the 
discussion, they called in the consultants. The production manager (PM) and the 
project coordinator together explained that WestIndia got and would get unexpected 
orders even from its group owners, which it cannot avoid, as it is from the owners of 
the company. The consultant responded, “I doubt whether it’s possible in ERP”. Then 
the production manager said, “but we have no other go”.  
 
Initially, the consultant argued that given the system limitations, it was nearly 
impossible to incorporate the customer push-in. Thus, there was an attempt to create a 
perception of technology non-affordance. But, the production managers replied that 
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since they already had yielded to adopting other ERP standard practices, this time, the 
consultants should modify. They also told that the company’s survival depended on 
such customer responsiveness. Interestingly, the production staff argued for encoding 
customer push-in into the ERP system, knowing that it would nullify one of the 
desired outcomes of ERP implementation—time boundedness. At the same time, they 
seemed to have believed that “unsystematic” practices like customer push-in that 
causes lack of adherence to planned dates (or schedules) are “not good”. For example, 
see some excerpts from the interview that I took during this time: 
 
PM (a manager): ..it [customer push-in] is wrong..but, the issue is not whether right 
or wrong, but its necessity..for practical purpose. 
 
AM (an assistant manager): There are two things. First we don’t have much strict 
planning. Our planning is quite flexible. Still, we managed well for almost 10 years. 
Some things we do wrong like the lack of adherence to planned dates and the push-in. 
It’s like a necessary evil. In the current situation, we need precautions like push- in.   
 
Note that the manager interpreted the necessity of customer push-in as a precaution 
that is related to the current situation. Unclear points are a) precaution against what, 
and b) the meaning of current situation. We will come back to this question later. After 
a long debate, the consultants divulged that they had no access rights and had to 
contact the vendor, and that it would take more time and efforts. Finally, after two 
months of discussions the vendor agreed to make the modification. The production 
staff had mentioned that in order to enable the second type of customer push-in (when 
the production is going on), they would need material diversion. 
 
6.5.2 Negotiating the material diversion 
Before presenting the episode of negotiation, I briefly explain what material diversion 
means. Material diversion means materials that are reserved (in the Information 
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System (IS)) to be used for the manufacturing of one transformer are instead used for 
manufacturing another transformer. There were two types of material diversion in the 
existing local Information System (IS), which occurred at two different stages: 1) in 
the IS supervisors make changes in the reservation of materials allocated to one 
customer order by reserving it for another customer order before material is issued, for 
which the system would ask for engineer’s approval, and 2) diversion of the material 
after its issue: the material reserved for order 1 (the material that is now already issued 
against order 1 and kept in production sub store) would be diverted to manufacturing 
of order 2 with the authorization of the manager (in day shift) or engineer (in night 
shift since no managers would be available) on the shopfloor. Subsequently, the 
engineer or the managers would edit the reservation in the IS. The supervisors had no 
access rights to edit. Thus, this type of material diversion was under the tight control 
of the managers. The managers argued that material diversion increased machine 
utilization. Historically, machine utilization was taken to be very important for 
WestIndia. Below, is an empirical example for type 1 material diversion (excerpt from 
a production engineer’s interview): 
 
“ See there came an order today. The due date for that is November 15 (two weeks 
away). I reserve the material for that today and then give a list of what materials are 
lacking to the Purchase. Assume tomorrow another order comes that needs the same 
materials. In that case I will get a date only after November 15 since I already have 
booked the materials for November 15. Or else a lot of materials should come in 
between. But, I have to do the order that came today before the order that came 
yesterday. In that case when I go for reserving the materials (for today’s order) it (IS) 
will show no materials since the available materials are already reserved for the other 
(yesterday’s) order. Then, I or the supervisors with my approval, will divert (change 
the reservation) the materials to this order. Then those 100 pieces (material reserved 
for yesterday’s order) will come to this one (today’s order) and there will be none 
available to the other (yesterday’s order). I don’t know whether such provision is there 
in ERP. It is necessary. It will become necessary. Since booking and ordering are 
connected, it is required. Then only we will get correct date.” 
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Two weeks after the negotiations about the customer push-in, the consultants took up 
the issue of material diversion since the managers had asked for incorporating the 
material diversion. Below, see the consultants’ (C1 and C2) response.  
 
C1: Hi, Alex [PM], Rex [PC], we discussed this earlier [during customer push-in 
discussion], and we tried our level best after that. No way. The system needs each 
material to be identified with a unique transformer [through transformer number] 
before we can make material requisition and issue. You can’t allocate the material to 
the transformer you like after you get the material issued. Otherwise also, you think, 
isn’t it weird? The natural sequence is to plan the material with respect to the product 
before you take the material.”  
PC (jokingly): But our situation is a little weird and peculiar. So we need a weird 
solution. (PM smiles; while PC laughs, others chuckled to themselves.) 
C2: As we told you earlier, you know that, had there been some provision to change, 
we would have helped you. You see, we are doing the laborious customer preference 
interface [customer push-in].  We even took the pains to convince [the vendor]. But, 
sincerely the system won’t allow us to do what you ask (the second type of material 
diversion), especially retaining the access right structure as it is…but we can keep the 
process under control”. 
…….. 
C1: The re-reservation (first type of material diversion) although very difficult, we can 
manage and we can keep the same access structure. But, if you really want the editing 
facility (the second type of material diversion), it is extremely hard, but may be 
possible. But, there is no way we can retain the access rights [this means supervisors 
would be able to divert materials without manager’s or engineer’s approval]. 
 
When the mangers learnt that the incorporation of the second type of material 
diversion would reduce their control over the supervisors’ act of diversion of materials 
and that it would be technically more difficult, they dropped the second type of 
material diversion. Recall that the managers had argued that the second type would 
increase the capacity utilization and had projected it as very significant. Now, that 
functional consideration gave way to the political consideration of keeping the existing 
power relations and the managerial control over supervisors’ job (notice there was no 
issue with the process control but only with the labor control). It is also interesting to 
note how consultants shaped the perceived technology non-affordance of the users, 
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which partly resulted in dropping a useful (in managers’ assessment) technology 
modification. Perhaps, as a result of these two dynamics—political consideration and 
perceived technology non-affordance—only the first type of material diversion was 
incorporated. That is, in ERP, the consultants provided a user interface so that the user 
can manually change the reservation of the material only before the material is issued 
(but not after it).  
 
The technology modification--the result of the negotiation—occurred through the 
incorporation of two local practices. This result had a number of effects on the work 
life as well as the ERP software. The incorporation of material diversion before the 
material and order release, as the consultants had warned, led to ERP showing 
negative numbers in inventory stock of materials for the customer order from whose 
pool the material was diverted. Consequently, the ERP postponed that customer order 
to next production cycle that affected the schedule adherence. Material diversion also 
adversely affected the optimization of material utilization. Similarly, the customer 
push-in adversely affected the optimization of capacity utilization, various types of 
costs and times, and reduced its links with material planning. At another level, now, 
the incorporation of customer push-in and material diversion adversely affected the 
adherence with production schedules. It also meant that the ERP software came to 
embody both the so-called Western temporal norms (e.g., time boundedness with 
respect to data entry) or ERP’s global temporal norms and a contrasting set of 
WestIndia’s local temporal norms (e.g. schedule flexibility). Therefore, the cultural 
context shaped the content of ERP technology resulting in a cross-cultural ERP 
software.  What led to such a result was the manager’s choice to incorporate two local 
practices irrespective of their knowledge about its negative (in their evaluation) 
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implication. If we assume that the managers were rational44 (since they made a cost-
benefit analysis as visible in their conversations) in making their choice and that their 
articulation of their assessment is believable and open, the question remains, what 
benefits did they see as outweighing the assessed costs? Relaxing the two 
assumptions, we can reframe the question as what can explain the negotiation 
outcomes?  
 
6.5.3 Explaining the negotiated outcomes45 
I consider explanations from four alternative perspectives: a) functional perspective 
(functional utility of the local practices), b) cognitive-cultural perspective (inertia to 
change and issue of organizational memory), c) technological perspective 
(technological constrains leading to dropping some part of the local practices), and d) 
political perspective (political interests of the negotiators). I analyze the strength and 
weakness of explanation from each perspective. Subsequently, I conclude that the 
political perspective, specifically the political interests of the negotiators, offers the 
most significant explanation.  
 
6.5.3.1 Functional perspective 
During the discussion of ERP modification to incorporate customer push-in and 
material diversion, when the consultants asked the reason for such incorporation, the 
managers consecutively presented two different logics: the logic of capacity utilization 
and the logic of customer responsiveness (see p: 222-224). When the managers first 
presented capacity utilization as their concern, the consultants informed that the new 
                                                 
44
 By rational I mean taking actions consciously based on a cost-benefit analysis. I made the same 
assumption when I analyzed the supervisors’ and others response to the discourse of manager-
consultant coalition. 
45
 I am indebted to Prof. Brian Rubineau who helped me to analyze the negotiated outcomes and 
particularly pointed out the possibility of a political explanation as the most significant explanation. 
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utility, an add-on, in the system (along with other utilities) called “Advanced 
Production Scheduling (APS)” would automatically take care of the capacity 
utilization of man, machine, and material. They explained the APS briefly to the 
managers. Subsequently, the managers advanced the logic of customer responsiveness. 
See that their main argument was that WestIndia gets unexpected customer orders 
even from the group owners, which WestIndia could not afford not to meet. They also 
mentioned that the survival of the company itself was dependent on meeting such 
unexpected customer requirements. When emergency customer orders (that are 
unexpected) come, for example an unexpected order from the group owners, the 
managers took the decision to stop some ongoing production and push in the owner’s 
order. They never said no to the owner requirements. Moreover, historically the owner 
had seen WestIndia as a site to meet their emergencies. Therefore, meeting owners’ 
requirements (as well other unexpected customer orders, perhaps) was critical to the 
production managers. Then, prima fascia, the managers’ argument looks sound.  
 
But, my examination of the archival of the customer orders showed that WestIndia 
rarely got an unexpected customer order from the owners.  From the take over until 
now (three years span) the new owners have never given unplanned or unexpected 
order to WestIndia. Even the past owner gave such unexpected orders only rarely. 
Moreover, even if the managers had expected such unexpected order from the new 
owners and that meeting such order was extremely important for WestIndia, there 
were more effective means than customer push-in to meet the owners’ emergency 
orders. An example is the case of sequence skipping. The mangers had used sequence 
skipping in the past to meet owners’ emergency requirement. But, now, sequence 
skipping, although was technically feasible to do, had not been incorporated by 
manager’s own choice.  When I asked about this, the production manager said that he 
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did not realize that incorporation of sequence jumping was technically feasible at that 
point in time. Perhaps, he was right. But, then the manager became aware (at least at 
the point of time of my conversation with him) of the feasibility while the coding of 
customer push-in had just started. Still, he did not ask for sequence skipping in a 
manner at least confined to the customer push-in practice. Therefore, the argument of 
perceived technical infeasibility or technology non-affordance only weakly explains 
the manager’s decision to incorporate customer push-in. We will revisit this point of 
technology non-affordance argument. In sum, the customer responsiveness argument 
or meeting the (new) owner’s unexpected requirements does not seem to explain 
managers’ choice. Moreover, the managers had not even perceived that they would get 
unexpected orders from the owners. For example, see an excerpt from my later 
interview (on June 13, 2009) with an assistant production manager (APM): 
 
I: But then how do you manage the unexpected orders from the Group? 
APM: Oh! The group never gives us unexpected orders. They give us at least six 
weeks time. So we get only well planned orders from the group. That is what we 
expect in the future too. The problem is only with the Indian customers, not even with 
foreign customers. Still, we get unexpected orders from Indian customers. But, we do 
not entertain now that much, unless it is extremely profitable. The profit focus has 
become stronger now. We do say no to the unprofitable customers.  
 
Another functional argument is that given the increased competition in transformer 
product market especially from China, it is important for WestIndia to keep the 
flexibilities that would increase its customer responsiveness. Moreover, historically, 
customer satisfaction and customer responsiveness had been WestIndia’s hallmark. 
Let me take the latter point first. The employees in their interview had indicated that 
WestIndia had long-held policy of treating ‘customer as God’46, which WestIndia 
interpreted as ‘you have to satisfy the customer irrespective of the profit you get from 
                                                 
46
 This phrase is a famous Gandhian quote regarding how one should do business. Gandhian philosophy 
had significant influence on the old generation that is people aged 60-80 years. 
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that order’. But, after the take over, there was a clear change in this policy. The 
mangers had been advocating and arguing for an increased profit focus. Also, they had 
interpreted ERP as a means to increase the profit concern. This point is obvious in the 
interview excerpt I reproduced above. Therefore, as far as customer push in and 
material diversion are concerned, the argument of customer responsiveness has to be 
limited to profitable unexpected customer orders from India. Such orders amounted to 
approximately 20% of the total profit after sales.  Out of this 20% let us see how many 
could go to other suppliers (than WestIndia) such as Chinese suppliers. Again an 
excerpt from the same interview with the assistant manager (APM): 
 
I: By chance, did you lose customers then (by saying no to customers)? 
APM: Not much. Actually, it is very unlikely that the Indian customers will go to 
another party. In many of these cases (light specialty transformers) no one else is able 
to deliver customized transformers within such a short time as we do. So they have to 
stick with us…We don’t think this will change in the near future.   
After a calculation of which of the Indian customer WestIndia might lose because of 
their non-responsiveness to unexpected orders, it came down to a merely 2%. Given 
that the managers were aware of this point (may not be in terms of percentage) while 
they took the decision on the incorporation of customer push-in, it is difficult to argue 
that the customer responsiveness concern significantly influenced the managers’ 
decision.   
 
6.5.3.2 Cognitive-cultural perspective 
From a cognitive-cultural perspective we may argue that the norms and values that 
underlie customer push-in and (part of) material diversion were culturally valued and 
thus gave more legitimacy (i.e. public acceptance) to WestIndia in the local culture. 
Therefore, to retain the legitimacy it was necessary for WestIndia to retain the local 
practices. But, we have seen that the case was just the opposite. Within the immediate 
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external environment (the local silicon valley), we have seen that the companies that 
function like a software firm had more public acceptance. WestIndia had taken task 
efficiency as a hallmark of such companies. Since customer push-in would adversely 
affect task efficiency and that the managers were aware of it, the legitimacy 
explanation with respect to immediate institutional environment does not hold good. 
In the wider society too, we have seen that although flexibility had been valued earlier, 
now, there is a shift to task efficiency, and the managers were aware of this shift too. 
Therefore, to gain legitimacy, the managers should have been more concerned about 
the task efficiency as they did with the implementation so far. They had highlighted 
task efficiency as a central concern and software engineer, an esteemed and well-
accepted professional role, as a desired identity. Since customer push in and material 
diversion were utilized only for a small percentage of Indian customers, and that 
WestIndia is a 100% export oriented unit, retaining the legitimacy through the 
flexibility that customer push in and material diversion provides cannot be significant 
for WestIndia. Therefore, the legitimacy explanation (gaining legitimacy and retaining 
legitimacy) also cannot significantly explain managers’ choice.   
 
Another possible explanation is from organizational inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 
1984; Stinchcomb, 1962) viewpoint. The point is that irrespective of legitimacy 
concern and functional utility concern, WestIndia did not want to change the 
habituated practices due to its organizational inertia. The same managers had chosen 
to adopt ERP practices and thus to change from other institutionalized practices such 
as sequence jumping so the question would be why is there an institutional inertia in 
the case of customer push-in alone? Is it that customer push-in was the most 
institutionalized? That does not seem to be the case. For example, customer push-in 
was confined only to unexpected orders and the frequency of unexpected orders was 
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significantly lower than the planned orders. The employees practiced the sequence 
jumping in the case of expected as well as unexpected orders (although in the case of 
unexpected orders more steps were skipped in order to increase customer 
responsiveness). That means, WestIndian employees practiced sequence jumping 
significantly more frequently than customer push-in. As a result, sequence jumping 
should be more habituated and thereby more institutionalized than customer push-in. 
Since the managers were ready to change a more institutionalized practice, the 
institutional inertia cannot explain the unwillingness to change a less institutionalized 
practice such as customer push-in. Also, since the managers had opted to retain local 
practice in one occasion and not to adopt in another occasion, the personality 
explanations such as resistance to change as personality trait are not applicable in this 
case. Similarly, the explanation from organizational memory viewpoint also does not 
hold good here. That is the managers’ fear that since customer push-in and material 
diversions had been so imprinted in the organizational memory in the form of routines 
and shared mental map, the employees would not be able to change within reasonable 
time (in the case of customer push in and material diversion) even though they were 
willing to change. In turn, the managers might fear that the change to ERP practices 
just in the case of customer push-in and material diversion would lead to failure of the 
whole ERP software. Similar to the case of organizational inertia, the decision to 
change a more institutionalized and pervasive practice such as sequence jumping 
contradicts such ‘fear explanations’.  
 
6.5.3.3  Technological perspective 
I had mentioned earlier that the perception of a technical non-feasibility that the 
consultants created (partly) in the minds of the managers along with the perceived loss 
of managers’ control over supervisors’ acts resulted in dropping the second part of 
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material diversion (that is diversion of material on the shopfloor). But, what about the 
customer push-in? During the modification negotiation with the consultants, the 
production manager had indicated a ‘lack of faith in the system’ (as he put it) to 
generate feasible production schedules or in other words perceived technology non-
affordance (the incapability of the system to generate feasible schedules) as the 
justification for demanding customer push in. In my interview too he repeated the 
same point. Below I reproduce the excerpt from that interview: 
 
PM: …see unlike in an assembly line, we have a number of variables here. Their 
system is unable to take into account all these variables. It has only limited features. 
So we cannot just completely rely on the system. This is what I stressed in our internal 
meeting too (referring to the meeting I mentioned earlier). That is the issue.  
……….. 
PM: So, we need manual intervention, I mean like customer push in and material 
diversion.  Also, if we could not execute the system suggested plan, we doubt we can, 
we have no provision in the system to give our feedback. If the system could self-
rectify based on our feedback, we could have relied on the system more. We could 
have then avoided provisions like material diversion or customer push-in and the 
clustering. But, the system cannot do that. This is what I understood from the 
discussion and our trial use.  
 
From the above excerpt it seems that technology non-affordance was a significant 
factor that influenced managers’ decision. In that case, why did not the managers ask 
for manual intervention or user interface to retain sequence jumping? See part of my 
interview with the production manager regarding this point: 
 
I: To get sequence jumping in, as Roy mentioned, I guess, N [consultants] could have 
provided a simple user exit or user intervention. 
PM: For sequence jumping, they had to provide more access right structures. See they 
already told they couldn’t play with the access right structure. So we didn’t push (for 
sequence jumping).  
I: Rex [PM], I have a doubt. Please explain how access right structure is an issue since 
in the case of sequence jumping it is only engineers who are involved. Also, for MRP 
and BOM utilities, they already have the access right structures in place, right? Also, 
they already modified the code. It did not take up too much of their time. 
PM: I don’t know .net (the software language). So I don’t know what they really did. 
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But, ya, in the case of sequence jumping access right is not an issue. It didn’t click me 
at that point in time.  
 
The manager’s point further reinforces the idea that it could be technology non-
affordance (as he perceived at that point in time) that explains manager’s decision of 
not asking for sequence jumping. Still, it does not explain his choice of incorporating 
customer push-in since the same manager had pushed for customer push-in even 
though its incorporation also involved changing the access right structure. Also, as I 
mentioned earlier, the argument of technology non-affordance is weak in its 
explanatory power since the manager came to be aware of the technical feasibility to 
change sequence jumping during my conversation with him that occurred when the 
encoding of customer push-in had just begun, and he could have asked the consultants 
to incorporate sequence jumping at least in a manner limited to customer push-in 
which he did not do. Then, it seems that perhaps the managers were not as much 
concerned about sequence jumping as they were about customer push-in. Why were 
they more concerned abut customer push-in? One answer we have seen so far is that 
the concern about customer responsiveness drove their choice. But, we have already 
seen that the argument of customer responsiveness is not significant. Perhaps, it was a 
consideration, but certainly not the most significant one. Therefore, we need a more 
significant explanation.  
 
Person-situation research that focus on the moderating role of situation strength 
(Mischel, 1977; Monson, Hesley, & Cherick, 1982; Weiss & Adler, 1984) has 
repeatedly shown that in the case of strong situation, the situation will significantly 
moderate the effect of personality on individual’s (and group’s) behavioral as well as 
decisional choices. Above I argued that the strength of institutional, cultural, and 
market (or functional) environments did not strongly influence the managers’ decision. 
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The technical environment might have influenced the decision to some extent but not 
very significantly. The situation or environment I consider next is political 
environment. We already have seen that the political environment in terms of labor 
relations, and in turn, labor control had increasingly been more salient and significant 
for WestIndian employees, especially managers. Therefore, it is likely that political 
consideration significantly influenced managers’ choice. I develop this argument 
further in the following paragraphs.  
 
6.5.3.4 Political perspective 
We have seen previously that during the stage of flexibility reducer frame, particularly 
during the discussion about ERP modification to incorporate customer push-in, the 
labor relation in WestIndia was deeply disturbed. Machine operators’ were staging 
continuous strike (four times) that included go-slow strike, wildcat strike and whole-
day strike. Below, I explain one of the ways the managers tried to mitigate the effect 
of strike, and in turn, reduce the power of the striking operators.  
 
Some of the operators announced a wildcat strike while the manufacturing of a 
significant number of orders from an important customer was going on. Many of these 
operators were employed in the production line where the manufacturing of the 
important order was going on. Thus, the operators calculated that it would 
significantly affect WestIndia. The management transferred these important orders to 
other production lines where they had operators who did not join the strike at that 
particular time. For transferring the order to another production line (say L2), they had 
to stop the ongoing production of that line (L2) and push-in the orders to be 
transferred. Subsequently, the managers and engineers had to edit the IS. These 
operations (the transfer of order and the subsequent editing of IS) were possible since 
 237 
customer push-in was incorporated in the existing IS and it (customer push-in) had 
been in practice on the shopfloor for some time. After transferring the orders to L2, the 
management shut down the lines where the operators were on strike. The management 
assessed that this strategy reduced the possible impact of the employee strike on 
company performance. This was an occasion where the customer push-in became 
useful to mitigate the “adverse” effect on company performance.  
 
There was still another occasion when the management utilized customer push-in 
politically. When the majority of the operators went on go-slow strike, the 
management redeployed the minority of the employees in the next shift clustering 
them around particular production lines and then transferred the important orders to 
those lines. Through such instances, the managers were well aware of the potential of 
customer push-in to handle the employee strike effectively. Given these recent (and 
therefore vivid in memory) and significant experience with the political use of 
customer push-in, it is highly likely that the managers considered customer push-in not 
only as a flexibility provider but also as a political tool to handle labor unrest 
effectively. I explain the currency and significance in the following sentence. Perhaps, 
the ongoing labor issues made such potential utility of customer push-in more salient. 
For example, following the strikes that I mentioned previously, the management 
declared a lay-off. Given the repeated earlier threat of the management that it would 
close the company in the case of strikes (The Hindu, July 2, 2003; August 8, 2004), 
the managers and other employees might have been concerned about the labor unrest. 
But, one can argue that since the same was the case with earlier owners and that the 
new group took over the company recently, employees or at least the managers did not 
perceive any possibility of permanent closure. Perhaps this argument is valid but not 
strong since the managers I interviewed considered that the strikes and lay off could 
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lead to closure. But, I do no know how sincere and strong their statements were. 
However, it is likely that such statements were not insincere since the new MD had 
closed the company for a week by this time, which he mentioned as a temporary 
closure. But, he also implied a possibility to permanently close the company. Below is 
the relevant part from the company announcement that appeared on the company 
notice board during the operators’ strike:  
 
Cir/13/2008                            Notice    23/3/2008 
It has come to the knowledge of the management that some employees are planning 
for indefinite strike inciting others to participate in the strike. Therefore, …, the 
management has decided to publish this notice for the information of the 
employees…… As all the employees know, the company is now facing severe 
critical situations due to lack of orders. The main reason for the same is that there is 
propaganda in the industry that there is labor unrest in our company…… As the 
situation now stands if there occurs any illegal and unjustified strike, the same will 
threaten the very existence of the company.  
 
See the response of some managerial staff: 
An assistant manager: They (workers) struck in right time. We had a lot of orders as 
you know. All of them have gone to Sri Lanka or revoked. Now, we don’t know what 
is going to happen..totally uncertain..even the company might close. 
Production supervisor: It is like a sinking boat. People started escaping (referring to 
resignation of some employees). And everyone (supervisors) is looking for job 
outside.  
 
Purchase staff: This closing is right now “initially”(about the temporary closing of the 
plant for a week). Who knows this initially won’t repeat again. It may be opened for a 
week, then, again closed down initially for two weeks, and so on until it is out (of 
existence). 
 
I also highlighted the frequent concern of the managers about the worsening labor 
relations. They had also mentioned that in such situations they would be careful about 
what practices were coded into the software and how they were coded. It is in this 
situation, the managers labeled the incorporation of customer push-in as a 
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“precaution”, although they considered customer push-in as a “necessary evil”. All 
through out the implementation the managers themselves had expressed that 
functionally customer push-in was not a “correct” practice since it was unsystematic 
and would adversely affect task efficiency, a component of customer responsiveness. 
Still, they took it as a necessary precaution that should be encoded into the software. 
During the discussion about the customer push-in with the consultants, the managers 
had mentioned the intended utility of customer push in as a tool to switch customer 
orders when some production lines go slow. Below, see the relevant part of that 
discussion (Consultant: C, Manager: PM): 
 
C: Why do you want to stop the ongoing production and push in another order? 
PM: When unexpected orders come and you are running full (capacity), you have to 
accommodate the emergency order. You can do this only through replacing some 
ongoing production. 
C: I will give you a user exit to hold back the job order release. Then you can push in 
the emergency order there (rather than during the production). 
PM: But, there is one more important issue. We don’t have enough precision about the 
machine performance. Even the operator performance also can vary. If want to speed 
up a production in a slow running line, we can transfer it to another line.   
 
Notice that the manager mentioned the utility of customer push to transfer an order 
from a slow running line to a faster line. Of course, the slowness could occur due to 
various reasons including problems with the machines. Before discussing these 
reasons, let us see how one of the production managers explained his decision in my 
interview: 
 
I: I think you had mentioned that in the current situation you would be more careful 
about what gets into the software. What is the current situation you were referring to? 
PM: I meant the increased competition, our lack of information about the machines, 
the unpredictability of our own performance, etc. 
….. 
I: What about the struggles we are passing through now? 
PM: The labor issues never influenced my decision. The main issue was customer 
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responsiveness. 
When I presented my doubts regarding the customer responsiveness, after meandering, 
the manager came to his lack of faith in ERP to generate a feasible schedule: 
PM: None of us in production has that much faith in the system.  
Then he continued with the issue of technology non-affordance. I had reproduced that 
excerpt earlier. The discussion went on for some time. Then he mentioned, 
PM: Finally, if we don’t have such flexibilities (as customer push-in),…., it is our 
discretion that is lost.  
I: Means? 
PM: Now, we (the managers) can decide which order to take up and in what order. To 
some extent only it is left to the engineers and supervisors. But, I can intervene any 
time if things go wrong and get it okay. So we can easily manage without any 
problem….But in ERP, if we don’t have those provisions (like customer push-in with 
proper authorization), it will go out of our hands. We have to just follow the system. 
The system may not give a reasonable schedule that we can hit or we have to stretch 
beyond our capacity. Now, we can decide the limit of that stretch. But, even if we 
want, we can’t tighten beyond a limit. In the system (ERP), we can, I guess, tighten it 
more.   
 
The manager is unable to tighten the production plan and schedule adherence in the 
existing system, while in ERP he thinks he would be able to do so. But, if the 
flexibility such as customer push-in were not there, the managers would lose control 
over the scheduling process. Further the managers would be answerable for not hitting 
the production schedule, as it is visible to the top management, peers as well as the 
owners. Therefore, getting the control over setting the production schedule or 
changing it at the managers’ will was very important to the managers. In this context, 
let us see what the flexibilities such as the material diversion (the part which was 
incorporated into ERP) and the customer push-in do.  
 
Before the incorporation of material diversion into the ERP (i.e. in the standard ERP), 
the system automatically firms up the rank order of the customer orders to be taken 
before a month of the actual production. This occurs in the order firming up utility of 
standard ERP. Users could change the preference order of the customer order (ready-
to-release for production) before firming up the ready-to-release list (next operation in 
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the ERP software is “release for production”). Once the system firms up the list, users 
cannot modify the list. But, since the system firms up the list for one-month period and 
then the production schedules are automatically generated for a month (based on this 
list), the flexibility that the managers had to change the preference order of the 
customers and the production schedule (and in turn managers’ control over these 
processes) was reduced from a daily level of changeability (in the existing system) to a 
monthly level of changeability. Also, the manager lost the control over adjusting the 
production due date for one month. By incorporating the material diversion, the 
managers could change the preference order of the customer even after the system 
firms up the order. In fact, the managers could change the rank order of the customers 
just before releasing the order for production, which had a cycle of a one-week period. 
Whenever the managers change the order preference the system would automatically 
generate a new monthly production schedule. Thus, in effect, the inflexibility of the 
production schedules, and in turn, the span of system control over the schedule came 
down from a month to a week. Also, since the shortest production cycle was one 
week, the one week scheduling gave the production manager significant control over 
the production scheduling as well as deployment of operators. This means the 
managers would not have much trouble with adhering to the production schedules as 
well as redeploying the operators. At the same time, the system also gave the 
provision to tighten the schedule dates through which the managers could tighten the 
supervisors’ and operators’ work. In sum, the provision of material diversion and 
customer push in by the way they had been encoded increased the managers’ control 
over the production schedule (directly) and the labor (directly and indirectly).  
 
Still, since the production manager refuted any influence of the labor concerns on their 
decision to incorporate the “flexibilities”, my argument for the most significant 
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influence of the managers’ (or the negotiators’) political interests needs to be 
strengthened. To strengthen my argument, I reproduce an excerpt of my most recent 
telephonic interview (dated June 13, 2009) with the assistant manager (I had quoted 
from this interview earlier): 
 
I: Is it that then contrary to what you thought there is not much use of customer push-
in? 
AM: Not actually. See we are using it but in a limited manner. That’s what I told you 
some time back. This is what we expected.  [I had asked about the frequency of the 
use of customer push-in before ERP implementation. The manager had told me that 
they did not use it frequently and that he expected that the use of customer push-in 
would come down].  
I: If it’s just for the limited use, I was wondering why you pressed for customer push 
in… 
AM: See, customer push in also helps switching orders between lines. 
I: Can you please explain it? 
AM: When you have some problems in a line where an important order is going on 
you can just shut off that complete line or part of it and transfer the order to other 
lines.  
I: What kind of problems? 
AM: Machine problems like machine breakdown that will take more time…then man 
problems too…(pause for some time)..that (man problem) was the main worry that 
time, now…You know the situation we were in. Anything could have happened any 
moment in any line. We had to have precautions set in. I don’t see that coming up 
any more. 
[Notice that the managers indicates one meaning of precaution by referring it to labor 
unrest] 
I: What do you mean? 
AM: There was a good shake here. After that lines are running very smoothly. . 
……………………………………… 
I: What was the shake then.. 
AM: The management weeded out all bad elements. All those who were making 
problems who tried to form the TU were terminated..nearly 10 guys..everything done 
on valid legal grounds…no one could raise any question…The TU leader was fired on 
the strong ground of misbehaving with a lady supervisor..for calling bad words…like 
that..then ..finally TS [the HR manager who dealt with the operators strikes] retired. 
I: But, there is as such no retirement, right? What happened to TS? 
M: TS was made to retire. .. 
M: Also, Jack [new MD] gave 40% salary hike to the operators. So they are all very 
happy. Now, things are moving pretty good..contrary to our expectation, no much 
hassle for us that would give us nightmares.  
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In this conversation, the manager clearly indicates that one major reason for encoding 
customer push-in was the managers’ concern with the labor unrest. Therefore, it is 
quite likely that the managers’ political intentions explain the negotiation outcome of 
encoding customer push in and material diversion.  
 
In sum, the most significant factor that influenced the negotiating managers’ decision 
to modify the technology was their political interests. The political interests influenced 
the managers’ decision in two ways, one directly and the other indirectly: directly 
through the managers’ decision to modify the ERP in order to use it as a means to 
reduce the power of the employees on strike, indirectly through the managers’ 
decision to modify the ERP in order to gain more control over the production schedule 
process, and in turn, the labor. In short, in WestIndia, the negotiators’ political interest 
significantly, and both directly and indirectly, influence the content or body of the 
ERP software, a technological artifact. This echoes Winner’s (1980) provocative 
argument that technological artifacts bear the political intention of its creators. 
However, Winner was criticized for lack of analytical rigor--not considering plausible 
alternative explanations--as well as for the lack of methodological rigor (see Joerges, 
1999). My argument also reflects Noble’s (1984) illustration of Braverman’s 
deskilling thesis. Noble shows how management’s desire to gain more control over 
labor led to the replacement of playback tapes in numerically controlled machines 
with numerical controls. However, his focus is on the replacement of an ‘old’ 
technology with a ‘new’ technology (but not the development or customization of a 
technology) while I show how political interest partly but significantly decides the 
body or content of the technology itself. In this sense, technological artifacts may have 
the fingerprints of its creators’ or modifier-negotiators’ political intentions. In other 
words, political intention could come to constitute technological artifacts.  
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6.6 Summary and discussion 
I summarize the case study as an action-response-result diagram in table 6. 2 (next 
page). In the following summary analysis of the case that uses table 6.2, I boldface and 
italicize my key arguments and insights.  
 
From table 6.2, it is obvious that in WestIndia ERP implementation was a process of 
multiple actors shifting technology frames over time in their attempt to impose the 
frames that embody their interest over others’ frames. For example, during stage 1, 
manager-consultant coalition (MC coalition in figure 6.1) advanced a frame of delay 
reducer that embodied their interests. As per owners’ demand, the managers had to 
reduce the delays. The managers framed ERP as the delay reducer and mobilized a 
discourse around it. Intentionally or unintentionally, they further tied it to an identity 
that the employees desired—software engineer. The consultant appropriated this delay 
reduction discourse to preempt the modification of the standard ERP (consultants’ 
interests) suggesting that the replacement of the local practices by ERP’s global 
practices would only result in delay reduction.  
 
During stage 2, based on the trial use and their increased familiarity with the ERP 
software, the managers’ sensemaking evolved further. Thus, by this time, they realized 
that to reduce delays the employee behavior also needs a change. Therefore, they 
framed ERP as a disciplining agent that would cause this positive transformation and 
again made their discourse attractive by tying it to the desirable identity. The 
consultants appropriated this discourse to suggest that ERP’s standard global practices 
(vis-à-vis the local practices) only would bring about this positive transformation of 
employees into the desired identity.  
 
 245 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6.2: SHIFTING TECHNOLOGY FRAMES, THE RESPONSES, AND 
THE RESULTS IN WESTINDIA 
Actors  
MC coalition 
PM  + other 
employees  
Action-
Response  
A1:Coalition’s 
sensegiving 
discourse using 
the frame (TF) 
R1: Employees’ 
reprodn. of the 
discourse while 
one manager and 
associates oppose 
A2: Coalition’s 
approprn. of 
meta-discourses 
that favor ERP’s 
global norms + 
Negative 
characterizn. of 
local norms & 
simultaneous 
positive 
characterizn. of 
ERP’s global 
norms 
R2: Employees’ 
partial reprodn. 
A3: Exclusion of 
countering views 
 
Results 
Adoptn. of ERP’s 
global practices & 
trial use 
+Employees’ 
reflection on how 
adoptn would lead 
to delay reducn. 
 
TF: delay reducer 
 
Results 
Adoptn.of ERP’s 
global practices+ 
trial use 
reinforcing the 
frame and 
structuring user 
behavior  
TF: enabling 
disciplining 
agent 
Actors  
Managers 
Group 4 
(opposing TF) 
Action-
Response  
A6: Group 4 
members’ 
sensemaking: 
the different 
TF 
R6: 
Discounting 
by managers + 
managers 
label the 
flexibilities as 
“unnecessary” 
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user behavior 
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non-
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Results 
Replacing 
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engineer 
R5: 
Employees’ 
reprodn while 
some group 4 
members 
remain skeptic 
of the claimed 
benefits 
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During stage 3, some of the supervisors and engineers (Group 4 members) disagreed 
with the coalition’s argument of positive transformation and counter-argued that the 
transformation would have adverse effect on their work life. They framed their 
argument into an opposing frame that highlights this potential negative impact. As a 
response to this opposition and in order to align group 4 members’ interest with that of 
the management, during stage 4, the managers framed ERP as a solution to the group 4 
members’ (supervisors’) difficulties with group 5 members (machine operators), that 
is ERP as an increaser of transparency in operators’ performance appraisal. Later, this 
frame evolved in many different dimensions (e.g. transparency in production 
processes, reports, costing process, materials management processes).  
 
During stage 5, the attempt to protect managers’ political interest came out explicitly 
in the flipping of technology frame: earlier the managers’ had opposed group 4 
members’ framing of ERP as a reducer of certain flexibilities, but now the same 
managers framed ERP as a reducer of the same flexibilities that they had earlier 
interpreted as unnecessary and unsystematic. I analyzed this flip in the framing 
(marked with a dark dotted line in table 6.2) and showed that the main reason was 
managers’ political intention to preserve as well as enhance their labor control. Thus, I 
concluded that in WestIndia, the negotiators’ political interest significantly, and both 
directly and indirectly, influenced the content or body of the ERP software, a 
technological artifact. At this point in time, although the consultants tried to bring 
back the technology frame they used earlier--ERP a less modifiable standard software-
- in order to protect their interests, ultimately they had to yield to the managers’ 
pressure. As the end results in table 6.2 shows, the final ERP software—a mix of 
ERP’s global (so-called “Western”) work practices and norms and WestIndia’s local 
(so-called “traditional”) work practices and norms--was an outcome of this power 
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play. In WestIndia’s case, this also means that the cultural context (e.g., the local 
temporal norms that were in conflict with the ERP’s temporal norms) of the 
implementing organization (e.g. WestIndia) shaped the technology (e.g., the final 
software) through the political actions—most significantly shifting of technology 
frames--of the actors involved directly (e.g., the mangers) or indirectly (e.g., the 
supervisors) in the negotiations about the modification of the technology.  
 
Similar to the case of GovIndia in the previous chapter, WestIndia case also illustrates 
how actors inscribe their political interest and the existing power relations into 
technology. To inscribe political interest and power relations into technology, actors 
used technology framing as a primary process and technology frame as an emerging 
discursive resource in order to mobilize sensegiving discourses. To explain this 
point, as I did in GovIndian case, I abstract further from table 6.2.  
 
Consider the vertical column in table 6.2. In each column, there is an approximate 
sequential flow that starts at the top with framing of technology frame (a structure that 
carries the framer’s political interests), which is an outcome of an actor’s (e.g., 
consultants or managers) ‘cognitive sensemaking’ (Weick et al., 2005). In this process 
of ‘emergence of frames’, either some aspects of existing technology frame changed 
(e.g. expansion of delay reducer frame to enabling discipliner frame) or new 
technology frame emerged (e.g. “flexibility reducer” frame). Mobilization of interests 
and its consolidation followed. Subsequently, there was the creation of a consensus 
about what technology is/should be (a collective normative understanding) and the 
corresponding expectations or in other words a consensus on the new frame or the 
newly emerged aspects of the existing frame. This frame was then encoded (i.e., 
translated into software language and entered into the body of the software). In the 
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previous chapter, following Joerges and Czarniawska (1998), the creation of a 
collective normative understanding about technology and the conversion of this 
understanding into material medium (such as software language) or encoding together 
I called “technical inscription”.  The inscribed part of the software (called a module or 
sub-module) was put into testing and sometime trial use since the software had a 
modular structure. In the previous chapter, from a structurational viewpoint, I called 
the testing or the trial use (a form of practice)--an instantiation of the frames (that is 
structure) and the underlying norms encoded into the software through daily use— 
“enactment” through daily use.  This pattern is repeated in each column of table 6.2. 
Therefore, the underlying process can be described as emergence of frames or its 
aspects--use of political strategies--technical inscription—enactment (see figure 6.3, 
next page). 
 
For the sake of convenience I have shown only three stages. The same is repeated in 
the remaining two stages too. Overall, the figure shows the process of constructing a 
cross-cultural information system in WestIndia that includes the process of inscribing 
actors’ political interests into technology.  
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Table 6.2 and figure 6.3 together suggest that we need to conceptualize technology 
frame as a political device in addition to the existing conceptualization of technology 
frame as a cognitive device for sensemaking (see Orlikowski & Gash, 1994). 
Moreover, while IS implementation that uses technology frames usually focuses on 
technology frames as an outcome (as opposed to a process), my study highlights the 
need to focus on the framing process. The benefit of such focus is a better 
FIGURE 6.3: THE POLITICAL PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTING A  
CROSS-CULTURAL IS IN WESTINDIA 
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understanding of the socio-political construction of IS in organizations, for example 
the use of technology frame as a political device. One of the ways managers used 
technology frame as a political device in this case study warrants more attention since 
it is one of the most basic elements of human relations, that is one’s occupational 
identity. Unlike in the case of GovIndia, in WestIndia, intentionally or unintentionally 
managers tried to form a new occupational identity, which I call “ERP enabled 
employee equivalent to software engineer”.  The managers reproduced the meta-
discourse in the society that venerated software engineer (an occupational identity). 
Subsequently, they framed ERP as an agent (“ERP an enabling disciplining agent”: 
Stage 2) that would bring about such a desirable identity transformation. The hallmark 
of this new identity was task efficiency--a positive hallmark attributed to software 
engineer--that underlay the frame of “delay reducer” (Stage 1). Other characteristics 
included “systematism” which indicated a spatial arrangement that looks organized (as 
opposed to disorganized), and meeting of strict deadlines. Thus, the managers used 
technology frames in combination with hegemonic meta-discourses in the wider 
society to produce a new identity, an ERP enabled employee who was expected to be 
equivalent to software engineer.  The political dynamics of the identity formation 
influenced the technical inscription of the remaining stages (stage 3 and stage 4) 
excluding the last stage (stage 5). For example, in stage 2, stage 3 and stage 4, the 
collective predominant interpretation of ERP was that ERP is an agentic tool that helps 
its users achieve the new identity (a desirable identity) by shaping the users’ work 
culture. Thus, ERP was understood collectively as a transformer of the organization, 
which is a reproduction of the popular discourse (Grant et al., 2006). The use of 
technology frames to create new identity is a rare observation in the IS implementation 
as well technology frame literature.  
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The unethical side of this new identity formation is that while the managers knew that 
the transformation process involved adversary effect (e.g., increased work stress, 
increased monotony, increased monitoring) on the work life of other employees such 
as supervisors, they underplayed it. Further, when these employees (e.g., group 4 
members) articulated their concerns about the potential adversary effect in terms of 
technology frame (e.g. ERP as a constraining tool and a flexibility reducer), the 
managers not only discounted it but they advanced a new technology frame that 
redefined some potential negative aspects (e.g. increased monitorability) as positive 
(e.g. increased data leading to not monitorability but transparency and precision). This 
is the unethical part of WestIndia’s ERP implementation. During my analysis I have 
also raised the ethical issue of increasing monitorability of employees without 
negotiating it with them before hand and instead excluding them formally from the 
negotiation process.  
 
The managers’ discount of employees’ opposing views (which I mentioned above), 
the exclusion of opposing views from negotiations (e.g., purchase managers’ exclusion 
during stage 1), and elimination of conflicting frames through perceived coercion that 
is generated via institutional arrangements and actions (e.g. termination of opposing 
employees) significantly facilitated creation of a “consensus” on frames or the 
meaning and expectations of the technology. Therefore, in WestIndia, these 
institutional means of creating a consensus or closure, which I called “institutional 
closure” in the previous chapter, was an important means to create consensus on 
the meaning of technology. This implies that institutional closure may be as 
significant as other means of closure since it is the combination (not just the 
independence existence) of institutional means with rhetoric and cognitive means that 
leads to the closure of the meaning attributed to technology, and in turn, its encoding 
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into the technology. The existence of institutional closure raises doubts on the 
genuineness and breadth of the sharedness (i.e., how widely and how genuinely the 
frame is shared) of technology frame that the technology implementation literature 
usually assumes. I had raised the same point in the last chapter also.  
 
In the next concluding chapter, I interweave the findings of the two case studies and 
the process models I generated. Through this I identify the central macro process—the 
core concept in grounded theory’s language--in the political shaping of creating a 
working IS. I also consolidate the new concepts I have developed consistently across 
the two case studies: institutional closure and technology non-affordance.  I conclude 
the chapter with the potential contributions of my study, the research and practical 
implications, and the limitations that indicates possibilities of further research. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
NEGOTIATING TECHNOLOGY FRAMES 
In this chapter, I conclude my research by interweaving the findings of the two case 
studies and the micro processes that I identified. To answer my research question, I 
also generate a process model that highlights the core process—negotiating 
technology frame. My research question is how does exercise of power shape creation 
of a working information system in organizations. This question was embedded within 
a broader question of how do organizations create a working information system. 
Based on my preliminary analysis in the field, I narrowed down the broad question to 
focus more on the exercise of power that I call politics, which might shape the 
creation.  Further, based on my literature review and my prior experience on 
technology implementation, I chose to focus on the process of collective sensemaking 
(Weick, 1995) of actors both directly and indirectly involved in the implementation.  
In turn, this study is my sensemaking about the sensemaking of the actors, and thus is 
essentially an interpretive study. To do a longitudinal (over time) and interpretive 
study, I chose an appropriate methodology—interpretive qualitative case study 
supported with grounded theory.  This chapter presents my conclusions from the study 
followed by the contributions this study makes, methodological, theoretical, and 
practical. Finally, I describe the limitations of this study and the scope for further 
research.  
 
7.1 Interweaving the main findings and the micro processes 
Below (next page), in table 7.1 I reproduce the main findings that are common to both 
cases. As the second column of the table 7.1 shows, these findings correspond to the 
three main processes (out of the four I identified in the case analyses) that occur in a 
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nearly sequential manner forming three phases of the implementation.  
 
 
 
Main common findings across the cases Corresponding 
process 
The implementation was significantly an outcome of a power 
play among the actors. The power play was mainly a process of 
multiple actors framing and shifting technology frames over time 
in their attempt to impose the frames that embody their interest 
over others’ frames. 
Emergence of 
frames (or its 
aspects) 
The actors used technology frames as an emergent (in the sense it 
emerged from actors’ ongoing sensemaking) discursive resource 
through framing it in a way that embodies their interests. 
Subsequently, they employed it for sensegiving in order to 
mobilize other group’s interests. To consolidate the mobilized 
interest, the actors used a combination of political strategies such 
as discursive shaping, coercion, and exclusion of frames that 
carry the interests that are in conflict their interests. 
Interest 
mobilization 
and 
consolidation 
Through such mobilization and consolidation of interests, the 
actors tried to create a normative (in appearance) consensus on 
meaning of technology (what technology is and what it should 
be), and in turn, the to-be-done technology modifications, which 
were subsequently translated into software codes and entered into 
the software program (encoding). In this way, actors used 
technology framing as a primary process and technology frame as 
an emergent discursive resource to inscribe their political interest 
and favorable power relations into the software program. 
Technical 
inscription: 
consensus 
creation + 
encoding 
 
 
TABLE 7.1: COMMON FINDINGS FROM THE TWO CASES AND THE 
CORRESPONDING PROCESSES 
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The above-mentioned three findings that correspond to the three processes in my 
process models (see figures 5.1 and 6.3) together succinctly explain a significant part 
of the ERP implementations that occurred in both GovIndia and WestIndia, two 
radically different implementation environments. Therefore, before discussing other 
common findings, I explain how the micro process models that I generated can explain 
these main findings, and in turn, the political dynamics of the implementations. In line 
with grounded theory methodology, to increase the explanatory power of the model 
and to make it more parsimonious, first I abstract from the micro-process models and 
generate a macro-process model. Subsequently, I use the macro model to explain the 
political dynamics of the two implementations. 
 
If we compare the two process diagrams (figure 5.1 and figure 6.2) that I generated 
using the two cases, they look exactly the same. Therefore, I collapsed the two 
diagrams into a single one (see figure 7.1 below). An exception is the feedback loop 
(the dotted line in figure 7.1) from technical inscription to emergence of frame that 
occurred only in the case of GovIndia when the ERP consultants learnt from their 
coding they had done so far that the implementation was more time and effort 
consuming than they expected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For all actors 
For employees 
For consultants (occurred only in GovIndia case) 
Emergence 
of frames 
Interest 
mobilization and 
consolidation 
Technical 
inscription 
of frames 
Enactment of 
frames in 
daily use 
FIGURE 7.1: THE CYCLICAL POLITICAL MICRO PROCESS OF 
CONSTRUCTING AN IS  
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At this point in time, based on their (cognitive) sensemaking, the consultants framed 
ERP in a way that would reduce their efforts and time in order to generate a new sense 
of ERP technology (sensegiving) among the users. Note that in WestIndia’s case there 
was no such incident perhaps because the consultants had more experience with ERP 
implementations while for Itech (GovIndian ERP consultant) the GovIndian project 
was their second project. It may also be due to the developmental nature of GovIndian 
project as opposed to an implementation of a standard stabilized software (which was 
the WestIndian case). We should note one more point. In my discussion about 
sensemaking and sensegiving, I treated sensegiving as an action while I focused 
exclusively on the cognitive aspect of sensemaking. One can perhaps raise an 
objection here since I seem to be separating sensemaking from sensegiving. Scholars 
are on two sides regarding this point. There are scholars who define sensemaking 
exclusively as a cognitive process and sensegiving as an action process (e.g. Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991), while others (e.g. Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005) treat 
sensemaking as non-separable dualism of both cognition and action. Since I do not 
want to enter into this debate, I followed Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) to define 
sensegiving and named the cognitive part of evolving a frame as cognitive 
sensemaking. Also, although the consolidation of interest includes not only the 
creation of legitimacy through persuasive means (e.g. sensegiving using frames) but 
also other means such as coercion and its legitimation, the main findings in Table 7.1 
touch only the persuasive part of the consolidation process. I will take up the other 
parts later when I discuss the remaining common findings. In the following paragraph 
I abstract further from figure 7.1 using my main common findings. 
 
If we look at table 7.1, it is clear that the main findings correspond to the three main 
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micro processes in figure 7.1, namely, emergence of frames, interest mobilization and 
consolidation, and technical inscription. Now, consider the process of political 
negotiation, a macro process broader than the micro processes. Political negotiation 
may be considered basically as an articulation of interests and preferences using 
structures (which is similar to technology framing since technology framing, as I 
argued, is a structural articulation of interests and preferences), discussion over the 
interest (that subsumes interest mobilization and consolidation) in order to reach a 
consensus, the consensus formation and conversion of the agreement into a more 
durable, usually textual medium (which is same as technical inscription). Therefore, 
the three processes put together I call negotiating technology frames. Using this 
concept I refine the process diagram to make it more parsimonious and simple (see 
figure 7.2).  
 
‘ 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the two macro processes, I answer my research question. My research question 
was in a cross-cultural context, how do organizations create a working IS through 
exercise of power? The answer is: organizations create a working IS through two 
interactive processes, namely, negotiating technology frames and enacting 
technology frames.  
 
Now, using the two core concepts--negotiating technology frame and enacting 
Negotiating 
technology 
frames 
Enacting 
technology 
frames 
FIGURE 7.2: NEGOTIATING TECHNOLOGY FRAMES:  
THE CENTRAL PROCESS IN CONSTRUCTING A WORKING IS 
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technology frame, I explain the political dynamics of the implementations in GovIndia 
and WestIndia. The ERP software is a package of standardized work practices. During 
the implementation, primarily to reduce their efforts, time and cost (consultant’s 
interest), the consultants tried to retain these software-coded standard practices intact 
to the possible extent. Simultaneously, primarily to reduce their efforts and to preserve 
and/or extend their power (and organizational members’ interests), organizational 
members tried to get the software customized by replacing ERP’s standard practices 
with software-coded version of the organization’s local practices.  Assuming that the 
practices embody norms and interests, the mutually exclusive choice of retaining 
standard practices (or adopting ERP practices) vs. encoding local practices (or 
modifying ERP practices) to replace ERP’s standard practices generated a possibility 
of negotiation. Negotiations occurred over the contention (retain vs. replace) primarily 
using technology frame as an emergent persuasive discursive resource. The actors 
combined this persuasion with other strategies such as coercion and exclusion of 
technology frames that opposed their interests in order to consolidate the interests that 
they had mobilized using their technology frames. These micro political strategies 
resulted in the convergence of technology frames (or its aspects) among certain groups 
and the predominance of the converged technology frames over other conflicting 
technology frames (or its aspects). Consequently, there emerged a narrowly shared and 
negotiated consensus on technology frames (or its aspects). The narrowly shared 
technology frames contained the evaluation of the choice (an aspect of decision-
making) between adopting ERP practices and modifying ERP practices. The decision 
was translated into software codes. Subsequently, organizational members enacted the 
negotiated practices that were inscribed into the software. This led to new negotiations 
and enactments, and the cycle was repeated. Having illustrated the explanatory power 
of my core concepts and the model, below, I use the micro processes and concepts that 
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the model contains to analyze the political process of implementation. 
 
This political process of framing and inscribing a technology like the ERP was a 
cacophony of voices, which contested, questioned, reframed, and re-inscribed the 
meaning and the potential use of ERP. While there were a number of times when both 
framing and inscription processes moved in a relatively similar direction, there were 
other times when there was a struggle between different frames and inscriptions of the 
technology. This suggests that it was a rather temporary (but not fragile as Spicer 2005 
suggests) political achievement when one frame or inscription of the ERP (for 
example, in WestIndia and GovIndia, temporary acceptance of ERP as less 
customizable software) had been accepted and passed over in silence. As Foucauldian 
scholars such as Spicer (2005) observes, unlike what Joerges and Czarniawska (1998) 
note technical inscription is neither unquestioningly accepted by all actors nor is it 
simply the victory of one discourse over another (Munir & Phillips, 2005). Yet, unlike 
what the Foucauldian scholars suggest (e.g., Spicer, 2005), the political achievement 
of a frame at that point in time was not fragile. Instead, the encoding of the consensual 
meaning (achieved or manufactured through the political means) into the technology 
made such achievements more durable and stable. That is, given the complexity of IT, 
the time and budget constraints of the development/implementation projects, the usual 
path dependent progressive style of the development/implementation, the momentary 
achievements make their way into the technology and reside there nearly permanently. 
These momentary achievements were encoded and subsequently enacted by the users, 
which in turn, led to contestation of this consensual meaning (or frame), sometimes 
resulting in manufacturing of a new momentary consensus before the next inscription 
occurred. Thus, metaphorically, the technological artifact became a well-fitted 
puzzle of different pieces of momentary political achievements (and in turn frames) 
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that were made more ‘durable’47 (Latour, 1991:103-131). That is, the IS was created 
through encoding and enactment--two processes of infusing more durability--of the 
various pieces of socially constructed momentary political achievements represented 
as “consensual” technical inscriptions, which were representations of various 
interests. This enhanced durability is the realist end of the social construction. Also, it 
is not that each actor’s interests had a chance to become predominant at some point in 
time during the implementation. Instead, the interests of the structurally and 
functionally less powerful was institutionally excluded either through fiat or through 
coercive means. Thus, the coercive backdrop of the organization temporarily delimits 
what interests can contest and what interests can be inscribed into the technology.  
 
7.2 Interweaving the secondary findings and the micro processes 
Having the broad picture in place, I closely examine it focusing on two of the 
processes--the mobilization of interests and its consolidation, and technical inscription. 
Consider the process of mobilization of interests. In order to mobilize interests (both 
within a group such as the managers and across the groups) and to consolidate their 
interests, actors used technology frame, a carrier of their interest, as a discursive 
resource. In both cases (GovIndia and WestIndia), I had noted an interesting and a 
prominent way the ERP consultants used technology frame as a sensegiving discursive 
resource. That is discursively creating a perception that the technology by its inherent 
nature does not afford certain actions. Drawing on human-computer interaction 
literature, I proposed a concept—perceived technology non-affordance—to describe 
this political strategy. Thus, I argued that, it may be that during technology 
implementation, one of the prominent ways system professionals exercise their 
expert power over other actors through discursive means is by creating a perceived 
                                                 
47
 Latour’s (1991) famous saying that technology is society made durable 
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technology non-affordance.  
 
Apart from the persuasive discursive strategy, in both cases, the contextually powerful 
actors used coercive means to consolidate their interests, and in turn, manufacture a 
seemingly shared consensus on technology frame between the coercing actor and the 
coerced.  For example, in GovIndia’s case, there were two such instances: 1) 
GovIndia’s coercion of Itech that led to an apparent acceptance of GovIndia’s 
interpretation of the ERP, and 2) GovIndian management’s coercion of its office staff, 
particularly accounts and finance staff, using warning memos and attendance records 
that resulted in the coerced employees’ apparent acceptance of the salience of 
integration (as opposed to automation) that the management wanted. Subsequently, the 
management legitimated its coercion using hegemonic discourses available in the 
immediate society. This managerial action probably expedited the apparent (or non-
genuine) employee consensus with the top management’s frame or its aspects. 
Similarly in WestIndia, although unintentionally, the elimination of the countering 
technology frame occurred via exclusion from negotiations of the proponents of the 
countering technology frame (or some aspects of technology frame) through 
institutional arrangements, and via creation of a perceived coercion through 
institutional actions such as termination of employees who incidentally opposed some 
aspects of the consultant-manager coalition’s technology frame. Such coercive actions 
occurred in combination with the ongoing attempts of discursive shaping that used 
both technology frames (as a discursive resource) and the hegemonic meta-discourses 
available in the wider society. Therefore, I argued that during technology 
implementation, it is likely that actors use coercive means either as a last resort or in 
combination with persuasive discursive means to manufacture a seemingly widely 
shared consensus on technology frame. Drawing upon the social construction 
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literature, I proposed the notion of institutional closure to denote such consensus 
manufactured through institutional means. The social construction of technology 
literature uses a notion of closure to indicate the emergent-shared consensus on 
technology frame (defining technology frame more broadly). Further, the literature 
suggests two modes of creating such “closures”, through cognitive means (called 
problem redefinition closure) and rhetoric means (called rhetoric closure). To this 
repository, I add a third means of creating closure, an institutional means. 
 
So far our discussions were around technology frames-- the main discursive resource 
that the actors used to mobilize interests. But, as I mentioned above and had noted in 
my case analyses, in both cases, to consolidate interests, the actors supplemented this 
discursive resource with other discursive resources such as the hegemonic meta-
discourses available in the wider society. For example, in the case of GovIndia, the 
management used two hegemonic discourses: 1) the opposition to modern technology 
(as the management interpreted it) is a destructive belligerent TU stand, and 2) it is the 
management’s right to increase employee monitoring while it is the employee’s duty 
to obey the command of the management. Similarly, in WestIndia, the manager-
consultant coalition used the hegemonic discourse in the wider society that the so-
called “Western” temporal norms are more favorable than the so-called “traditional” 
temporal norms. These two hegemonic discourses do not use technology frames as 
discursive means. Therefore, I argued that during technology implementation, in 
addition to technology frame, actors may use the hegemonic discourses available in 
the immediate society in order to consolidate their interest, and in turn, create a 
shared consensus.  
 
A powerful meta-discourse that the WestIndian management used was identity 
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discourse. For example, in my analysis, I noted how the managers used the socially 
desirable professional identity of “software engineer” to create an equivalent identity 
“ERP enabled employee,” tying the managers’ technology frames of delay reducer and 
enabling discipliner to the meta-discourses in the society about the “software 
engineer” identity. Thus, the managers used technology frames in combination with 
hegemonic meta-discourses in the wider society to not only technically inscribe their 
interest into the software but also produce a new identity, an ERP enabled employee 
who is equivalent to software engineer. I have also shown that the political dynamics 
of this identity formation influenced the technical inscription, for example, the 
acceptance of the ERP’s global temporal norms such as time boundedness, which was 
taken as the hallmark of the software engineer identity. Therefore, I argued that ERP 
implementation may be seen as not only a creation of an information system but 
also a co-creation of a new worker identity, or in other words, ERP implementation 
is a co-evolution of an information system and a worker-user.   
 
So far we have considered interest mobilization and consolidation. In this paragraph, I 
focus on technical inscription, the next sequential process. In both cases, we have seen 
that the negotiators inscribed their interests into the software program. For example, in 
GovIndia, in order to reduce peer and superior monitorability, both plant staff and 
office staff cut down the connections (or the links) between their data and other 
division’s data, which resulted in a weak information integrator, a functionally inferior 
technology. Similarly, in WestIndia, I have shown how the managers’ choice of 
encoding certain local practices (while not others) into the ERP software was 
significantly based on political grounds than on alternative grounds such as functional 
considerations. The managers’ choice resulted in significant modification of the 
standard ERP creating a cross-cultural, specifically cross--temporal IS. Thus, in both 
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cases the political interests of the negotiators directly and significantly affected the 
content (e.g., the software codes) or the body of the ERP software, a technological 
artifact. Therefore, I argued that in certain context of technology implementation, 
beyond other considerations such as functional utility, the negotiators’ political 
interest may significantly and directly influence the content or body of technological 
artifacts. A step further, in the WestIndian case, the managers modified the software 
in order to make it a political means to weaken the strength of anticipated worker 
strikes. Thus, WestIndian case illustrates how technology becomes a politics by other 
means. In making technology a political weapon, the managers not only preserved but 
also extended their control (in turn, power) over labor. The managers realized this 
political interest through getting their interest translated into software codes that even 
changed the local practices in subtle ways (for example subtle changes in return 
material authorization in the case of material diversion practice). Thus, in a way, these 
modifications were a material realization of the managers’ political interests. 
Therefore, I argued that, in certain contexts of technology implementation, 
technological artifact may become a material realization or materialization of the 
political interests of the negotiators involved in technology modification.  
 
In WestIndia’s case, this also means that the cultural context (e.g., the local temporal 
norms that were in conflict with the ERP’s global temporal norms) of the 
implementing organization (e.g. WestIndia) shaped the technological artifact (e.g., the 
final software) through the political actions—most significantly shifting of technology 
frames--of the actors involved directly (e.g., the mangers) or indirectly (e.g., the 
supervisors) in the negotiations about the modification of the technology. The 
powerful actor (the managers) made the choice of which particular norms affected the 
technology. They chose the norms that either preserved or advanced their political 
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interest. In this choice, functional (e.g., tightening the integration as opposed to 
weakening the integration) and cultural considerations (e.g. preservation of the 
habituated local practices) were secondary to political considerations. Therefore, I 
suggested that in cross-cultural context of technology implementation, cultural 
context might shape technological artifacts through the actions that would realize 
the political interest of the negotiators.  
 
7.3 Contributions to research and practice 
This section is organized into two parts that together forms the contributions of this 
study: methodological and theoretical, in other words contributions to research, and 
practical, in other words contributions to practice.  
 
7.3.1 Methodological contribution 
In this study, I used grounded theory method to inductively develop a process model 
that parsimoniously explains the political dynamics of creating a cross-cultural IS in 
two South Indian manufacturing organizations. I built the process model using the 
core concept, negotiating technology frames. In addition, the inductive approach also 
helped generate two more concepts, technology non-affordance and institutional 
closure, that explain the fine-grained details of the process model. Deviating from the 
usual style of grounded theory application, in my case analysis I used one feature of 
qualitative case study approach, testing a hypothesis. For example, in WestIndian case, 
I analyzed alternative plausible explanations to test my hypothesis of negotiators’ 
political interests as the primary motivation for a modification decision. This I believe 
has increased the rigor of my argument and strengthened the overall model. Thus, 
following Glaser (1998), I exhibited a methodological flexibility by not sticking with 
the dictums of grounded theory. Also, unlike in many grounded theory studies that 
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present just the empirical data and the emergence of the theory showing their 
relationship but leaving the historicity of the empirical data out, I situated my data in 
its historical context. I believe that such situating, to some extent, wards off the 
criticism against grounded theory-in-use for its decontextualization of empirical data 
(see Charmaz, 2006; Glaser, 2002). Thus, methodologically, this study illustrates how 
we can build-in some features of the qualitative case study approach into the 
application of grounded theory in a fruitful manner.  
 
7.3.2 Theoretical contribution 
My study contributes to four streams of research. In organization studies, my study 
builds on the research on sociopolitical construction of IT in organizations. In IS 
studies, my study contributes to the IS implementation studies that use technology 
frame and that focus on the politics of IS implementation in organizations. In ERP 
studies (interdisciplinary) my study joins the research on sociopolitical construction of 
ERP. I also contribute to the social construction of technology (SCOT) literature.  
 
7.3.2.1 Contribution to organization studies 
As I mentioned in the literature review, a growing number of studies on technology 
implementation has shown that discourse shapes how actors may understand and use a 
new technology (Bloomfield & Best, 1992; Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; Doolin, 
2003, Hayes & Walsham, 2000; Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Maguire, 2004; Munir, 
2005; Munir & Phillips, 2005; Spicer, 2005). I build on these studies to show how 
actors use technology frame as a discursive resource to inscribe their political interest. 
While this stream of studies examine exclusively the politics involved in creating a 
consensus on the should-be-use and the should-be-meaning of technology, or in other 
words, the ‘politics of technical inscription’ (Spicer, 2005) which is prospective in its 
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nature, my study augments this stream of research by examining the influence of 
politics on the retrospective sensemaking (Weick, 1979a,b; 1995), for example the 
framing of the evolving meaning (not potential meaning) of ERP and its felt-use (not 
potential use). My study shows that it is important to understand this process of 
framing which is under researched in organizational studies (Van de ven, 2005), since 
it is framing that shapes the subsequent politics of technical inscription. I also identify 
an additional intermediate process –enactment of frame--that influences the content of 
the subsequent discourses through frames. The process of enactment captures the role 
of ‘strength of test’ that Grant et al. (2006) suggest as an enabler of counter discourse 
by the structurally and functionally less powerful users of technology.   
 
In short, the extant organizational studies on politics of technology implementation 
generally focus on the political process of technical inscription (Spicer, 2005). The 
upstream activity of emergence of frames, which is a retrospective sensemaking 
process (see figure 7.1), as well as the downstream activity of frame enactment is 
missing from this stream of studies. In turn, how political dynamics links frame 
emergence with the politics of technical inscription, and in turn, with frame enactment 
is also absent from this literature. The implication of this missing down stream and 
upstream activities is lack of a holistic picture. By developing a new concept—
negotiating technology frames—and a process framework to investigate the linking 
political dynamics, my study provides a theoretical tool to examine the political 
process of IT implementation holistically. Further, my study illustrates the explanatory 
power of the proposed theoretical tool by explaining parsimoniously the political 
dynamics of ERP implementation in two radically different contexts. The empirical 
examination in two radically different contexts also is a contribution of my study. As I 
have noted in the literature review, in organization studies of the sociopolitical 
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construction of IT implementations, studies that simultaneously examine IT 
implementation in radically different contexts is rare. The context of my study helps 
me make some other contributions too, that I discuss later.  
 
Years back scholars have called for brining concepts from sociology of technology 
literature and IS literature into organization studies noting the lack of such efforts (see 
Orlikowski & Barley, 2001). Recently, there are some attempts in this direction (e.g., 
Spicer, 2005; Fayard & Weeks, 2007). My study pushes these efforts further in the 
following way. By developing the new concept and the process model that I described 
above, I bring in concepts and a theoretical frame from the social construction of 
technology literature and the IS literature into organization studies of IT 
implementation.  
 
As I have noted in the literature review, historically, the research on sociopolitical 
construction of IT implementation has focused exclusively on one modality of 
exercise of power—discursive/rhetoric persuasion, though they implicitly 
acknowledge other modalities of power such as coercion. For instance, studies that 
highlight the role of coercion and its interaction with persuasion are rare. The 
exclusive focus on persuasion has generated a less nuanced picture of political 
dynamics. More importantly, such studies miss the opportunity to raise ethical 
questions on the coercive modus operandi of IT implementations that follow typical 
managerial instrumentalism (Sawyer, 2001). By highlighting the role of coercion and 
its interaction with persuasion (for example legitimated coercion) and raising the 
related ethical concerns, my study addresses this paucity. More importantly, the 
significant role of coercion in creating a sharedness of sensemaking in terms of a 
consensus on meaning (s) and use(s) of technology questions the assumption of a 
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shared sensemaking (shared across different actor groups). This assumption of 
sharedness is pervasive in the literature on organizational sesnemaking (Weick et al., 
2005).  
 
How system professionals such as ERP consultants exercise their expert power over 
users has been a sustained question in the literature on politics of IT implementations 
both in IS field and organization studies field (see Bloomfield & Danielle, 1995; 
Howcroft & Trauth, 2006; Jasperson et al., 2002; Markus & Bjorn-Anderson, 1986). 
Adding to the studies that answer this question (e.g., Bloomfield & Danielle, 1995; 
Howcroft & Trauth 2006; Markus & Bjorn-Anderson, 1986), my case study generates 
a rich description of the political strategies that the consultants may use during ERP 
implementation, the users’ response to it, and the effect of this interaction (see figure 
5.2 and figure 6.2). But beyond this description, I develop a concept—perceived 
technology non-affordance--that helps explain how system professionals exercise their 
expert power over the users through discursive means.  
 
Through the WestIndian case study, my research also addresses an empirical question 
of how organizations create a working IS when the system being implemented has in-
built cultural assumptions in conflict with that of the organization—an under-
researched theme in organizational studies and information systems studies. I focus on 
an oft-neglected element of organizational culture, temporal norms (Ancona, 
Goodman, Lawrence, 2001; Ancona, Okhyusen, Perlow, 2001; Trice, 1993), and the 
political strategies that organizations employ to create a working IS (Jasperson et al., 
2002; Spicer, 2005; Wagner et al., 2006). The studies on the politics of 
implementation and modification of IS have focused less on temporal aspects. 
Conversely, the studies that discuss changes in temporal aspects during IS 
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modification or implementation do not examine the associated political aspects 
(Kandathil, 2009). This lack of dialogue situates the contribution of my study. Apart 
from this theoretical interest, this contribution of my study has practical importance 
too. During trans-national implementation with its Western origin, design, and the 
embodiment of Western work practices, ERP is bound to encounter non-Western work 
practices (Davison, 2002; Martinsons, 2004) that may have different temporal norms 
and assumptions. Therefore, from a practical viewpoint, it is important to understand 
how an organization resolves the conflicts between the temporality embedded in the 
standard off-the-shelf technology and the organizations’ work practices. My study 
shows that actors resolve this conflict primarily through political strategies that 
include attempts to discursively shape users’ temporal norms, and through exclusion 
of opposing views through coercive means. This micro politics creates an apparent 
consensus on the modification of the ERP software, and in turn, leads to embedding 
the temporal asymmetry (e.g., the mix of global temporal norms and local temporal 
norms that are in conflict) into the resulting technological artifact, the final ERP 
software.  
 
7.3.2.2 Contribution to information systems studies 
Information systems literature defines and employs technological frame as a cognitive 
device that actors use for their individual as well as collective sensemaking (e.g. 
Orlikowski & Gash, 1994; Davidson, 2006). In addition, my study illustrates that 
actors use technology frames as emergent discursive resource. Therefore, I propose a 
re-conceptualization of technology frame as a simultaneous cognitive device and 
political device in its use. As both my case studies illustrate, such a re-
conceptualization will increase the explanatory power of the notion of technology 
frame. For example, my study illustrates how the use of technology frame as an 
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emergent discursive resource facilitates the political actions that links cognitive-
discursive generation of frames (emergence of frame in figure 7.1) and the process of 
technical inscription. Moreover, to the extent sensemaking is simultaneously a 
cognition and an action (Weick et al., 2005), the IS conceptualization of technology 
frame as a sensemaking device and its exclusive focus on cognitive use of technology 
frame, for example, the examination of generation of shared consensus using frames 
as a cognitive congruence creating process (e.g., Orlikowski & Gash, 1994), creates a 
less holistic picture. Such studies miss an important dimension of sensemaking—the 
political action (Weick et al., 2005).  Similar is the issue when we use the definition of 
technology frame as a cognitive device to investigate the political dynamics of 
technology frame (e.g. Davidson, 2002; Yeow & Sia, 2008). In such examinations, the 
structural shift of technology frames becomes an outcome of actors’ political action 
(e.g., Davidson, 2002); neither such frame shift nor the content formation of frames is 
treated as a means or medium of political action. For such understanding of how 
frames are a medium of political actions and its implications, we need to re-
conceptualize technology frames as political device.  
 
IS studies that employ technology frame as a theoretical lens usually treat technology 
frame as an outcome. The exclusive focus on outcome has black-boxed the notion 
limiting its explanatory power (Davidson, 2006). An exception is the Davidson (2002) 
work that examines the cognitive and political process of shifting salience of 
technology frames and the resultant drift in actors’ understanding about system 
requirements for an IS implementation. Another exception is the Yeow and Sia (2008) 
work that illustrates how actors’ discursive strategies resulted in the non-congruence 
of technology frames. I push these works further by showing how technology frame 
itself is both a medium (as opposed to an outcome as in Davidson’s work and Yeow’s 
 272 
and Sia’s work) and an outcome of actors’ political strategies. By doing this, I also 
answer the recent call in the framing literature on political negotiations that exhorts 
scholars to examine the political process of framing as opposed to treating frames as a 
result of political actions (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, Lewicki, 
Aarts, Bouwen, & van Woerkum, 2009).   
 
The politics of identity construction is central to the critical studies on management of 
organizations (Alvesson &Willmott, 2003) that include management of technology 
implementation. The critical perspective is a predominant approach in IS studies 
(Jasperson et al., 2002). Yet, critical IS studies have limited focus on the issues of 
worker identity production.  This relative neglect has provoked scholars to criticize 
critical IS studies for its ‘soft criticality’ (e.g., Mitev, 2006). In WestIndian case study, 
I show how the use of meta-discourses in the wider society in combination with the 
use of technology frame as a discursive resource co-creates IS and a new worker 
identity—ERP enabled worker. I also had argued that one of the predominant 
underlying processes that the managers used to create consensus on their technology 
frame was identity construction. Thus, I highlighted the co-production of a worker 
identity and an IS that is expected to sustain and reproduce that worker identity.  
 
7.3.2.3 Contribution to ERP studies 
As my literature review shows, scholars from different fields have engaged in 
examining the implementation of ERP within organizations. Still, majority of ERP 
studies are done from a system engineering perspective that focuses on critical success 
factors of the implementation. This has created a huge imbalance in the ERP literature 
(Wagner et al., 2006). As my literature review shows, there is a growing exception 
that focuses on the sociopolitical construction of ERP (see Pollock & William, 2009). 
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My study joins this stream of research. Similar to what I mentioned regarding the 
studies on sociopolitical construction of IT implementations in organizations, ERP 
studies that focus on sociopolitical construction also have an exclusive focus on 
persuasive discourses which has generated a less nuanced picture. By focusing on 
persuasion, coercion, and its interaction, my study generates a more nuanced 
understanding of the sociopolitical construction of ERP implementation. In addition to 
the exclusive focus on persuasion, ERP researchers have noted the lack of an 
integrative process model in ERP studies to examine the sociopolitical construction of 
ERP (Wagner et al., 2006). By proposing a process model that integrates both 
upstream and downstream activities of the political strategies to create a shared 
consensus on the meaning and use of ERP, I address this paucity. 
 
Most of the published ERP studies use a single organization case study. Given the 
complex nature of ERP implementation and its spread over multiple phases and 
periods, recently (e.g. Pollock, 2009; Pollock & Williams, 2009) IS scholars have 
called for investigating multiple cases that span over multiple periods and phases. 
Taking two radically different ERP implementations that spans over multi-period and 
multi-phases, this study answers that call. 
 
7.3.2.3 Contribution to social construction of technology studies 
The social construction of technology (SCOT) framework has been rarely used to 
study introduction of IT in an organization. This study takes care of that neglect. More 
importantly, the SCOT literature in general has been criticized for its overlook of 
power relations that emerge during technology development and implementation (see 
Winner, 1993; Pinch, 1996; Wacjman, 2000). Also, the SCOT framework discounts, 
in favor of persuasion (social influence), the role of coercion (power dimension) in 
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constructing a social consensus that the technology is “working”. By highlighting the 
role of coercion in constructing the “shared” consensus on the meaning and use of 
ERP technology, this study address the above concerns. In doing this, I generated a 
concept—institutional closure—that helps explain how actors use institutional 
coercive means to manufacture a seemingly shared consensus. I argued that it is the 
combination of institutional means with rhetoric and cognitive means—the two means 
that SCOT literature identifies--that leads to “shared” consensus on or the closure of 
the meaning attributed to technology. The existence of institutional closure raises 
doubts about the genuineness and breadth of the sharedness (i.e., how widely and how 
genuinely the frame is shared) of technology frame that the technology 
implementation literature usually suggests. 
 
7.3.3 Contributions to the practice 
Although increasingly and in massive way multinational organizations, especially 
Western multinational organizations, have been implementing ERP in their subsidiary 
units in the emerging economies (Huang & Palvia, 2001), especially in India 
(Gunasekaran, 2008). As I mentioned in the literature review, systematic academic 
study on ERP implementations in emerging economies or the so-called developing 
countries is scarce (Martinsons, 2004). Also, ERP studies have limited focus on ERP 
implementations in Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) sector, though such 
implementation is an increasing phenomenon (Chen et al., 2008). Equally rare is the 
study on ERP implementation in government organizations, especially in emerging 
economies (Singla, 2005). On these grounds, my study is a unique attempt that shows 
to practitioners as well as academicians what may occur during ERP implementations 
in such contexts. Furthermore, one of my case studies—GovIndia—is of special 
significance since in that case, the ERP implementation was turned into an ERP 
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development, and the developed product is now increasingly sold out to other 
countries including Western countries. Thus, it shows the messy historical 
development of a “global” software product that originated unexpectedly in the 
politics of a local government organization. As we have seen, to a large extent some of 
the points I mentioned in this paragraph (exclusive focus on persuasion, lack of 
process model, and focus on single case study) are equally applicable to studies that 
focus on sociopolitical construction of IT implementation in general.  
 
Finally, there is an issue of organizational ethic. While ERP implementation affords 
increased monitorability, the group that could be most affected (e.g., group 4 and the 
operators in WestIndian case) is usually excluded from negotiations (Sawyer, 2001).  
The exclusion from participation, on one hand, creates an information asymmetry that 
may lead to inadvertent speculations, as it occurred in the case of group 4 members. 
On the other hand, the exclusion from participation and the intentional discursive 
domination severely limit the possibility of negotiation about the close monitoring of 
employees before it occurs. Thus, in effect, it leads to an increased monitoring of 
employees without negotiating this issue with them before hand. This should be an 
ethical concern for practitioners as well as academicians.  
 
7.4 Limitations and further research 
Although the unique context of my study enables me to make a number of theoretical 
and practical contributions, it may also limit the generalizability of the findings of this 
study. For example, the institutional closure and perceived technology non-affordance 
may not occur or play a significant role in other contexts. However, I tried to 
overcome this limitation through multiple levels of abstraction from the empirical 
data. Still, my findings may be confined to implementation of ERP or perhaps 
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implementation of configurable technologies such as ERP.  This limitation brings us 
to the possibility of further research. 
 
In order to understand and expand the explanatory power of the model and the 
concepts I generated in this study, this study should be repeated in other contexts, 
especially in Western contexts and larger corporations. Also, my study does not focus 
on both the upstream (for example, the vendor activities before ERP implementation) 
and the downstream (for example, the repeated use of the full-fledged ERP system) 
side of ERP implementation. Examination of these activities will help expand the 
process model to a historical model that captures the ‘complete biography’ of ERP 
technology (Pollock & Williams, 2009). It will also help to understand more fully the 
implications of the activities during ERP implementation (from starting of choice of 
the ERP system to its initial use) for working life in organizations. Also, although my 
study showed how worker identity production occurs during ERP implementation, it 
did not examine the intricacies of such politics. Drawing on the vast literature on 
identity construction and subjectivity, it may be possible to get into such intricacies.  
 
I have used technology frame as the theoretical lens for analysis. Another possible 
theoretical lens is institutional logics. Given that technology frame can embed logics 
of action (for example, task efficiency as the temporal logic of action that governed 
the technology frame of ERP as a delay reducer, and ERP as a discipline enabling 
agent) and that such logics of action are usually institutionalized within a community, 
(for example the ERP consultants), it may be possible to consider technology frame as 
a structural carrier of ‘institutional logics’ (Friedland & Alford, 1991).  Such an 
approach could bring out an interesting point that contradictory institutionalized 
temporal logics, for example, the temporal logics of efficiency that suggests a 
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temporal rigidity such as time bound action and schedule adherence versus the 
contrasting temporal logics of flexibility that suggest a temporal flexibility such as 
lack of time bound action and deviation from schedules, are co-mingled and encoded 
in the process of institutional change. 48The point that actors’ co-mingle contradictory 
institutional logics that results in institutional change point will be interesting since the 
much of the neo-institutional literature that use institutional logics to examine 
institutional change posits or argues that institutional change occurs when one logic 
wins over other competing logics (example, Seo & Creed, 2002; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005; for a review, see Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 I am indebted to Prof. Susan Newell for this point.  
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APPENDIX 6.1 
THE TUSSLE OVER PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL SYSTEM IN WESTINDIA 
During the initial years after the inception of WestIndia (i.e. 1996-1999), there was no 
formal Performance Appraisal System (PAS) for the line workers including machine 
operators. The operators complained about the lack of transparency in the promotion 
and production bonus (arguably based on job performance). As the grievance 
increased, the management instituted a formal PAS in 2003. Until the PAS was 
instituted there were frequent frictions between the Management represented by the 
Business manager and the non-managerial employees, especially over issue of salary 
increases, promotions, and bonuses. Once the PAS was instituted, the operators 
complained that the PAS was too subjective and non-transparent to them. Thus, again 
there were frictions between the management and the employees. There were ripples 
of these frequent frictions on the shopfloor. For example, there were frequent clashes 
between supervisors and operators (line workers) over performance appraisal. The 
operators used to accuse supervisors’ and engineers of subjective assessment and point 
to the subjective criteria in the appraisal form. It was said (and line workers agree) that 
the middle managers had improved the objectivity of the PAS by replacing some 
subjective criteria such as intelligence with objective criteria such as number of 
defective products produced per month. Still, there had been issues in assigning the 
reasons for failure to workmanship vs. machine problems vs. material problem. 
Absenteeism of the line workers had been another frequent headache for the 
management. The non-managerial employees as well as the managerial employees 
considered absenteeism mostly as an expression of employee resistance to the 
management policies. Before the Norwegian take-over, some of the workers had 
performed a go-slow strike to show their dissatisfaction over not getting salary hike 
and production bonus.  
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When the new MD took over, he called a meeting of all non-managerial employees 
and promised them his cooperation and a salary hike. In return, he asked for increase 
in production. The production shot up by 40% (Company document, 2007) and when 
ERP implementation just began (in August 2007), the line workers got a 10% salary 
hike.  Subsequently, in November 2007, supervisors got a 40% salary hike. The line-
workers had complained about the significant salary difference (and the percentage of 
salary hike)—2 times--between the line workers and the supervisors (having same 
number of years of experience). Now, the gap increased further and this, in turn, 
increased line workers’ grievance, which finally resulted in strikes and lay offs. Thus, 
during ERP implementation, unlike GovtIndia’s “peaceful labor-management 
relationship” the labor relation environment in WestIndia was “explosive”, as one 
engineer put it. 
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